ALL THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES,

PRONOUNCED

TO EXCITE THE ATHENIANS

AGAINST

PHILIP King of MACEDON.

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH,

By THOMAS LELAND, D.D.

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M.DCC.LXX.


BRITISH MUSEUM

TO

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

JAMES,

EARL OF

CHARLEMONT, *F. R. S.*

THE FOLLOWING

TRANSLATION

IS,

WITH A JUST RESPECT,

AND

SINCERE GRATITUDE,

INSCRIBED,

BY

HIS LORDSHIP's

DUTIFUL,

MOST OBLIGED,

AND

MOST OBEDIENT SERVANT,

THOMAS LELAND.


BRITISH MUSEUM

PREFACE.

TO animate a people renowned for juſtice, humanity, and valour, yet in many inſtances, degenerate and corrupted; to warn them, of the dangers of luxury, treachery, and bribery; of the ambition and perfidy of a powerful foreign enemy; to recal the glory of their anceſtors to their thoughts; and to inſpire them

with reſolution, vigour, and unanimity; to correct abuſes, to reſtore diſcipline, to revive and enforce the generous ſentiments of patriotiſm and public ſpirit:—Theſe were the great purpoſes for which the following Orations were originally pronounced. The ſubject therefore may poſſibly recommend them to a BRITISH reader, even under the diſadvantages of a tranſlation, by no means worthy of the famous original. His candor may pardon them; or ſometimes, perhaps, they may eſcape him, if he ſuffers his imagination to be poſſeſſed with that enthuſiaſm, which our orator is, of all others, moſt capable of inſpiring; and will, for a while, intereſt himſelf in the cauſe of Athens.

To the hiſtory of Greece, I muſt ſuppoſe he is no ſtranger. Yet, though it

it may not inform him, his memory may poſſibly be aſſiſted, by a ſummary review of the affairs and intereſts of that country; particularly of thoſe diviſions, which had a long time ſubſiſted between its principal ſtates, and on which Philip juſtly grounded his hopes of ſucceſs, in his attempts upon their liberties.

Theſe ſtates were LACEDEMON, ATHENS, and THEBES.

The firſt, famous for her antient kings, had acquired new ſplendor under the reign of Lycurgus. The wiſdom of the conſtitution which he eſtabliſhed, and the exact obedience paid to his laws, preſerved the ſtate from thoſe domeſtic diviſions which prevailed in other places; and the remarkable temperance of Sparta, the ſeve-

rity of her diſcipline, her public ſpirit, and concern for the liberty and happineſs of other communities, made her long revered as the parent of Greece. Her conſtitution, however, was not without its faults. Her government ſavoured of the humour of her inhabitants, who extended the ſame harſh ſeverity to their allies, which they uſed towards each other. Beſides, they were devoted to arms; and their conſtitution required continual wars for the preſervation of it. This made their government diſtaſteful, and favoured the ambition of the Athenians their rivals, who, though a more antient people, had, for many years, (through their weakneſs or diſorders) lived without any thought of command.

ATHENS was originally governed by kings; the laſt of whom ſacrificed his life to the good of his country; and upon his death, the Athenians took occaſion to aboliſh the royalty, and inſtituted their perpetual Archons, which were changed to a decennial, and afterwards to an annual magiſtracy. The ſtate, however, was not compleatly ſettled, until Solon, by his wiſe laws, reſtored the love of labour and huſbandry, opened a way for commerce, taught his countrymen to enrich themſelves, and found means to ſubdue their licentiouſneſs by the rules of juſtice, order, and diſcipline. Athens, thus reformed, was in a fair way of growing great and illuſtrious, when one of the citizens found means to ſeize the ſupreme power. The ſtruggles of the Athenians for liberty, againſt the ſucceſſors of this man, was one occaſion

of the Perſian war: the glorious exploits of which are too well known, to need a recital. The victories of Marathon, Salamis, and Platæa, the chief honour of which the Athenians aſſumed to themſelves, determined the character of that people; inſpired them with the higheſt notions of glory and honour, and at laſt prompted them to ſet up for ſovereign umpires of Greece.

SPARTA was willing to reſign to them the command of the ſea: but they would be abſolute in all. And as they had delivered Greece from the oppreſſion of the Barbarians, they thought themſelves entitled to oppreſs her in their turn They called themſelves protectors of the Grecian cities, but behaved like their lords; till at laſt, Sparta, urged by the complaints of ſeveral

veral ſtates, againſt the violence of Athens, began the famous Peloponneſian war, which was carried on with various ſucceſs, twenty-ſeven years. The unhappy expedition of the Athenians into Sicily, firſt ſhook their power; and the victory of Lyſander at Ægos-Potamos, entirely overthrew it.

By this event, however, Greece only changed her maſters. Sparta reſumed the ſuperiority; but her new reign laſted only thirty years. The Spartans were poſſeſſed with ſuch a prejudice in favour of their own form of government, that they attempted to aboliſh Democracy every-where: and while they impoſed their thirty tyrants upon Athens, eſtabliſhed a government of ten, in other ſtates, compoſed of men devoted to their intereſt. Thus they

became more abſolute, but at the ſame time more odious. Their proſperity made them preſume too much upon their ſtrength. Their forces were lent to ſupport the pretenſions of the younger Cyrus. Their king, Ageſilaus, was ſent into Perſia; where the GREAT KING could not put a ſtop to his progreſs, but by bribing the Greeks, and by that means, raiſing up enemies againſt Sparta.

The Greeks readily hearkened to his ſolicitations. The Athenians, at the head of the malecontents, reſolved to hazard every thing for liberty; and without reflecting on their late miſerable condition, preſumed to affront that ſtate which had reduced them to it. They knew ſo well to make a right uſe of the overſight the Spartans had committed, in provoking the great

King,

King, that, joining their force with the Perſian fleet, they defeated them, and rebuilt their walls: nor did they lay down their arms, till the Lacedemonians were obliged, by a ſolemn treaty, to reſtore the Grecian cities to their liberty. For although the Lacedemonians pretended a voluntary generoſity in this affair, yet it appeared by the conſequence, that fear only had obliged them to it; as they took an opportunity, ſome time after, to oppreſs Thebes, though expreſly comprehended in the treaty. This raiſed the ſtates of Greece againſt them. The Athenians (who always harboured the moſt inveterate hatred and jealouſy of them, and had lately been particularly provoked by an attempt of one of their generals to ſeize their port) ſet themſelves once more at the head of the confederacy; and took upon them-

themſelves the whole expence of the war; in which their arms were crowned with victories by ſea and land, at Corinth, Naxos, Corcyra, and Leucas. Thus were the Spartans obliged to renew the treaty, and the cities of Greece again reſtored to an entire independency.—Theſe bold efforts of the Athenians, to reduce the Spartan power, and to regain their former ſovereignty, are frequently extolled in the following Orations, as the glorious effects of their concern for the liberties of Greece.

And now the peace was juſt concluded, and the Greeks had the faireſt proſpect of enjoying it, when, on a ſudden, the Thebans ſtarted up, and aſſerted their claim to ſovereign power.

THEBES had, from the earlieſt ages, been ranked among the moſt conſiderable ſtates. The natural ſlowneſs and heavineſs of the inhabitants had, however, prevented them from aiming at any pre-eminence. In the Perſian war, they even had the baſeneſs to join with the Barbarians. And in order to ſcreen themſelves from the reſentment of the Athenians, on this account, they afterwards attached themſelves to Lacedemon; and continued firm, through the whole courſe of the Peloponneſian war. They ſhifted ſides however, ſome time after, and had ſome conteſts with the Lacedemonians. The ſeizing of their citadel, and the recovery of it out of the hands of the Lacedemonians by Pelopidas, had created a mutual hatred between theſe two ſtates. And the Thebans, naturally hardy and robuſt,

buſt, and grown experienced ſince the Peloponneſian war, (from which time their arms had been conſtantly exerciſed) now at length began to entertain thoughts of commanding. They refuſed to accede to the treaty negotiated by the Athenians, unleſs they were acknowledged chief of Bœotia. This refuſal not only expoſed them to the reſentment of the king of Perſia, (who was at that time particularly concerned that the Greeks ſhould be at peace) but raiſed Athens, Sparta, and indeed all Greece againſt them. The Lacedemonians declared war, and thinking them an eaſy victory, now that they were deſerted by their allies, marched their forces a conſiderable way into the Theban territory. Now it was, that Epaminondas firſt ſhone out in all his luſtre. He put himſelf at the head of the Thebans,

bans, and met the enemy at Leuctra; where he gave them a total overthrow. He then marched into Peloponneſus, and had well-nigh made himſelf maſter of the city of Sparta; relieved ſome people who had been oppreſſed by the Spartans; and by his juſtice and magnanimity, his extenſive abilities, and zealous concern for his country, promiſed to raiſe the Thebans to the moſt exalted degree of power and dignity; when in another engagement with the Lacedemonians at Mantinea, he fell, as it were, in the arms of victory.

The death of Epaminondas, and the peace which enſued, ſlackened the zeal of the principal powers of Greece, and rendered them too ſecure. The Athenians, particularly, (when they ſaw the fortune of Lacedemon at the loweſt ebb, and that on the part of Thebes,

Thebes, they were freed from all apprehenſions by the death of the general, the ſoul of their counſels and deſigns, were now no longer upon their guard, but abandoned themſelves to eaſe and pleaſure. Feſtivals and public entertainments engaged their attention, and a violent paſſion for the ſtage baniſhed all thoughts of buſineſs and glory. Poets, players, ſingers, and dancers were received with that eſteem and applauſe, which were due to the commanders who fought their battles. They were rewarded extravagantly, and their performances exhibited with a magnificence ſcarcely to be conceived. The treaſures which ſhould have maintained their armies, were applied to purchaſe ſeats in their theatres. Inſtead of that ſpirit and vigour which they exerted againſt the Perſian, they were poſſeſſed with indolence

lence and effeminacy; they had no further concern about the affairs of war, than juſt to keep a few foreign troops in pay; in ſhort, treachery, corruption, and degeneracy overſpread the ſtate.

But while they were ſinking into this condition, they found themſelves unexpectedly engaged with a very formidable enemy, PHILIP, king of the MACEDONIANS, a people hitherto obſcure, and in a manner barbarous: but now by the courage, activity, and conſummate policy of their monarch, ready to lay the foundation of a moſt extenſive empire.

PHILIP had been ſent early into Thebes, as an hoſtage, where he was ſo happy as to improve his natural abilities, by the inſtructions of Epaminondas.

minondas. The news of his brother Perdiccas being ſlain in a battle with the Illyrians, determined him to fly to the relief of his country: he eluded the vigilance of his guards, and eſcaped privately to Macedon; where taking advantage of the people's conſternation at the loſs of their king, and of the dangers they apprehended from an infant reign, he firſt got himſelf declared protector to his nephew, and ſoon after, king in his ſtead: and indeed the preſent condition of the Macedonians required a prince of his abilities. The Illyrians, fluſhed with their late victory, were preparing to march againſt them; the Pæonians harraſſed them with perpetual incurſions; and, at the ſame time, Pauſanias and Argæus, two of the royal blood, pretended to the crown; the

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one ſupported by Thrace, the other by Athens.

Under theſe circumſtances, Philip's firſt care was to gain the affections of his people, to raiſe their ſpirits, to train and exerciſe them, and to reform their military diſcipline. And now he began to diſcover thoſe abilities, which afterwards raiſed him to ſuch an height of power, and which were not to be expected in a prince of the age of twenty-two years.

The chief motive of the Athenians, in ſupporting the pretenſions of Argæus, was the hopes of getting poſſeſſion of Amphipolis, a city bordering on Macedon, which they had long claimed as their colony. It had ſometimes been in their hands, ſometimes ſubjected to Lacedemon, according to

the different changes of fortune of theſe ſtates. After the peace of Antalcidas, the Greeks acknowledged the pretenſions of the Athenians; and it was reſolved, that they ſhould be put in poſſeſſion of this city at the common charge. Probably the people of Amphipolis refuſed to ſubmit to their old maſters; for the Athenians were obliged to diſpatch Iphicrates thither with forces. But the Kings of Macedon now began to diſpute it with them. Perdiccas made himſelf maſter of it; and Philip would very gladly have kept it in his own hands; but this could not be done, without weakening his army, and incenſing the Athenians, whom his preſent circumſtances required him rather to make his friends: on the other hand, he could not think of ſuffering them to poſſeſs it, as it was the key to that ſide of his dominions.

nions. He therefore took a middle courſe, and declared it a free city: thereby leaving the inhabitants to throw off their dependance on their old maſters, and making it appear to be their own act. At the ſame time, he diſarms the Pæonians by the force of preſents and promiſes; and then turns his arms againſt the Athenians, who had marched to the aſſiſtance of Argæas. A battle enſued, in which Philip was victorious. By the death of Argæas, who fell in the action, he was freed from that diſpute; and by his reſpectful care of the Athenians, when he had them in his power, he ſo far gained upon that people, that they concluded a peace with him. He now found himſelf ſtrong enough to break with the Pæonians, whom he ſubdued; and having gained a compleat victory over the Illyrians, he obliged

them to reſtore all their conqueſts in Macedon. He alſo ſhut up the entrance of his kingdom againſt Pauſanias: but having provided for the ſecurity of it; in the next place, he thought of making it more powerful and flouriſhing.

The re union of Amphipolis he conſidered as the principal means to this end; and therefore, under pretence of puniſhing ſome wrongs, which he alledged againſt that city, he laid ſiege to it. The moment they perceived their danger, the people of Amphipolis ſent two of their citizens to Athens to ſollicit ſuccours: but, in order to prevent any oppoſition on the part of the Athenians, Philip gave them the ſtrongeſt aſſurances, that his ſole deſign was to put them in poſſeſſion of it the moment it was in his power:

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they therefore ſuffered him to make a conqueſt of it. But, inſtead of performing his promiſe, he proceeded to take from them Pydna and Potidæa, with which he purchaſed the friendſhip of the Olynthians, whom it concerned him at that time to oblige; the golden mines of Crenides fell next into his hands, and contributed greatly to his ſucceſſes.

The Athenians could not but be alarmed at the progreſs of this prince. His vigilance and activity, his policy and inſincerity, now began to appear dangerous; and councils were held to deliberate upon the meaſures proper to be taken. But although the Athenians were poſſeſſed with delicacy and ſenſibility, and entertained magnificent ideas of virtue and its duties, yet they wanted application, conſtancy, and

perſeverance. The good qualities which had long been the boaſt of that people, were now diſappearing, while their faults increaſed. Hence it was, that they eaſily ſuffered themſelves to be lulled into a falſe ſecurity. Beſides, they had enough of difficulty to ſupport their juriſdiction in other parts, and to bear up againſt a conſiderable revolt of their allies.

This revolt produced the war called the ſocial war; which laſted three years, and was ſucceeded by the Phocian or ſacred war, ſo called, becauſe begun from a motive of religion. The Phocians had plowed up ſome ground adjoining to the Temple of Apollo at Delphos, which their neighbours exclaimed againſt as ſacrilege, and was ſo judged by the council of Amphictyons, that venerable aſſembly, compoſed

poſed of repreſentatives from the principal ſtates of Greece, who ſat twice every year at Delphos and Thermopylæ. They laid a heavy fine upon them; but, inſtead of ſubmitting to the ſentence, the Phocians alledged, that the care and patronage of the temple belonged antiently to them, and encouraged by Philomelus, one of their principal citizens, took up arms to aſſert their claim. The ſeveral ſtates of Greece took part in this quarrel, as their intereſts and inclinations directed. Athens and Sparta, with ſome other of the Peloponneſians, declared for the Phocians. The Thebans were their principal oppoſers: and were aſſiſted by the Theſſalians, Locrians, and other neighbouring ſtates. At firſt Philomelus had ſome ſucceſs; but, in the ſecond year of the war, the

Thebans gave him a ſignal defeat, and he himſelf was killed in the purſuit.

In the mean time, Philip took no part in this war. He was well pleaſed that the parties ſhould exhauſt their ſtrength; and alſo had an opportunity of ſecuring and extending his frontier without interruption, by taking in ſuch places as were either convenient or troubleſome to him. Of this latter kind was the city of Methone, which after ſome reſiſtance he took and demoliſhed, annexing its lands to Macedon. During the ſiege, he was in imminent danger of his life, having loſt one of his eyes by an arrow. But it was not long before Philip had a fair opportunity of engaging as a party in the Phocian war. The Theſſalians, a people ſuſceptible of all impreſſions, and incapable of preſerving any;

equally

equally forgetful of benefits and injuries; ever ready to ſubmit to tyrants, and to implore the aſſiſtance of their neighbours to free them from ſlavery; had ſome time ſince been governed by Alexander of Pheræ, the moſt deteſtable tyrant ever known in Greece. He was diſpatched by Tiſiphonus, Lycophron and Pitholaus; who ſeized the government, and became equally intolerable. So that the nobility of Theſſaly, with the Aleuadæ, deſcendants from Hercules, at their head, declared againſt them, and implored the aſſiſtance of Philip. This prince willingly ſacrificed the hopes of extending his conqueſts in Thrace to the honour of aſſiſting the Aleuadæ, who were of the ſame race with him; and of imitating Pelopidas in giving liberty to Theſſaly. He had alſo long wiſhed to have the Macedonians conſidered as a

Grecian

Grecian people, and as he thought no opportunity could be ſo honourable and favourable, as to affect an intereſt of the affairs of Theſſaly, he readily marched againſt the tyrants, and ſoon diveſted them of all their authority.

But Philip's apparent danger from the wound which he received at Methone, imboldened Lycophron to reſume the ſovereign power. The Phocians (who after the death of Philomelus, had renewed the war with all imaginable vigour under Onomarchus) eſpouſed the cauſe of this tyrant: who had engaged the Theſſalians to obſerve a neutrality; and they in return ſupported him with all their power. Philip therefore now became involved in the general quarrel. At firſt, the Phocian general gained ſome advantages over him; but he afterwards had

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ſuch ſucceſs, as enlarged his views, and inſpired him with new hopes and expectations. He thought of nothing leſs than the conqueſt of Greece; and under pretence of marching againſt the Phocians, made a bold attempt to ſeize the famous paſs at Thermopylæ, which he juſtly called the key of Greece. This rouſed the Athenians from their lethargy. At the firſt news of his march, they flew to the paſs; and prevented his deſign, as he did not think it prudent to force his way.

We may reaſonably look on his retreat from Thermopylæ as the æra of Philip's hatred to the Athenians. He ſaw that they were the only people in Greece capable of defeating his projects, or of giving him uneaſineſs in his own kingdom: he therefore provided himſelf, with much diligence, a fleet

fleet compoſed of light ſhips, which might diſturb their trade, and at the ſame time inrich his ſubjects by bringing in prizes. He alſo increaſed his army; and projected the deſtruction of the Athenian colonies in Thrace. At the ſame time he practiſed very ſucceſsfully at Athens itſelf; and, by large appointments, ſecured ſome eminent orators, to charm the people with deluſive hopes of peace, or to frighten them with expenſive eſtimates while they pretended a zeal for the defence of the ſtate.

In a democratical government, like that of Athens, ELOQUENCE was the ſure means of recommending its poſſeſſor to the attention and regard of his fellow-citizens, and of raiſing him to all public honours and advantages. The gradual improvements of litera-

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ture had introduced and perfected the arts of moving and perſuading; and perhaps the diſorders of the ſtate contributed to make them more important; called forth a greater number of public ſpeakers, and opened a larger field for their abilities. Many of thoſe orators, who about that time took the lead in the Athenian aſſemblies, are loſt to poſterity. The characters, however, of the moſt eminent have been tranſmitted, or may be collected from the writings of antiquity.

DEMADES, by his birth and education, ſeemed deſtined to meanneſs and obſcurity: but as the Athenian aſſembly admitted perſons of all ranks and occupations, to ſpeak their ſentiments; his powers ſoon recommended him to his countrymen; and raiſed him from the low condition of a com-

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mon mariner, to the adminiſtration and direction of public affairs. His private life was ſtained with thoſe brutal exceſſes, which frequently attend the want of early culture, and an intercourſe with the inferior and leaſt refined part of mankind. His conduct, as a leader and miniſter, was not actuated by the principles of delicate honour and integrity: and his eloquence ſeems to have received a tincture from his original condition. He appears to have been a ſtrong, bold, and what we call a blunt ſpeaker; whoſe manner, rude and daring, and ſometimes bordering on extravagance, had oftentimes a greater effect than the more corrected ſtyle of other ſpeakers, who confined themſelves within the bounds of decorum and good breeding.

HYPERIDES,

HYPERIDES, on the contrary, was bleſſed with all the graces of refinement: harmonious, elegant, and polite; with a well-bred feſtivity, and delicate irony: excellent in panegyric; and of great natural abilities for affecting the paſſions. Yet his eloquence ſeems rather to have been pleaſing than perſuaſive. He is ſaid to have been not ſo well fitted for a popular aſſembly, and for political debates; as for private cauſes, and addreſſing a few ſelect judges. And even here, when he pleaded the cauſe of a woman, for whom he had the tendereſt paſſion; he was obliged to call the charms of his miſtreſs to the aſſiſtance of his eloquence; and was more indebted to theſe for his ſucceſs than to his own powers.

LYCURGUS

LYCURGUS had all the advantages which birth and education could afford for forming an orator. He was the hearer of Plato, and the ſcholar of Iſocrates. He ſeems to have been particularly affected by the charms of poetry, and the polite arts; nor was he leſs remarkable for diligence and attention; yet his influence in the aſſembly ſeems, like that of PHOCION, to have ariſen rather from a reſpect to his character, and the general opinion of his virtue and integrity, than from his abilities as a ſpeaker.

ÆSCHINES was an orator, whoſe ſtyle was full, diffuſive, and ſonorous. He was a ſtranger to the glowing expreſſions and daring figures of Demoſthenes, which he treats with contempt and ridicule. But, though more ſimple, he is leſs affecting: and, by being leſs

leſs contracted, has not ſo much ſtrength and energy. Or, as Quinctilian expreſſes it, *carnis plus habet, lacertorum minus.* But, if we would view his abilities to the greateſt advantage, we muſt not compare them with thoſe of his rival. Then will his figures appear to want neither beauty nor grandeur. His eaſy and natural manner will then be thought highly pleaſing: and a juſt attention will diſcover a good degree of force and energy in his ſtyle, which, at firſt, appears only flowing and harmonious.

But all the * ſeveral excellencies of his countrymen and cotemporaries were at leaſt equalled by DEMOSTHENES. His own no age or nation could attain to. From him, critics have form-

* *Nihil Lyſiæ ſubtilitate cedit; nihil argutiis & acumine Hyperidi; nihil lenitate Æſchini & ſplendore verborum.*
Cic. de Orat.

ed their rules; and all the maſters in his own art have thought it an honour to imitate him. To enlarge upon his character would be to reſume a ſubject already exhauſted by every critic, both antient and modern. Let it be ſufficient to ſay, that energy and majeſty are his peculiar excellencies. From the gravity of Thucydides, the pomp and dignity of Plato, the eaſe and elegance, the neatneſs and ſimplicity of the Attic writers, he formed a ſtyle and manner admirably fitted to his own temper and genius, as well as that of his hearers. His own ſeverity determined him to the more forcible methods of aſtoniſhing and terrifying, rather than to the gentle and inſinuating arts of perſuaſion: nor did the circumſtances and diſpoſitions of his countrymen admit of any but violent impreſſions. As many of thoſe to whom

whom he addreſſed himſelf were men of low rank and occupations, his images and expreſſions are ſometimes familiar. As others of them were themſelves eminent in ſpeaking, and could readily ſee through all the common artifices of oratory; theſe he affects to deſpiſe: appears only ſollicitous to be underſtood; yet, as it were without deſign, raiſes the utmoſt admiration and delight; ſuch delight as ariſes from the clearneſs of evidence, and the fulneſs of conviction. And as all, even the lower part of his hearers, were acquainted with the beauties of poetry, and the force of harmony; he could not admit of any thing rude or negligent; but with the ſtricteſt attention laboured thoſe compoſitions, which appear ſo natural and unadorned. They have their ornaments; but theſe are auſtere and manly, and ſuch as are

conſiſtent with freedom and ſincerity. A full and regular ſeries of diffuſive reaſoning would have been intolerable in an Athenian aſſembly. He often contents himſelf with an imperfect hint: a ſentence, a word, even his ſilence is ſometimes pregnant with meaning. And this quickneſs and vehemence flattered a people who valued themſelves on their acuteneſs and penetration. The impetuous torrent that in a moment bears down all before it; the repeated flaſhes of lightning, which ſpread univerſal terror, and which the ſtrongeſt eye dares not encounter, are the images, by which the nature of his eloquence hath been expreſſed.

As a ſtateſman and as a citizen, his conduct was no leſs remarkable. If the fire of his eloquence ſeems at ſome times abated, his judgment and accu-

racy

racy and political abilities are then conſpicuous. The bravery with which he oppoſed the paſſions and prejudices of his countrymen, and the *general* integrity of his character (to which Philip himſelf bare witneſs) are deſerving of the higheſt honour: and, whatever weakneſs he betrayed in his military conduct, his death muſt be acknowledged truly heroic.

The reader will obſerve, that the Oration, intitled, *On the Haloneſus*, is not admitted into the following collection. Some critics aſcribe it to * Hegeſippus, an Athenian orator, of inferior

* In the oration on the Haloneſus, the ſpeaker takes notice of his having been the manager of a proſecution againſt Calippus, on account of an illegal motion made by this man in the aſſembly, relative to the boundaries of Cardia. Hegeſippus was the perſon who conducted this proſecution. And this circumſtance, Libanius mentions, as having (together with the difference of ſtyle) induced the

inferior character. But, however this may be, it is certainly intirely different from thoſe compoſitions of Demoſthenes, which are confeſſedly genuine. That he really wrote an * Oration ſo intitled, the authority of the antient writers confirm, I think ſufficiently. But one would be tempted to believe, that the paſſages which they have

critics to aſcribe this oration, not to Demoſthenes, but to Hegeſippus. To this we may add another circumſtance of the like nature. The ſpeaker obſerves that he went on an embaſſy to Macedon, in order to obtain an explanation and amendment of ſome articles in the treaty concluded between Philip and the Athenians. Hegeſippus was at the head of this embaſſy; nor was Demoſthenes at all concerned in it; as appears from the oration of this latter (περὶ τῆς Παραπ.)

* Æſchines, in his oration on the embaſſy, mentions two particulars in that of Demoſthenes on the Haloneſus, neither of which are found in the oration now extant. The firſt is, that Demoſthenes treated Philip's ambaſſadors with great ſeverity, and inſiſted that they were really ſent as ſpies. The other, that he recommended to the Athenians by no means to ſubmit their diſputes with Philip to the deciſion of an umpire; for that no one impartial meditating ſtate could be found through Greece, ſo totally were the minds of all men corrupted by the Macedonian.

quoted,

quoted, had been taken up by ſome old ſcholiaſt, and inſerted in a performance of his own.

As to the tranſlation now offered to the public, the author has no doubt but that it will meet with all due indulgence from the ingenious and judicious reader. His ſentence muſt determine its fate; and to him it is implicitly ſubmitted.

THE FIRST

ORATION against PHILIP:

PRONOUNCED IN THE

ARCHONSHIP of ARISTODEMUS,

In the First Year of the Hundred and Seventh Olympiad, and the Ninth of PHILIP's Reign.

BRITISH MUSEUM

INTRODUCTION.

WE have ſeen Philip oppoſed in his deſign of paſſing into Greece, through Thermopylæ; and obliged to retire. The danger they had thus eſcaped deeply affected the Athenians. So daring an attempt, which was, in effect, declaring his purpoſes, filled them with aſtoniſhment: and the view of a power, which every day received new acceſſions, drove them even to deſpair. Yet their averſion to public buſineſs was ſtill predominant. They forgot that Philip might renew his attempt; and thought they had provided ſufficiently for their ſecurity, by poſting a body of troops at the entrance of Attica, under the command of Menelaus, a foreigner. They then proceeded to convene an aſſembly of the people, in order to conſider what meaſures were to be taken to check the progreſs of Philip.

lip. On which occaſion Demoſthenes, for the firſt time, appeared againſt that prince; and diſplayed thoſe abilities, which proved the greateſt obſtacle to his deſigns.

At Athens, the whole power and management of affairs were placed in the people. It was their prerogative to receive appeals from the courts of juſtice, to abrogate and enact laws, to make what alterations in the ſtate they judged convenient; in ſhort, all matters, public or private, foreign or domeſtic, civil, military, or religious, were determined by them.

Whenever there was occaſion to deliberate, the people aſſembled early in the morning, ſometimes in the forum or public place, ſometimes in a place called Pnyx, but moſt frequently in the theatre of Bacchus. A few days before each aſſembly there was a Προγραμμα *or Placart fixed on the ſtatues of ſome illuſtrious men erected in the city, to give notice of the ſubject to be debated. As they refuſed admittance into the aſſembly to all perſons who had not attained the neceſſary age, ſo they obliged all others to attend. The Lexiarchs ſtretched out a cord dyed with ſcarlet, and by it puſhed the people towards the place of meeting. Such as received the ſtain were fined; the more*

diligent

diligent had a ſmall pecuniary reward. Theſe Lexiarchs were the keepers of the regiſter, in which were inrolled the names of ſuch citizens as had a right of voting. And all had this right who were of age, and not excluded by a perſonal fault. Undutiful children, cowards, brutal debauchees, prodigals, debtors to the public, were all excluded. Until the time of Cecrops, women had a right of ſuffrage, which they were ſaid to have loſt, on account of their partiality to Minerva, in her diſpute with Neptune, about giving a name to the city.

In ordinary caſes, all matters were firſt deliberated in the ſenate of five hundred, *compoſed of fifty ſenators choſen out of each of the ten tribes. Each tribe had its turn of preſiding, and the fifty ſenators in office were called Prytanes. And, according to the number of the tribes, the Attic year was divided into ten parts, the four firſt containing thirty-ſix, the other thirty-five days; in order to make the Lunar year compleat, which, according to their calculation, contained one hundred and fifty-four days. During each of theſe diviſions, ten of the fifty Prytanes governed for a week, and were called Proedri: and, of theſe, he who in the courſe of the week preſided for one day, was called the*

the Epiſtate: three of the Proedri being excluded from this office.

The Prytanes aſſembled the people: the Proedri declare the occaſion; and the Epiſtatæ demand their voices. This was the caſe in the ordinary aſſemblies: the extraordinary were convened as well by the generals as the Prytanes; and ſometimes the people met of their own accord, without waiting the formalities.

The aſſembly was opened by a ſacrifice; and the place was ſprinkled with the blood of the victim. Then an imprecation was pronounced, conceived in theſe terms: May the Gods purſue that man to deſtruction, with all his race, who ſhall act, ſpeak, or contrive, any thing againſt this ſtate! *This ceremony being finiſhed, the Proedri declared the occaſion of the aſſembly, and reported the opinion of the ſenate. If any doubt aroſe, an herald, by commiſſion from the Epiſtatæ, with a loud voice, invited any citizen, firſt of thoſe above the age of fifty, to ſpeak his opinion: and then the reſt according to their ages. This right of precedence had been granted by a law of Solon, and the order of ſpeaking determined intirely by the difference of years. In the time of Demoſthenes, this law was*

not

not in force. It is ſaid to have been repealed about fifty years before the date of this oration. Yet the cuſtom ſtill continued out of reſpect to the reaſonable and decent purpoſe for which the law was originally enacted. When a ſpeaker has delivered his ſentiments, he generally called on an officer, appointed for that purpoſe, to read his motion, and propound it in form. He then ſat down, or reſumed his diſcourſe, and inforced his motion by additional arguments: and ſometimes the ſpeech was introduced by his motion thus propounded. When all the ſpeakers had ended, the people gave their opinion, by ſtretching out their hands to him whoſe propoſal pleaſed them moſt. And Xenophon reports, that, night having come on when the people were engaged in an important debate, they were obliged to defer their determination till next day, for fear of confuſion, when their hands were to be raiſed.

Porrexerunt manus, *ſaith Cicero (pro Flacco)* & Pſephiſma natum eſt. *And, to conſtitute this Pſephiſma or decree, ſix thouſand citizens at leaſt were required. When it was drawn up, the name of its author, or that perſon whoſe opinion has prevailed, was prefixed: whence, in ſpeaking of it, they call it his decree.*

cree. The date of it contained the name of the Archon, that of the day and month, and that of the tribe then preſiding. The buſineſs being over, the Prytanes diſmiſſed the aſſembly.

The reader who chuſes to be more minutely informed in the cuſtoms, and manner of procedure in the public aſſemblies of Athens, may conſult the Archæologia of Archbiſhop Potter, Sigonius, or the Concionatrices of Ariſtophanes.

PHI-

34 36 38 40

42 40 38 36

Labeatis Palus
Drilo fl.
ILLYRIS
Scupi
Boreas M.
Bylazora
Axius fl.
Stobi
Erigon fl.
Edessa
Sipontum
GRÆCIA
Barium
Venusia
Brundusium
ITALIA
Epidamnus
Parthium
Dauhia
Aulon
Tarentum
Hydrus
Grumentum
Buxentum
Callipolis
MAGNA
GRÆCIA
Cosentia
Buthrotum
EPIRUS
Olympus M.
Dolopes
Pencus fl.
Thesprotii
Pandosia
Molossi
Ambracia
Dodone
Pindus M.
Corcyra I.
MARE IONIUM
Cephalenia I
Leucas
Actium
ACARNANIA
Ithaca I.
Echinades I.
ÆTOLIA
Naupactus
Amphissa
LOCRI
Patræ
ACHAIA
ELIS
Elis
Zacynthus I.
Olympia
Pisa
Lepræum
Epiti
Macystus
Pylus
MESSENIA
Methone
Pheræ
Tænarium Pr.
SICULUM MARE
Sive
ADRIATICUM
SICILIA
Messana
Catana
Syracusæ

Tabula Cosmographica
GRAECIÆ
Antiquæ.

Scala Stadiorum Mille.
300 1000

40 42 44 46

TRIBALLI
Scupi
Pantalia
Scumus fl.
Hæmus M.
Hebrus fl.
Rhodope M.
Nestus fl.
Calybia
PONTUS EUXINUS
Bosphorus Thracius
Olympiada
THRACIA
Odrysæ
PÆONIA
ubi PÆONII
Pæoplæ
Doberæ
Phagræ
Pergamum
Mædi
Odomanti
Edoni
Satræ
Briantica
Bistonis L.
Regio
Pæti
Novem Viæ seu Amphipolis
Phillipi
Lyssirus
Mygdonia
Anthemus
Chalestra
Cresstonia
Abdera
Maronea
Strymon
Lisius fl.
Doriscus
Ænos
Cardia
M. Sacer
Selybria
Byzantium
Perinthus
Tiristasis
Pella
Bottiæi
Via Xerxis
Acanthus
Thasus I.
Serrium
Melanus Sinus
PROPONTIS
Proconnesus I.
Thermæa
Ænea
Chalcis
Mt. Athos
Cleonæ
Samothrace
Chersonesus
Ægos
Sestos
Madytos
Ichnæ
Olynthus
Potidæa
Imbros I.
Pydna
Lemnos I.
Eleus
Abydos
Lampsacus
Grynium
Olympus M.
Peræbi
Larissa
Pepareth us I.
Sigeum
Dardanus
Zelia
Ossa M.
Gonnus
Methone
Magnetes
Magnesia
Halonesus I.
Troia
Via Xerxis
Ida Mons
Pharsalus
Pagasæ
Sciathus I.
Tenedos I.
TROAS
Alexandria
THESSALIA
Halos
Sinus
Pelus M.
Antandrus
Cilicia
Othrys M.
Phthiotis
Agaficus
Adramyttium
Antron
Echinus
Skiros I.
Mysia
Thermopylæ
Vicæa
Attarnea
LOCRIS
Locri Epicnemidii
Delphi
Elatæa
Lesbus I.
Æolis
Amphissa
Cuma
Locri Ozolæ
PHOCIS
Chæroneæ
Orchomenus
Haliartus
Corycia
Chalcis
Porthmus
Tanagra
Eretria
Smyrna
Sardis
Hermus fl.
Lydia
Cirrha
Thebæ
Oropus
Chius I.
Gerestus P.
BÆOTIA
Platææ
Megara
Eleusis
Marathō
Ionia
Sicyon
Decelia
Rhamnus
Carystus
Colophon
Leucira
ATTICA
Andros I.
Ephesus
Meander
Corinthus
Isthmus
Salamis I.
Athenæ
Nemea
Argos
Aphidna
Cia I.
Icaria I.
Samus I.
Magnesia
PELOPONNESUS
ARGOLIS
Megalopolis
Epidaurus
Trœzen
Ægina
Tegea
Suniums P.
Tenos I.
Scyros I.
Caria
ARCADIA
Mantinea
Calauria I.
Miletus
LACONIA
Cythnus
Delos I.
Myconus I.
Cyclades I.
Icaria M.
Sparta seu Lacedæmon
Seriphus
Leria I.
Halicarnassus
Messena
Siphnus
Naxos I.
Ceramus
DORIS
Epidaurus
Melos I.
Claros
Malea Pr.
Cos I. seu Nymphæa I.
Gnidus
Ios I.
Sporades
Cythera I.
Thera I.
Astypalæa
Nisyrus I.
Rhodus I.
MARE CRETICUM
Dia I.
CARPATHIUM MARE
Cydonia
Carpathus I.
CRETA INS

40 42 44 46

T. Jefferys Sculp.

PHILIPPIC THE FIRST.

HAD we been convened, Athenians! on ſome new ſubject of debate, I had waited, until moſt of the uſual perſons had declared their opinions. If I had approved of any thing propoſed by them, I ſhould have continued ſilent: if not, I had then attempted to ſpeak my ſentiments. But ſince thoſe very points on which theſe ſpeakers have oftentimes been heard already are, at this time, to be conſidered; though [A] I have

 ariſen

[A] *Though I have ariſen firſt, &c.* Demoſthenes was at that time but thirty years old, which made it neceſſary for him to apologize for his zeal in riſing before the other ſpeakers: and the ingenious turn which he gives it, not only prevents any unfavourable impreſſion on the minds of his hearers, but engages their affection, and excites their attention,

ariſen firſt, I preſume I may expect your pardon: for if they on former occaſions had adviſed the neceſſary meaſures, ye would not have found it needful to conſult at preſent.

Firſt then, Athenians! theſe our affairs muſt not be thought deſperate; no, though their ſituation ſeems intirely deplorable. For the moſt ſhocking circumſtance of all our paſt conduct is really the moſt favourable to our future expectations. And what is this? That our own total indolence hath been the cauſe of all our preſent difficulties. For were we thus diſtreſſed, in ſpite of every vigorous effort which the honour of our ſtate demanded, there were then no hope of a recovery.

In the next place, reflect, (you who have been informed by others, and you who can yourſelves remember) [B] how great a power the

attention, by the tacit promiſe of better counſel, than they had hitherto received. TOURREIL.

[B] *How great a power, &c.* It has been already obſerved in the preface to theſe orations, that Demoſthenes takes many occaſions of extolling the efforts of Athens to reduce the Spartan power, and to regain that ſovereignty which they loſt by the victory of Lyſander at Ægos-Potamos. Theſe efforts he every-where repreſents as high inſtances

the Lacedemonians not long ſince poſſeſſed; and with what reſolution, with what dignity you diſdained to act unworthy of the ſtate, but maintained the war againſt them for the rights of Greece. Why do I mention theſe things? That ye may know, that ye may ſee, Athenians! that if duly vigilant, ye cannot have any thing to fear; that if once remiſs, not any thing can happen agreeable to your deſires: witneſs the then powerful arms of Lacedemon, which a juſt attention to your intereſts inabled you to vanquiſh: and this man's late inſolent attempt, which our inſenſibility to all our great concerns hath made the cauſe of this confuſion.

If there be a man in this aſſembly who thinks that we muſt find a formidable enemy in Philip, while he views, on one hand, the [c] numerous

ſtances of magnanimity and public ſpirit: though revenge and jealouſy had no leſs ſhare in them. The victories which the Athenians gained over Sparta at Corinth, Naxos, &c. and which he here alludes to, happened about twenty-four years before the date of this oration; ſo that he might well appeal to the memories of many perſons preſent.

[c] *The numerous armies, &c.* The number of Philip's forces at that time amounted to twenty thouſand foot and three thouſand horſe; a great army compared with thoſe of

numerous armies which attend him; and, on the other, the weakneſs of the ſtate thus deſpoiled of its dominions; he thinks juſtly. Yet let him reflect on this: there was a time, Athenians! when we poſſeſſed Pydna, and Potidæa, and Methonè, and all that country round: when many of thoſe ſtates now ſubjected to him were free and independent; and more inclined to our alliance than to his. Had then Philip reaſoned in the ſame manner, "How ſhall I dare to attack the Athenians, "whoſe garriſons command my territory, "while I am deſtitute of all aſſiſtance!" He would not have engaged in thoſe enterprizes which are now crowned with ſucceſs; nor could he have raiſed himſelf to this pitch of greatneſs. No, Athenians! he knew this well, that all theſe places are but [D] prizes, laid between the combatants, and ready for the conqueror: that the dominions of the abſent devolve naturally to thoſe who are in the

of the Greeks. At their march to Marathon, the Athenians could not aſſemble more than ten thouſand forces. TOURREIL.

[D] *But prizes, &c.* His hearers were of all others moſt devoted to public games and entertainments, and muſt therefore have been particularly ſenſible of the beauty of this image.

field;

field; the poſſeſſions of the ſupine to the active and intrepid. Animated by theſe ſentiments, he overturns whole countries; he holds all people in ſubjection: ſome, as by the right of conqueſt; others, under the title of allies and confederates: for all are willing to confederate with thoſe whom they ſee prepared and reſolved to exert themſelves as they ought.

And if you (my countrymen!) will now at length be perſuaded to entertain the like ſentiments: if each of you, renouncing all evaſions, will be ready to approve himſelf an uſeful citizen, to the utmoſt that his ſtation and abilities demand: if the rich will be ready to contribute, and the young to take the field: in one word, if you will be yourſelves, and baniſh thoſe vain hopes which every ſingle perſon entertains, that while ſo many others are engaged in public buſineſs, his ſervice will not be required; you then (if Heaven ſo pleaſes) ſhall regain your dominions, recal thoſe opportunities your ſupineneſs hath neglected, and chaſtiſe the inſolence of this man. For you are not to imagine, that, like a God, he is to enjoy his preſent greatneſs for ever fixed and unchangeable. No, Athenians!

there are, who hate him, who fear him, who envy him, even among thoſe ſeemingly the moſt attached to his cauſe. Theſe are paſſions common to mankind; nor muſt we think that his friends only are exempted from them. It is true they lie concealed at preſent, as our indolence deprives them of all reſource. But let us ſhake off this indolence! for you ſee how we are ſituated; you ſee the outrageous arrogance of this man, who does not leave it to your choice whether you ſhall act, or remain quiet; but braves you with his menaces; and talks [E] (as we are informed) in a ſtrain

[E] *And talks, (as we are informed, &c.* The ſucceſs which had hitherto attended Philip's arms, muſt naturally have inſpired him with thoſe deſigns which he afterwards executed againſt the Athenians: and reſentment of their late oppoſition at Thermopylæ might have made him leſs careful to conceal them, at leaſt in his own court. This the orator repreſents as *arrogant and extravagant menaces:* not that a man who had ſo juſt a conception of the weakneſs of the Athenian politics, and the vigour and abilities of their enemy, could really believe ſuch deſigns extravagant and romantic. But it was part of his addreſs ſometimes to avoid ſhocking the national vanity of his countrymen. After all their loſſes, and amidſt all their indolence, they could not entertain a thought ſo mortifying, as that the conquerors of Perſia and the arbiters of Greece could ever ſee their liberty eſſentially affected, or their power and glory intirely wreſted from them by a king of Macedon.

of

of the higheſt extravagance: and is not able to reſt ſatisfied with his preſent acquiſitions, but is ever in purſuit of further conqueſts; and while we ſit down, inactive and irreſolute, incloſes us on all ſides with his toils.

When therefore, O my countrymen! when will you exert your vigour? When rouſed by ſome event? When forced by ſome neceſſity? What then are we to think of our preſent condition? To freemen, the diſgrace attending on miſconduct, is, in my opinion, the moſt urgent neceſſity. Or ſay, is it your ſole ambition to wander through the public places, each inquiring of the other, "what new ad-"vices?" Can any thing be more new, than that a man of Macedon ſhould conquer the Athenians, and give law to Greece?—"Is "Philip dead? [F]—No, but in great dan-"ger."——How are you concerned in thoſe

[F] *Is Philip dead, &c.* Theſe rumours and inquiries of the Athenians were occaſioned by the wound Philip received at Methonè, the year before, and which was followed by a dangerous fit of ſickneſs.——Longinus quotes this whole paſſage as a beautiful inſtance of thoſe pathetic figures, which give life and force and energy to an oration. TOURREIL.

The Engliſh reader will find the remark in Sect. 18. of Mr. Smith's tranſlation.

rumours? Suppoſe he ſhould meet ſome fatal ſtroke: you would ſoon raiſe up another Philip, if your intereſts are thus regarded. For it is not to his own ſtrength that he ſo much owes his elevation, as to our ſupineneſs. And ſhould [G] ſome accident affect him, ſhould Fortune, who hath ever been more careful of the ſtate, than we ourſelves, now repeat her favours; (and may ſhe thus crown them!) be aſſured of this, that by being on the ſpot, ready to take advantage of the confuſion, you will every-where be abſolute maſters; but in your preſent diſpoſition, even if a favourable juncture ſhould preſent you with [H] Amphipolis,

[G] *Some accident, &c. If he ſhould die.* This is plainly the ſenſe of it: but it muſt be expreſſed covertly as Demoſthenes has done, not to tranſgreſs againſt that decorum which Cicero, ſays this orator, made his firſt rule. For there were certain things which the antients preſumed not to expreſs, but in terms obſcure and gentle; that they might not pronounce what were called *verba male ominata.* They did not dare to ſay to any perſon, *If you ſhould be killed*; *If you ſhould die:* they concealed as much as poſſible the melancholy and odious idea of an approaching, or even of a diſtant death. The Greeks ſaid εἴ τι πάθοις; the Romans, *ſi quid humanitus contingat.* OLIVET.

[H] *Preſent you with Amphipolis, &c.* They had nothing more at heart than the recovery of this city. So that the author

polis, you could not take poſſeſſion of it, while this ſuſpence prevails in your deſigns and in your councils.

author here gives the laſt and moſt heightening ſtroke to his deſcription of their indolence. TOURREIL.

And at the ſame time by artfully hinting at ſuch an event, as poſſible, he rouſes their attention, and enlivens their hopes and expectations.

The Italian commentator illuſtrates this paſſage in the following manner: Monet orator, quod quamvis accidat, ejuſdem, *(ſci. Amphipolis)* compotes fieri, ipſis tamen non ſatis id fore ad turbandas res Macedonicas; cum aliis tot locis, quæ memoravimus, privati, ad tantam rerum molem parum opis habere poſſint, ex una duntaxat civitate. Accordingly, the paſſage before us hath been rendered to this effect: *If ſome favourable conjuncture ſhould deliver up Amphipolis to you, &c. you could not receive the leaſt benefit from the poſſeſſion, with reſpect to Macedon.* The aſſertion of the orator, as expreſſed in the preſent tranſlation, hath been pronounced extraordinary, and the argument inconcluſive. The ſubſtance, therefore, of the preſent argument I ſhall here endeavour to collect: " You are all earneſt to be informed whether Philip be dead or no. But, unleſs you " change your meaſures, his death or life can make no " difference, or prove of any conſequence. Indeed, if " ſome accident ſhould take him off, nothing more would " be neceſſary to give you the full advantage of the confuſion, " which ſuch an event muſt occaſion, than to appear on " the frontier of Macedon with a powerful force. This " would make you abſolute maſters of the country. But, " in your preſent circumſtances, what would it avail, " even if ſuch a favourable incident, as that of Philip's " death, ſhould give you an opportunity of recovering " Amphipolis? So important an acquiſition (which would

" in

And now, as to the neceſſity of a general vigour and alacrity; of this you muſt be fully

" in a great meaſure inable you to command all Macedon) " muſt ſtill be loſt; unleſs you had your forces ready, you " could not take poſſeſſion of it." Whether there be any thing unreaſonable in this aſſertion, or impertinent in this argument, muſt be ſubmitted to the reader. With deference to his judgment, I muſt declare, that it appears, to me, to have rather more force, and to ſet the fatal conſequence of the indolence and irreſolution of the Athenians in a ſtronger light, than the other interpretation; whoſe propriety may be at once determined, by comparing the paſſage with the ſentence immediately preceding. In that, the orator declares, that, in caſe of Philip's death, the Athenians had no more to do, but to appear on the frontier of Macedon, in order to gain the abſolute diſpoſal of the affairs of that kingdom: Ἴσθ' ὅτι πλησίον μὲν ὄνλες, ἅπασιν ἂν τοῖς πράγμασι τεταραγμένοις ἐπιστάνλες, ὅπως βέλεσθε διοικήσαισθε. We muſt, therefore, be at ſome pains to clear Demoſthenes of the ſuſpicion of inconſiſtency, if the very next ſentence be underſtood, as containing a declaration, That although the Athenians ſhould not only appear upon the borders of Macedon, but there poſſeſs themſelves of a poſt of the utmoſt conſequence, ſtill they could derive no advantage from their acquiſition, far from having the whole kingdom at their diſpoſal. What ſeems to have tempted the Italian commentator to ſuggeſt this interpretation, is, the expreſſion, διδόνλων ὑμῖν τῶν καιρῶν Ἀμφίπολιν, *if ſome conjunctures ſhould* GIVE *you Amphipolis*: which he takes in a literal ſenſe. But the genius of ſpirited eloquence, and of our orator in particular, fully warrants us to regard it only as a lively figure, and to underſtand no more by *giving up*, than, *affording a favourable opportunity of gaining*.

perſuaded:

perſuaded: this point therefore I ſhall urge no further. But the nature of the armament, which, I think, will extricate you from the preſent difficulties, the numbers to be raiſed, the ſubſidies required for their ſupport, and all the other neceſſaries; how they may (in my opinion) be beſt and moſt expeditiouſly provided; theſe things I ſhall endeavour to explain.——But here I make this requeſt, Athenians! that you would not be precipitate, but ſuſpend your judgment 'till you have heard me fully. And if, at firſt, I ſeem to propoſe a new kind of armament, let it not be thought that I am delaying your affairs. For it is not they who cry out "inſtantly! "this moment!" whoſe counſels ſuit the preſent juncture (as it is not poſſible to repel violences already committed, by any occaſional detachment) but he who will ſhew you, of what kind that armament muſt be, how great, and how ſupported, which may ſubſiſt until we yield to peace, or 'till our enemies ſink beneath our arms, for thus only can we be ſecured from future dangers.—Theſe things, I think, I can point out: not that I would prevent any other perſon from declaring his opinion,—Thus far am I engaged: how I

can

can acquit myſelf, will immediately appear: to your judgments I appeal.

Firſt then, Athenians! I ſay that you ſhould fit out fifty ſhips of war: and then reſolve, that on the firſt emergency you will embark yourſelves. To theſe I inſiſt that you muſt add tranſport and other neceſſary veſſels ſufficient for half our horſe. Thus far we ſhould be provided againſt thoſe ſudden excurſions from his own kingdom to Thermopylæ, to [I] the Cherſoneſus, to [K] Olynthus, to whatever places he thinks proper. For of this he ſhould neceſſarily be perſuaded, that poſſibly you may break out from this immoderate indolence,

[I] *To the Cherſoneſus.* The year before, Cerſobleptes, unable to defend this country againſt Philip, had put the Athenians in poſſeſſion of it. Cardia, one of the chief cities, refuſed to acknowledge theſe new ſovereigns, and had recourſe to the protection of Philip, who, under pretence of ſupporting them, carried his arms into the Cherſoneſus. TOURREIL.

[K] *To Olynthus.* Philip had already committed ſome acts of hoſtility againſt this ſtate, but had not as yet formed the ſiege of Olynthus, or taken any meaſures tending to it: for in ſuch a caſe Demoſthenes would not have touched ſo lightly upon an enterprize, which he afterwards dwells upon ſo often, and with ſo much force. TOURREIL.

dolence, and fly to ſome ſcene of action: as you did to [L] Eubœa, and formerly, as we are

[L] *To Eubœa, &c.* Monſ. Tourreil tranſlates this paſſage thus: *et qu'il riſque de retrouver en vous ces mêmes Athéniens qu'il rencontra ſur ſon chemin en Eubée*, &c. (for which there is no warrant in the original) and taking for granted that all the expeditions here mentioned were made againſt Philip, he endeavours to ſettle the date of this to Eubœa by conjecture. But it does not appear from hiſtory that Philip carried his arms into that iſland, before his attempt on Thermopylæ. In the three ſucceeding olynthiac orations there is not the leaſt mention of ſuch a thing, though there is a particular recital of his expeditions in the third, and though afterwards the orator inveighs loudly againſt his hoſtile attempts in Eubœa. I apprehend therefore, that the expedition hinted at in this place was that which the Athenians made about ſeven years before in favour of the Eubœans againſt Thebes: when in five days they brought an army into Eubœa, and in thirty obliged the Thebans to come to terms, and evacuate the iſland: (according to Æſchines.)—Demoſthenes mentions this in other places; particularly about the end of the oration on the ſtate of the Cherſoneſus: where he quotes part of the ſpeech made by Timotheus to encourage the Athenians to this expedition.

In the above note, I have endeavoured to ſuggeſt ſome reaſons why the expeditions, here alluded to, could not have been made againſt Philip. But it hath been affirmed, that, if this were ſo, it would be almoſt impertinent in our orator to mention them. That, as facts, they muſt be found ſpiritleſs, if taken in a general ſenſe, and, as arguments, inconcluſive. The tranſlator can, with ſincerity, declare, that, if any repreſentation of his tends, in the leaſt,

are told, to [M] Haliartus, and but now, to Thermopylæ. But although we ſhould not act with all this vigour, (which yet I muſt regard

leaſt, to depreciate the value of the great original, he readily gives it up, as utterly erroneous and indefenſible. But, at the ſame time, he muſt obſerve, that if it be a fault to make uſe of ſuch facts, and ſuch arguments, it is a fault which Demoſthenes has frequently committed. Thus he ſpeaks of the vigorous oppoſition of his countrymen to the Lacedemonians; of their marching againſt the Corinthians and Megareans; of their expelling the Thebans from Eubœa, &c. In the ſecond Philippic oration, he tells his countrymen, that the Macedonian muſt regard them as the great and ſtrenuous defenders of Greece; becauſe he muſt be informed of the ſpirit which their anceſtors diſcovered, in the days of his predeceſſor Alexander. If we are not to allow the orator to reaſon, from the conduct of his cotemporaries, on former occaſions, to the conduct which they ought to purſue, or which may be expected from them, in their conteſt with Philip, what ſhall we ſay of an argument deduced from their anceſtors in the heroic age of Athens? The truth ſeems to be, that although the facts, ſuppoſed to be alluded to in this paſſage, had been paſſed over by hiſtorians; (which I cannot admit) yet, we are not, from hence, to conclude that they had no weight or importance in the Athenian aſſembly. We are not to judge of the light in which they appeared there, from the obſcurity into which diſtance of time and place may have now caſt them. The reaſons of this are obvious.

[M] *To Haliartus.* Tourreil refers this to ſome action which he ſuppoſes might have happened in Bœotia in the courſe of the Phocian war: and in which the Athenians might

regard as our indiſpenſable duty) ſtill the meaſures I propoſe will have their uſe: as his fears may keep him quiet, when he knows we are prepared: (and this he will know, for there are too [N] too many among ourſelves, who inform him of every thing) or if he

might have had their ſhare of the honour. But from the text it ſhould ſeem that the event alluded to muſt have happened at ſome conſiderable diſtance of time, and have deſcended to the orator by tradition.——About forty years before this oration, when Thebes and Sparta began to quarrel, Lyſander, the Spartan general, threatened the Thebans with a very dangerous war, and began with laying ſiege to this city of Haliartus. The Thebans applied for aid to the Athenians, which they readily granted, (though the Thebans had juſt before preſſed for the utter demolition of their ſtate) and obliged Pauſanias to raiſe the ſiege, after Lyſander had been killed.———I apprehend, that this is the expedition here alluded to. It was the more remarkable as the Athenian power was then at the loweſt ebb. "You Athenians! (ſays Demoſthenes in his oration on the crown) "at a time when the Lacedemo-"nians had the abſolute command both at ſea and land; "when Attica was quite encompaſſed with their com-"manders and their garriſons; when Eubœa, Tanagra, "all Bœotia, Megara, Ægina, Cleone, and the other "iſlands were in their poſſeſſion, when the ſtate had not "one ſhip, not one wall,———*Ye marched out to Ha-"liartus*, &c."

[N] *Too many, &c.* He glances particularly at Ariſtodemus and Neoptolemus. As to Æſchines, he had not been with Philip till ſix years after. TOUR.

ſhould

ſhould deſpiſe our armament, his ſecurity may prove fatal to him; as it will be abſolutely in our power, at the firſt favourable juncture, to make a deſcent upon his own coaſts.

Theſe then are the reſolutions I propoſe, theſe the proviſions it will become you to make. And I pronounce it ſtill farther neceſſary to raiſe ſome other forces which may harraſs him with perpetual incurſions. Talk not of your ten thouſands, or twenty thouſands of foreigners; of [o] thoſe armies which

[o] *Thoſe armies which, &c.* In the Greek it is ἐπιστολιμαίκς δυνάμεις.——Inſtead of enumerating the various ſenſes in which the commentators interpret this expreſſion, I ſhall copy an obſervation on it by the Abbé D'Olivet, whoſe interpretation I have followed:—— "I have without any refinement choſe a plain expreſſion, "which ſeems to hit the thought of Demoſthenes di- "rectly, and to paint ſtrongly the bitter ridicule of the "paſſage. It was uſual for the Athenians, upon any "emergency, to write to all quarters to demand ſoldiers. "They were anſwered, that in ſuch a place ſuch a "number would be provided: from another place, ſo "many more might be expected. But in the end it ap- "peared, that theſe were by no means ſo many effective "men. There were great abatements to be made from the "numbers promiſed, and we find beſides from this ora- "tion, that theſe foreigners were not paid at all, or ill "paid;

which appear ſo magnificent on paper; but let them be the natural forces of the ſtate: and if you chuſe a ſingle perſon, if a number, if this particular man, or whomever you appoint as general, let them be intirely under his guidance and authority. I alſo move you that ſubſiſtence be provided for them. But as to the quality, the numbers, the maintenance of this body: how are theſe points to be ſettled?——I now proceed to ſpeak of each of them diſtinctly.

The body of infantry therefore—But here give me leave to warn you of an error, which hath often proved injurious to you. Think not that your preparations never can be too magnificent: great and terrible in your decrees; in execution weak and contemptible. Let your preparations, let your ſupplies at firſt be moderate; and add to theſe if you find them not ſufficient.—— I ſay then that the whole body of infantry ſhould be two thouſand: of theſe, that five

" paid; ſo that theſe grand armies were no where com-
" pleat, but in the *letters* written to demand them on one
" part, and to promiſe them on the other. If I am not
" miſtaken, this is, what Demoſthenes calls, δυνάμεις
" ἐπιστολιμαίας, *armies which exiſt only in letters.*"

hundred ſhould be Athenians, of ſuch an age as you ſhall think proper; and with a ſtated time for ſervice, not long, but ſuch as that others may have their turn of duty. Let the reſt be formed of foreigners. To theſe you are to add two hundred horſe, fifty of them at leaſt Athenians; to ſerve in the ſame manner as the foot. For theſe you are to provide tranſports.—And now, what farther preparations?——Ten light gallies. For as he hath a naval power, [P] we muſt be provided with light veſſels, that our troops may have a ſecure convoy.

But whence are theſe forces to be ſubſiſted? this I ſhall explain, when I have firſt given my reaſons, why I think ſuch numbers ſufficient, and why I have adviſed that we ſhould ſerve in perſon. As to the numbers, Athenians! my reaſon is this: it is not at preſent in our power to provide a force able to meet him in the open field: but we muſt harraſs him by depredations: thus the war muſt be carried on at firſt. We therefore cannot think of raiſing a prodigious army,

[P] *As he hath a naval power.* In conſequence of his engagements with the Theſſalians, he commanded their ports and ſhips.

(for

for ſuch we have neither pay nor proviſions) nor muſt our forces be abſolutely mean. And I have propoſed that citizens ſhould join in the ſervice, and help to man our fleet; becauſe I am informed that, ſome time ſince, the ſtate maintained a body of auxiliaries at [Q] Corinth, which [R] Polyſtratus commanded, and Iphicrates, and Chabrias, and ſome others; that you yourſelves ſerved with them; and that the united efforts of theſe auxiliary and domeſtic forces gained a conſiderable victory over the Lacedemonians. But, ever ſince our armies have been formed of foreigners alone, their victories have been over our allies and confederates; while our enemies have ariſen to an extravagance of power. And theſe armies, with ſcarcely the ſlighteſt attention to the ſervice of the ſtate,

[Q] *At* Corinth. This was in the ſame war which he alludes to in the beginning of the oration, (Sec. 2.) Corinth was appointed as the place of general rendezvous for the Greeks who confederated againſt Sparta.

[R] *Which* Polyſtratus *commanded.* Inſtead of Polyſtratus, which is a name little known in hiſtory, Monſieur Tourreil propoſes to read Calliſtratus, who according to Xenophon and Diodorus was collegue to Iphicrates and Chabrias, in the war of Corcyra. But, as Mr. Mounteney has obſerved, Polyſtratus is again mentioned by Demoſthenes, together with Iphicrates, in the oration on the immunities; ſo that it is probable this is the true reading.

ſail off to[s] fight for Artabazus, or any other perſon: and their general follows them: nor ſhould we wonder at it; for he cannot command, who cannot pay his ſoldiers. What then do I recommend? that you ſhould take away all pretences both from generals and from ſoldiers, by a regular payment of the army, and by incorporating domeſtic forces with the auxiliaries, to be as it were inſpectors into the conduct of the commanders. For at preſent our manner of acting is even ridiculous. If a man ſhould aſk, "are you at peace, Athenians?" the anſwer would immediately be, "by no

[s] *To fight for* Artabazus. He here alludes to an affair which had happened ſome time before, and had occaſioned great commotion. The Athenians had ſent Chares at the head of a powerful force to reduce Byzantium, Cos, and Chios, which had revolted from them. But this general, when he had a proſpect of ſucceſs in that enterprize, ſuffered himſelf to be corrupted by Artabazus, a rebellious Satrap of Aſia, and aſſiſted him againſt an army of ſeventy thouſand men. Chares received a reward proportioned to the ſervice; but this action raiſed the indignation of the Athenians; as he had not only deſerted the cauſe of the republic, but alſo incenſed the king of Perſia. Demoſtenes, however, here ſhifts the blame from Chares to his ſoldiers, who refuſed to obey him: [or rather to the people, who took no care to provide for their pay.]

"means!

"means! we [T] are at war with Philip. "Have not we choſen [U] the uſual generals "and officers both of horſe and foot?" And of what uſe are all theſe, except the ſin-

[T] *We are at war with* Philip. So the orator affects to ſpeak. Though I apprehend it does not appear from hiſtory, that they were at that time *directly* at war with him. They had indeed joined with the Phocians, and Philip was at the head of the oppoſite confederacy. Thus far they were engaged againſt each other, though neither of them, as principals in the quarrel. The Athenians indeed might have made ſome attempts to recover Amphipolis; they certainly made ſome ineffectual preparations to relieve Potidæa and Methone: and, after Philip's attempt on Thermopylæ, did ſtation ſome forces upon their frontiers, to oppoſe him, in caſe he renewed his attack. But ſtill the war was not declared in form.——But of this I ſhall ſpeak more hereafter.

[U] *The uſual officers.* In the text they are mentioned particularly. Ten Taxiarchs, Στρατηγοὶ or generals, and Phylarchs, and two Hipparchs. Each of the ten tribes choſe a new general every year; and each of theſe [originally, when all went to the field,] had the command for one day in his turn. Philip was very pleaſant on this number of commanders. *I never* (ſaid he) *could find but one general*, (meaning Parmenio) *but the Athenians can get ten every year.* Antiently the people upon extraordinary occaſions choſe a Polemarch, to determine, when the opinions of the generals were equally divided. The Taxiarch commanded the infantry; the Phylarch, the cavalry of his tribe. The whole body of horſe was divided into two corps, each of which was commanded by a general of horſe, or Hipparch. TOUR.

gle perſon whom you ſend to the field? the reſt attend your prieſts in their proceſſions. So that, as if you formed ſo many men of clay, you make your officers for ſhew, and not for ſervice. My countrymen! ſhould not all theſe generals have been choſen from your own body; all theſe ſeveral officers, from your own body, that our force might be really Athenian? and yet, for an expedition in favour of [x] Lemnos, the general muſt be a citizen, while troops, engaged in defence of our own territories, are commanded [y] by Menelaus. I ſay not this to detract from his merit; but to whomſoever this command had been intruſted, ſurely he ſhould have derived it [z] from your voices.

[x] *In favour of* Lemnos. When, in the ſocial war, the revolters invaded it with a fleet of an hundred ſail. TOUR.

[y] *By* Menelaus. Monſieur Tourreil ſays, that this Menelaus was the brother of Philip by another marriage. But, though Philip and his brother were not on good terms, yet it is not likely that the Athenians would have truſted one ſo nearly allied to their enemy. OLIVET.

[z] *From your voices.* The regular method of chuſing all officers. However, the choice was ſometimes left to the commander in chief. TOUR.

[A] Per-

[A] Perhaps you are fully ſenſible of theſe truths; but would rather hear me upon another point; that of the ſupplies; what we are to raiſe, and from what funds. To this I now proceed.——The ſum therefore neceſſary for the maintenance of theſe forces, that the ſoldiers may be ſupplied with grain, is ſomewhat above [B] ninety talents. To the ten gallies, forty talents, that each veſſel may have a monthly allowance of twenty minæ. To the two thouſand foot, the ſame ſum, that each ſoldier may receive ten drachmæ a month for corn. To the two hundred horſe, for a monthly allowance of thirty drachmæ each, twelve talents. And let it not be thought a ſmall convenience, that the ſoldiers are ſupplied with grain: for I am clearly ſatisfied, that, if ſuch a pro-

[A] *Perhaps you are fully*, &c. It is not impoſſible but that the people might have been ſtruck with the freedom and candour of the orator; and given ſome marks of their approbation.

[B] *Ninety talents.* The Attic talent is computed by Tourreil equal to 187 *l.* 10 *s.* by Prideaux, to 188 *l.* 6 *s.* by Arbuthnot, to 193 *l.* 15 *s.* It contained ſixty minæ, and each mina, one hundred drachmæ. By the computation of the orator, it appears that the proviſions he recommends to be ſupplied, were to laſt one year. MOUNTENEY. [A]

viſion be made, the war itſelf will ſupply them with every thing elſe, ſo as to compleat their appointment, and this without any injury to the Greeks or allies: and I myſelf am ready to ſail with them, and to anſwer for the conſequence with my life, ſhould it prove otherwiſe. From what funds the ſum which I propoſe may be ſupplied, ſhall now be explained. * * * * *.

[*Here the ſecretary of the aſſembly reads a ſcheme for raiſing the ſupplies, and propoſes it to the people in form, in the name of the orator.*]

[c] Theſe are the ſupplies, Athenians! in our

[c] *Theſe are the ſupplies*, &c. Dionyſius of Halicarnaſſus gives us the reſt of this oration as a ſixth Philippic, pronounced in the Archonſhip of Themiſtocles. But it appears to me, as well as to the other interpreters, a natural concluſion of the firſt Philippic; and therefore I could not not prevail upon myſelf to ſeparate them. TOUR.

The ſcholiaſt is of the ſame opinion, and flatly accuſes Dionyſius of a miſtake. Mr. Mounteney has expreſſed greater deference for this critic. He ſuppoſes that this ſecond part is not that which Dionyſius quotes; but that there was another oration ſince loſt, which began with the ſame words; for he obſerves that the former part is plainly imperfect of itſelf, and the two parts are joined in all the copies

our power to raiſe. And, when you come to give your voices, determine upon ſome effectual

copies and manuſcripts, and that naturally and conſiſtently.

I muſt confeſs (with all ſubmiſſion to theſe authorities) that although I could not preſume to ſeparate them, yet I am not quite ſatisfied that theſe two parts are one oration. In the firſt place, I cannot think that the firſt Philippic would end abruptly, if this ſecond part was away: for we find, in the firſt part, all that the orator propoſes to ſpeak to in the beginning; and it concludes (not unlike a ſpeech in parliament) with a motion in form, for ſuch and ſuch ſubſidies to be raiſed, for the maintenance of ſuch and ſuch forces. And as to the manner in which the ſecond part begins, ſuppoſing it a diſtinct oration, we cannot object to that; as Dionyſius quotes an oration beginning exactly in the ſame manner: (ſee his letter to Ammæus)——It might alſo be obſerved that in the beginning of the oration, having for ſome time exhorted the Athenians to change their conduct, and act with vigour, Demoſthenes ſays expreſsly, that he intends to ſpeak no more on that ſubject: and yet this ſecond part is entirely taken up with it: and laſtly, there are ſome paſſages in the ſecond part, which I ſuſpect do not agree to the particular time, when the firſt oration againſt Philip was pronounced: (and I imagine that ſome editors were ſenſible of this, by their placing the Olynthiac orations before this which is called the firſt Philippic) theſe paſſages I ſhall take notice of as they occur.

As to any ſimilitude between the two parts, I apprehend that is no more than what runs through all theſe orations, and may be accounted for, from the ſimilitude

of

effectual [D] proviſion, that you may oppoſe Philip, not by decrees and letters only, but by actions. And, in my opinion, your plan of operation, and every thing relating to your armament, will be much more happily adjuſted, if the ſituation of the country which is to be the ſcene of action, be taken into the account; and if you reflect, that the winds and ſeaſons have greatly contri-

of the ſubject, without joining them.——But if this ſecond part be really a diſtinct oration, ſpoken after the deſtruction of Olynthus, (for this city was taken the year before the Archonſhip of Themiſtocles) how comes it that this event is not mentioned in it?——It had juſt then thrown the Athenians into the greateſt conſternation; and, as it was the orator's buſineſs to encourage them, poſſibly he might have kept it out of view on purpoſe. Though perhaps he does hint at it obſcurely, and as far as was conſiſtent with prudence, as I ſhall obſerve by and by.

[D] *Effectual proviſion.* In the Greek it is—— ἃ ἂν ὑμῖν ἀρέσκῃ Χειροτονήσατε —— *chuſe thoſe things which may be agreeable to you.* I own I do not ſee how their entering into the reſolution they liked beſt, would of conſequence inable them to oppoſe Philip effectually. Perhaps it might be of diſſervice, for in other places the orator is ever cautioning them againſt following the bent of their inclinations.——If we ſhould make a very ſmall alteration in the text, and for ἀρέσκῃ read ἀρκέσῃ——*thoſe things which may be ſufficient for your purpoſes*; I apprehend the ſenſe would be better and more agreeable to Demoſthenes. I have taken the liberty to tranſlate after this reading.

buted

buted to the rapidity of Philip's conqueſts; that he watches the blowing [E] of the Eteſians, and the ſeverity of the winter, and forms his ſieges when it is impoſſible for us to bring up our forces. It is your part then to conſider this, and not to carry on the war by occaſional detachments, (they will ever arrive too late) but by a regular army conſtantly kept up. And for winter-quarters you may command Lemnos, and Thaſſus, and Sciathus, and the adjacent iſlands; in which there are ports and proviſions, and all things neceſſary for the ſoldiery in abundance. As to the ſeaſon of the year, in which we may land our forces with the greateſt eaſe, and be in no danger from the winds, either upon the coaſt to which we are bound, or at the entrance of thoſe harbours where we may put in for proviſions——this will be eaſily diſcovered. In what manner, and at what time, our

[E] *Of the* Eteſians. Winds which blew regularly every year at the riſing of the dog-ſtar; when the Greeks were obliged to retire from action, on account of the exceſſive heats, and which, as they blew from the North, of conſequence oppoſed any attempt of invading Macedon, or ſending any forces to thoſe parts, which were the ſeat of Philip's wars at firſt.

forces

forces are to act, their general will determine, according to the junctures of affairs. What you are to perform, on your part, is contained in the decree I have now propoſed. And if you will be perſuaded, Athenians! firſt, to raiſe theſe ſupplies which I have recommended, then, to proceed to your other preparations, your infantry, navy, and cavalry; and laſtly to confine your forces, by a law, to that ſervice which is appointed to them; reſerving the care and diſtribution of their money to yourſelves, and ſtrictly examining into the conduct of the general; then, your time will be no longer waſted in continual debates upon the ſame ſubject, and ſcarcely to any purpoſe; then, you will deprive him of the moſt conſiderable of his revenues. For his arms are now ſupported, by ſeizing and making prizes of thoſe who paſs the ſeas. —But is this all?—No.—You ſhall alſo be ſecure from his attempts: [F] not as when ſome

[F] *Not as when ſome time ſince*, &c. If this be really a part of the firſt Philippic, theſe hoſtilities muſt have preceded the attempt on Thermopylæ: (elſe the orator could not have diſtinguiſhed them into thoſe which happened *ſome time ago*, and that committed *lately*) Now I cannot tell how to reconcile ſuch open acts of hoſtility with the other

ſome ſince, ſince he fell on Lemnos and Imbrus, and carried away your citizens in chains: not as when he ſurpriſed your veſſels at Geraſtus, and ſpoiled them of an unſpeakable quantity of riches: not as when lately he made a deſcent on the coaſt of Marathon, and carried off [G] our ſacred galley:

other parts of Philip's conduct, at that time. There was a peace ſubſiſting between him and the Athenians, which he affected to obſerve, and ſo far does he appear from making any open and profeſſed attack upon them, that, in the taking of Potidæa and Pyndа, he would not a ctas principal, but as ally to the Olynthians; and, when, theſe cities were taken, diſmiſſed the Athenian garriſons, with all imaginable reſpect and honour; and, upon all occaſions, courted and cajoled the Athenians. This then is one of thoſe paſſages, which I ſuſpect do not agree to the particular time, when the firſt Philippic was ſpoken. But if we ſuppoſe, that this which I call the ſecond part, is really the oration which Dionyſius quotes, (and which was ſpoken to engage the Athenians, to defend the iſlanders and the cities of the Helleſpont againſt the attempts of Philip) then all the difficulty vaniſhes. The hoſtilities here mentioned agree very well to a time of open war. Now, Diodorus Siculus informs us, that it was after Olynthus was taken, that the Athenians declared war againſt Philip in form; and we find, that immediately upon this, he attacked them and their tributary ſtates with ſuch fury, that they were ſoon glad to ſue for peace.

[G] *Our ſacred galley.* There were two of theſe appropriated to religious ceremonies, [and all extraordinary emergencies

galley: while you could neither oppoſe theſe inſults, nor detach your forces at ſuch junctures as were thought convenient.

And now, Athenians! what is the reaſon, (think ye) that the public [H] Feſtivals in honour of Minerva and of Bacchus are always celebrated at the appointed time, whether the direction of them falls to the lot of men of eminence, or of perſons leſs diſtinguiſhed: (feſtivals which coſt more treaſure than is uſually expended upon a whole navy; and more numbers and greater preparations, than any one perhaps ever coſt) while your expeditions have been all too late, as that to Methone, that to Pegaſæ, that to Potidæa. The reaſon is this: every thing relating to the former is aſcertained by law; and every one of you knows long before, who is [I] to conduct the ſeveral enter-

emergencies and occaſions of the ſtate] the Paralian and the Salaminian. Harpocration underſtands here the Paralian. TOUR.

[H] *Feſtivals*, &c. For the Panathenæa and Dionyſia, (as theſe feſtivals are called in the original) I refer the reader to Potter, and other writers on the antiquities of Greece.

[I] *To conduct*, &c. In the original it is *who is the Choragus*, (that is the citizen who provided the muſic, of which

entertainments in each tribe; what he is to receive, when, and from whom, and what to perform. Not one of theſe things is left uncertain, not one undetermined. But in affairs of war, and warlike preparations, there is no order, no certainty, no regulation. So that, when any accident alarms us, firſt, [K] we appoint our Trierarchs; then we allow them the EXCHANGE; then the ſupplies are conſidered. Theſe points once ſettled, [L] we reſolve to man our fleet with ſtrangers

which each tribe had a band) *and the Gymnaſiarch*, (he who preſided over the wreſtlers, and provided what was neceſſary for that entertainment.)

[K] *We appoint our Trierarchs.* The rich citizens who were obliged not only to command, but to equip a veſſel of war, at their own expence (either ſeverally, or jointly) for the ſervice of the public. As this was an office of great expence, it was allowed to any one who was nominated, to point out ſome citizen richer than himſelf, and to deſire he might be ſubſtituted in his place, provided he was willing to exchange fortunes with that citizen, and then to take upon him the office of Trierarch. This is what Demoſthenes calls *allowing the exchange*, [which in its nature muſt have occaſioned confuſion and delay.]

For a fuller account of theſe Trierarchs, &c. I refer the reader to Potter's Archæ.

[L] *We reſolve to man our fleet with ſtrangers*, &c. Μίσθιοι, which I tranſlate *Strangers*, were thoſe foreigners who

ſtrangers and foreigners; then, find it neceſſary to ſupply their place ourſelves. In the midſt of theſe delays, what are we ſailing to defend, the enemy is already maſter of: for the time of action we ſpend in preparing: and the junctures of affairs will not wait our ſlow and irreſolute meaſures. Theſe forces too, which we think may be depended on, until the new levies are raiſed, when put to the proof plainly diſcover their inſufficiency. By theſe means, hath he arrived to ſuch a pitch of inſolence, as to ſend [M] a letter to the Eubœans, conceived in ſuch terms as theſe:

The

who were permitted to ſojourn at Athens, on certain conditions.

This whole paſſage is an exact deſcription of the proceedings of the Athenians in defence of Olynthus, and of the event. I had it in view, when I obſerved that poſſibly we might find ſome obſcure alluſions to that affair.

[M] *A letter to the* Eubœans, *&c.* This letter has not deſcended to us. It is probable from the context, that he expreſſed in it a contempt for the Athenian power, and inſiſted how little dependance the Eubœans could have on that ſtate. And, if this be ſo, it confirms an obſervation, which I made before (ſee a note on page 5.) viz. that the Athenians had as yet given Philip no remarkable oppoſition in Eubœa.—The letter muſt have been written, when Philip began to raiſe commotions in that iſland, in order to

make

* * * *The* LETTER *is read.*

What hath now been read, is for the moſt part true, Athenians! too true! but perhaps not very agreeable in the recital. But if, by ſuppreſſing things ungrateful to the ear, the things themſelves could be prevented, then the ſole concern of a public ſpeaker ſhould be to pleaſe. If, on the contrary, theſe unſeaſonably pleaſing ſpeeches be really injurious, it is ſhameful, Athenians, to deceive yourſelves, and, by deferring the conſideration of every thing diſagreeable, never once to move until it be too late; and not to apprehend that they who conduct a war with prudence, are not to follow, but to direct events; to direct them with the ſame abſolute authority, with which a general leads on his forces: that the courſe of affairs may be determined by them, and not determine their meaſures. But you, Athenians, al-

make himſelf maſter of it. I am induced to think, both from hiſtory and Demoſthenes, that he did not make any attempts of this kind, ſo early as the firſt Philippic, and therefore that this is no part of that oration.

though [N] poſſeſſed of the greateſt power of all kinds, ſhips, infantry, cavalry, and treaſure; yet, to this day, have never employed any of them ſeaſonably, but are ever laſt in the field. Juſt [O] as barbarians engage at boxing, ſo you make war with Philip: for, when one of theſe receives a blow, that blow engages him: if ſtruck in another part, to that part his hands are ſhifted: but to ward off the blow, or to watch his antagoniſt——for this, he hath neither ſkill nor ſpirit. Even ſo, if you hear that Philip is in the Cherſoneſus, you reſolve to ſend forces thither; if in Thermopylæ, thither; if in any other place, you hurry up and down, you

[N] *Poſſeſſed of the greateſt power*, &c. They could then command three hundred ſhips of war, and thoſe capable of engaging a navy of double that number; they had twenty thouſand foot, and two thouſand eight hundred horſe: and their revenue amounted to above twelve hundred talents. TOUR. and MOUNT.

[O] *As barbarians*, &c. The learned reader will find a beautiful paſſage in Aulus Gellius, (l. 3. c. 27.) where on the contrary, a man of true prudence who engages in the buſineſs and dangers of the world, is compared to a ſkilful boxer, who is ever attentive to defend himſelf and annoy his adverſary. TOUR.

follow

follow his ſtandard. But no uſeful ſcheme for carrying on the war, [P] no wiſe proviſions are ever thought of, until you hear of ſome enterpriſe in execution, or already crowned with ſucceſs. This might have formerly been pardonable, but now is the very critical moment, when it can by no means be admitted.

It ſeems to me, Athenians, that ſome divinity, who, from a regard to Athens, looks down upon our conduct with indignation, hath inſpired Philip with this reſtleſs ambition. For were he to ſit down in the quiet enjoyment of his conqueſts and acquiſitions, without proceeding to any new attempts, there are men among you, who, I think, would be unmoved [Q] at thoſe tranſactions, which have branded our ſtate with the odious marks of infamy, cowardice, and all that is baſe. But as he ſtill purſues his conqueſts, as he is ſtill

[P] *No wiſe proviſions*, &c. I have followed the reading which Mr. Mounteney adopts, Περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων, &c. inſtead of Χρημάτων.

[Q] *At thoſe tranſactions*, &c. The taking of Pydna and Potidæa, and Amphipolis, may warrant what the orator here ſays. Yet I ſhould chuſe to apply it to their ſuffering Olynthus by their miſconduct to fall under the power of Philip.

extending his ambitious views, poſſibly, he may at laſt call you forth, unleſs you have renounced the name of Athenians. To me it is aſtoniſhing, that none of you [R] looks back to the beginning of this war, and conſiders that we engaged in it to chaſtiſe the inſolence of Philip; but that now it is become a defenſive war, to ſecure us from his attempts. And that he will ever be repeating theſe attempts is manifeſt, unleſs ſome power riſes to oppoſe him. But, if we wait in expectation of this, if we ſend out armaments compoſed of empty gallies,

[R] *Looks back to the beginning*, &c. I ſhall trouble the reader but with one argument more, in favour of my ſuſpicion, that this is no part of the firſt Philippic. The paſſage I now quote, I cannot think, is applicable to the tranſactions of the Athenians and Philip, before his attempt on Thermopylæ: when (from the time of Argæus's death) they acted againſt each other only indirectly; and, inſtead of puniſhing Philip, the Athenians could not even prevail upon themſelves to defend thoſe dominions which they claimed as their own.——But it is a very exact deſcription of what happened after their declaration of war againſt Philip, which ſucceeded the taking of Olynthus: for this declaration was made from a ſenſe of the danger of Philip's growing power, a reſentment of his infractions, and a reſolution to reduce him: and yet they were quickly obliged to defend themſelves againſt farther attempts.

gallies, and thoſe hopes with which ſome ſpeaker may have flattered you; can you then think your intereſts well ſecured? ſhall we not embark? ſhall we not ſail, with at leaſt a part of our domeſtic force, now, ſince we have not hitherto? — But where ſhall we make our deſcent? —— Let us but engage in the enterpriſe, and the war itſelf, Athenians, will ſhew us where he is weakeſt. But if we ſit at home, liſtening to the mutual invectives and accuſations of our orators; we cannot expect, no, not the leaſt ſucceſs, in any one particular. Wherever a part of our city is detached, although the whole be not preſent, the favour of the Gods and the kindneſs of fortune attend to fight upon our ſide; but when we ſend out a general, and an inſignificant decree, and the hopes of our ſpeakers, misfortune and diſappointment muſt enſue. Such expeditions are to our enemies a ſport, but ſtrike our allies with deadly apprehenſions. For it is not, it is not poſſible for any one man to perform every thing you deſire. He may promiſe, and harangue, and accuſe this or that perſon: but to ſuch proceedings we owe the ruin of our affairs. For when a general who commanded a wretched col-

lection of unpaid foreigners, hath been defeated; when there are perſons here, who, in arraigning his conduct, dare to advance falſehoods, and when you lightly engage in any determination, juſt from their ſuggeſtions; what muſt be the conſequence? How then ſhall theſe abuſes be removed? ——By offering yourſelves, Athenians, to execute the commands of your general, to be witneſſes of his conduct in the field, and his judges at your return: ſo as not only to hear how your affairs are tranſacted, but to inſpect them. But, now, ſo ſhamefully are we degenerated, that each of our commanders is twice or thrice called before you to anſwer for his life, though not one of them dared to hazard that life, by once engaging his enemy. No; they chuſe the death of robbers and pilferers, rather than to fall as becomes them. Such malefactors ſhould die by the ſentence of the law. Generals ſhould meet their fate bravely in the field.

Then, *as to your own conduct* —— ſome wander about, crying, Philip hath joined with the Lacedemonians, and they are concerting the deſtruction of Thebes; and

[s] the

[s] the diſſolution of ſome free ſtates. Others aſſure us he hath ſent an embaſſy [t] to the KING; others, that [u] he is fortifying places in Illyria. Thus we all go about framing our ſeveral tales. I do believe indeed, Athenians! he is intoxicated with his greatneſs, and does entertain his imagination with many ſuch viſionary proſpects, as he ſees no power riſing to oppoſe him, and is elated with his ſucceſs. But I cannot be perſuaded that he hath ſo taken his meaſures, that the weakeſt among us know what he is next to do: (for it is the weakeſt among us who ſpread theſe rumours)—Let us diſregard them: let us be perſuaded of this, that he is our enemy, that he hath

[s] *The diſſolution*, &c. Wherever the Lacedemonians had power, they were always for eſtabliſhing oligarchies, as has been obſerved in the preface to theſe orations.

[t] *To the king.* So the king of Perſia was called. —— The intent of this embaſſy was ſuppoſed to be to make ſuch demands, as muſt produce a war with the Perſian, which Iſocrates had exhorted him to very early.

[u] *He is fortifying places in* Illyria. Poſſibly theſe rumours were ſpread by Philip's friends, to perſuade the Athenians, that his views and ſchemes were removed to a great diſtance from Athens.

ſpoiled us of our dominions, that we have long been ſubject to his inſolence, that whatever we expected to be done for us by others, hath proved againſt us, that all the reſource left is in ourſelves, that, if we are not inclined to carry our arms abroad, we may be forced to engage here——let us be perſuaded of this, and then we ſhall come to a proper determination, then ſhall we be freed from thoſe idle tales. For we are not to be ſolicitous to know what particular events will happen; we need but be convinced nothing good can happen, unleſs you grant the due attention to affairs, and be ready to act as becomes Athenians.

I, on my part, have never upon any occaſion choſen to court your favour, by ſpeaking any thing but what I was convinced would ſerve you. And, on this occaſion, I have freely declared my ſentiments, without art, and without reſerve. It would have pleaſed me indeed, that, as it is for your advantage to have your true intereſt laid before you, ſo I might be aſſured that he who layeth it before you, would ſhare the advantage: for then I had ſpoken with greater alacrity. However, uncertain as is the conſequence

ſequence with reſpect to me, I yet determined to ſpeak, becauſe I was convinced that theſe meaſures, if purſued, muſt have their uſe. And, of all thoſe opinions which are offered to your acceptance, may that be choſen, which will beſt advance the general weal!

End of the FIRST PHILIPPIC.

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End of the FIRST PHILIPPIC.

2 AP 57

THE FIRST

OLYNTHIAC ORATION:

PRONOUNCED


Four Years after the FIRST PHILIPPIC,

IN THE

ARCHONSHIP of CALLIMACHUS,

THE

Fourth Year of the Hundred and Seventh
OLYMPIAD,
and the Twelfth of PHILIP's REIGN.



INTRODUCTION.

THE former oration doth not appear to have had any conſiderable effect. Philip had his creatures in the Athenian aſſembly, who probably recommended leſs vigorous meaſures, and were but too favourably heard. In the mean time, this prince purſued his ambitious deſigns. When he found himſelf ſhut out of Greece, he turned his arms to ſuch remote parts, as he might reduce without alarming the ſtates of Greece. And, at the ſame time, he revenged himſelf upon the Athenians, by making himſelf maſter of ſome places which they laid claim to. At length his ſucceſs imboldened him to declare thoſe intentions which he had long entertained ſecretly againſt the Olynthians.

Olynthus

INTRODUCTION.

Olynthus (a city of Thrace poſſeſſed by Greeks originally from Chalcis,—a town of Eubœa and colony of Athens) commanded a large tract called the Chalcidian region, in which there were thirty-two cities. It had ariſen by degrees to ſuch a pitch of grandeur, as to have frequent and remarkable conteſts both with Athens and Lacedemon. Nor did the Olynthians ſhew great regard to the friendſhip of Philip when he firſt came to the throne, and was taking all meaſures to ſecure the poſſeſſion of it. For they did not ſcruple to receive two of his brothers by another marriage, who had fled to avoid the effects of his jealouſy; and endeavoured to conclude an alliance with Athens, againſt him, which he, by ſecret practices, found means to defeat. But as he was yet ſcarcely ſecure upon his throne, inſtead of expreſſing his reſentment, he courted, or rather purchaſed, the alliance of the Olynthians, by the ceſſion of Anthemus, a city, which the kings of Macedon had long diſputed with them, and afterwards, by that of Pydna and Potidæa; which their joint forces had beſieged and taken from the Athenians. But the Olynthians could not be influenced by gratitude towards ſuch a benefactor. The rapid progreſs of his arms and his glaring acts of perfidy alarmed them exceedingly.

ingly. He had already made ſome inroads on their territories, and now began to act againſt them with leſs reſerve. They therefore diſpatched ambaſſadors to Athens, to propoſe an alliance, and requeſt aſſiſtance againſt a power which they were equally concerned to oppoſe.

Philip affected the higheſt reſentment at this ſtep; alledged their mutual engagements to adhere to each other in war and peace, inveighed againſt their harbouring his brothers, whom he called the conſpirators; and, under pretence of puniſhing their infractions, purſued his hoſtilities with double vigour, made himſelf maſter of ſome of their cities, and threatened the capital with a ſiege.

In the mean time, the Olynthians preſſed the Athenians for immediate ſuccours. Their ambaſſadors opened their commiſſion in an aſſembly of the people, who had the right either to agree to, or to reject their demand. As the importance of the occaſion increaſed the number of ſpeakers, the elder orators had debated the affair before Demoſthenes aroſe. In the following oration therefore he ſpeaks as to a people already informed, urges the neceſſity of joining with the Olynthians, and confirms his opinion by

powerful

powerful arguments; lays open the designs and practices of Philip, and labours to remove their dreadful apprehensions of his power. He concludes with recommending to them to reform abuses, to restore ancient discipline, and to put an end to all domestic dissensions.

THE

[A] THE FIRST

OLYNTHIAC ORATION.

IN many inſtances, (Athenians!) have the Gods, in my opinion, manifeſtly declared their favour to this ſtate: nor is it leaſt obſervable in this preſent juncture. For that an enemy ſhould ariſe againſt Philip, on the very confines of his kingdom, of no inconſiderable power, and, what is of moſt importance, ſo determined upon the war, that they

[A] I have diſpoſed the Olynthiac orations in the order pointed out by Dionyſius of Halicarnaſſus. And it plainly appears that this ſhould precede the others, for, in this, Demoſthenes ſolicits the immediate concluſion of an alliance with Olynthus: in the others, he ſuppoſes the alliance already concluded, and inſiſts only on the neceſſity of effectually fulfilling their engagements.

conſider any accommodation with him, firſt as inſidious, next, as the downfall of their country: this ſeems no leſs than the gracious interpoſition of Heaven itſelf. It muſt, therefore, be our care, (Athenians!) that we ourſelves may not fruſtrate this goodneſs. For it muſt reflect diſgrace, nay the fouleſt infamy upon us, if we appear to have thrown away not thoſe ſtates and territories only which we once commanded, but thoſe alliances and favourable incidents, which fortune hath provided for us.

To begin on this occaſion with a diſplay of Philip's power, or to preſs you to exert your vigour, by motives drawn from hence, is, in my opinion, quite improper. And why? Becauſe whatever may be offered upon ſuch a ſubject, ſets him in an honourable view, but ſeems to me, as a reproach to our conduct. For the higher his exploits have ariſen above his former eſtimation, the more muſt the world admire him: while your diſgrace hath been the greater, the more your conduct hath proved unworthy of your ſtate. Theſe things therefore I ſhall paſs over. He indeed, who examines juſtly, muſt find the ſource of all his greatneſs here, not in himſelf. But the

the ſervices he hath here received, from thoſe whoſe public adminiſtration hath been devoted to his intereſt; thoſe ſervices which you muſt puniſh, I do not think it ſeaſonable to diſplay. There are other points of more moment for you all to hear; and which muſt excite the greateſt abhorrence of him, in every reaſonable mind.—Theſe I ſhall lay before you.

And now, ſhould I call him perjured and perfidious, and not point out the inſtances of this his guilt, it might be deemed the mere virulence of malice, and with juſtice. Nor will it engage too much of your attention to hear him fully and clearly convicted, from a full and clear detail of all his actions. And this I think uſeful upon two accounts: firſt, that he may appear, as he really is, treacherous and falſe; and then, that they who are ſtruck with terror, as if Philip was ſomething more than human, may ſee that he hath exhauſted all thoſe artifices to which he owes his preſent elevation; and that his affairs are now ready to decline. For I myſelf (Athenians!) ſhould think Philip really to be dreaded and admired, if I ſaw him raiſed by honourable means. But I find, upon reflection,

that at the time when certain perſons drove out the Olynthians from this aſſembly, when deſirous of conferring with you, he began with abuſing our ſimplicity by his promiſe of ſurrendering Amphipolis, and executing the [B] ſecret article of his treaty, then ſo much ſpoken of: that, after this, he courted the friendſhip of the Olynthians by ſeizing Potidæa, where we were rightful ſovereigns, deſpoiling us his former allies, and giving them poſſeſſion: that, but juſt now, he gained the Theſſalians, by promiſing to give up [C] Magneſia; and, for their eaſe, to take the whole conduct of the Phocian war upon himſelf.

[B] *The ſecret article, &c.* When Philip had declared Amphipolis a free city, the Athenians, who were deſirous of recovering it, ſent ambaſſadors to Philip to ſolicit his aſſiſtance for that purpoſe: and on this condition promiſed to make him maſter of Pydna. But, leſt the people of Pydna, who were averſe to Philip's government, ſhould take the alarm, the whole negotiation was tranſacted ſecretly in the ſenate, without being referred as uſual to the aſſembly of the people.—This account Ulpian and Suidas cite from Theopompus.

[C] *Magneſia.* He had made himſelf maſter of this city, when he marched into Theſſaly againſt the Tyrants. The Theſſalians remonſtrated againſt this proceeding, but ſuffered themſelves to be amuſed by his aſſurances that he would give it up: while he really determined to keep poſſeſſion of it.

In a word, there are no people who ever made the leaſt uſe of him, but have ſuffered by his ſubtlety: his preſent greatneſs being wholly owing to his deceiving thoſe who were unacquainted with him, and making them the inſtruments of his ſucceſs. As theſe ſtates therefore raiſed him, while each imagined he was promoting ſome intereſt of theirs; theſe ſtates muſt alſo reduce him to his former meanneſs, as it now appears that his own private intereſt was the end of all his actions.

Thus then, Athenians! is Philip circumſtanced. If not, let the man ſtand forth, who can prove to me, I ſhould have ſaid to this aſſembly, that I have aſſerted theſe things falſely; or that they whom he hath deceived in former inſtances, will confide in him for the future; or that the Theſſalians, who have been ſo baſely, ſo undeſervedly [D] inſlaved,

[D] *Inſlaved.* When Philip had diſpoſſeſſed the Tyrants of Theſſaly, he began to ſet himſelf up in their place; but not by open force. He was ſo compleat a maſter of diſſimulation, appeared ſo gentle, ſo affable, ſo humane, ſo amiable, even to the conquered, that the Theſſalians gave themſelves up to him, with an intire confidence: which he knew how to take the advantage of.

TOURREIL.

would not gladly embrace their freedom.— If there be any one among you, who acknowledges all this, yet thinks that Philip will ſupport his power, as he hath ſecured places of ſtrength, convenient ports, and other like advantages; he is deceived. [E] For when forces join in harmony and affection, and one common intereſt unites the confederating powers, then they ſhare the toils with alacrity, they endure the diſtreſſes, they perſevere. But when extravagant ambition, and lawleſs power, (as in his caſe) have aggrandiſed a ſingle perſon; the firſt pretence, the ſlighteſt accident, overthrows him, and all his greatneſs is daſhed at once

[E] *For when forces, &c.* I need not take notice to the learned reader, how highly this paſſage is ornamented in the original, by the beauty of the metaphors, the grandeur of the compoſition, and the fineneſs of the ſentiment. The word ἀνεχαίτισε, by which he expreſſes the downfal of Philip, I apprehend, is not to be rendered into our, or perhaps any other language. It gives us the idea of a generous ſteed, toſſing his mane, impatient of the bit, and caſting his rider to the ground: which at once expreſſes the ſubjection of the ſtates conquered by Philip, their impatience of his government, their bold effort to regain their liberty, and the downfal of their maſter. The change of tenſes [ἀνεχαίτισε καὶ διέλυσεν] adds greatly to the force and beauty: it ſeems as if the deſtruction of Philip was too quick for words.

to the ground. For it is not, no, Athenians! it is not poſſible to found a laſting power upon injuſtice, perjury, and treachery. Theſe may perhaps ſucceed for once; and borrow for a while, from hope, a gay and flouriſhing appearance. But time betrays their weakneſs; and they fall into ruin of themſelves. For, as in ſtructures of every kind, the lower parts ſhould have the greateſt firmneſs, ſo the grounds and principles of actions ſhould be juſt and true. But theſe advantages are not found in the actions of Philip.

I ſay then, that you ſhould diſpatch ſuccours to the Olynthians: (and the more honourably and expeditiouſly this is propoſed to be done, the more agreeably to my ſentiments) and ſend an embaſſy to the Theſſalians, to inform ſome, and to inliven that ſpirit already raiſed in others: (for it hath actually been reſolved to demand the reſtitution of [F] Pagaſæ, and to aſſert their claim to Magneſia.) And let it be your care, Athe-

[F] *Pagaſæ.* A city of Theſſaly, which he had made himſelf maſter of five years before.

TOURREIL.

nians, that our ambaſſadors may not depend only upon words, but give them ſome action to diſplay, by taking the field in a manner worthy of the ſtate, and engaging in the war with vigour. For words, if not accompanied by actions, muſt ever appear vain and contemptible; and particularly when they come from us, whoſe prompt abilities, and well-known eminence in ſpeaking, make us to be always heard with the greater ſuſpicion.

Would you indeed regain attention and confidence, your meaſures muſt be greatly changed, your conduct totally reformed; your fortunes, your perſons, muſt appear devoted to the common cauſe; your utmoſt efforts muſt be exerted. If you will act thus, as your honour and your intereſt require; then, Athenians! you will not only diſcover the weakneſs and inſincerity of the confederates of Philip, but the ruinous condition of his own kingdom will alſo be laid open. The power and ſovereignty of Macedon may have ſome weight indeed, when joined with others. Thus, when you marched againſt the Olynthians under the conduct of Timotheus, it proved an uſeful ally; when united with the Olynthians againſt Potidæa,

dæa, it added ſomething to their force; juſt now, when the Theſſalians were in the midſt of diſorder, ſedition, and confuſion, it aided them againſt the family of their tyrants: (and in every caſe, any, even a ſmall acceſſion of ſtrength, is, in my opinion, of conſiderable effect.) But of itſelf, unſupported, it is infirm, it is totally diſtempered: for by all thoſe glaring exploits, which have given him this apparent greatneſs, his wars, his expeditions, he hath rendered it yet weaker than it was naturally. For you are not to imagine that the inclinations of his ſubjects are the ſame with thoſe of Philip. He thirſts for glory: this is his object, this he eagerly purſues, through toils and dangers of every kind; deſpiſing ſafety and life, when compared with the honour of atchieving ſuch actions as no other prince of Macedon could ever boaſt of. But his ſubjects have no part in this ambition. Harraſſed by thoſe various excurſions he is ever making, they groan under perpetual calamity; torn from their buſineſs, and their families, and without opportunity to diſpoſe of that pittance which their toils have earned; as all commerce is ſhut out from the coaſt of Macedon by the war.

Hence

Hence one may perceive how his ſubjects in general are affected to Philip. But then his auxiliaries, and the [G] ſoldiers of his Phalanx, have the character of wonderful forces, trained compleatly to war. And yet I can affirm, upon the credit of a perſon from that country, incapable of falſehood, that they have no ſuch ſuperiority. For, as he aſſures me, if any man of experience in military affairs ſhould be found among them, he diſmiſſes all ſuch, from an ambition of having every great action aſcribed wholly to himſelf: (for, beſides his other paſſions, the man hath this ambition in the higheſt degree). And if any perſon, from a ſenſe of decency, or other virtuous principle, betrays a diſlike of his daily intemperance, and riotings, and [H] obſcenities,

[G] *The ſoldiers of his Phalanx.* In the original πεζέταιροι, *fellow-ſoldiers.* A term invented for the encouragement of this body, and to reconcile them to all the ſeverities of their duty. Such kind of familiarities coſt but little, and are often of conſiderable ſervice to a prince. TOUR.

[H] *Obſcenities.* In the original χορδακισμὸς. Certain laſcivious dances, ſo called from the name of a ſatyr, ſaid to have invented them. Theophraſtus mentions it as a part of the character of a man utterly abandoned, that, when inflamed by wine, he is even capable of dancing the *Chordax.* TOUR.

In

obſcenities, he loſes all favour and regard; ſo that none are left about him, but wretches, who ſubſiſt on rapine and flattery, and who, when heated with wine, do not ſcruple to deſcend to ſuch inſtances of revelry, as it would ſhock you to repeat. Nor can the truth of this be doubted: for they whom we all conſpired to drive from hence, as infamous and abandoned, Callias [1] the public ſervant, and others of the ſame ſtamp; buffoons, compoſers of lewd ſongs, in which they ridicule their companions: theſe are the perſons whom he entertains and careſſes. And theſe things, Athenians, trifling as they may appear to ſome, are to men of juſt diſcernment great indications of the weakneſs both of his mind and fortune. At preſent, his ſucceſſes caſt a ſhade over them; for proſperity hath great

In this deſcription of the diſſolute manners of Philip and his court, one would imagine, that the orator had aggravated a little; yet we have the whole deſcription ſtill more heightened in hiſtory. The learned reader will find it in Athenæus. Book 6. TOUR.

[1] *The public ſervant.* One of thoſe public ſlaves, who attended the Athenian generals in the field. They choſe ſlaves for this buſineſs, that, if there was occaſion for their evidence on any public inquiry into the conduct of the war, they might be put to the torture; from which free citizens were exempted. ULP.

power

power to veil ſuch baſeneſs from obſervation. But let his arms meet with the leaſt diſgrace, and all his actions will be expoſed. This is a truth, of which he himſelf, Athenians! will, in my opinion, ſoon convince you, if the Gods favour us, and you exert your vigour. For as in our bodies, while a man is in health, he feels no effect of any inward weakneſs; but, when diſeaſe attacks him, every thing becomes ſenſible, in the veſſels, in the joints, or in whatever other part his frame may be diſordered; ſo in ſtates and monarchies, while they carry on a war abroad, their defects eſcape the general eye; but when once it approaches their own territory, then they are all detected.

If there be any one among you who, from Philip's good fortune, concludes that he muſt prove a formidable enemy; ſuch reaſoning is not unworthy a man of prudence. Fortune hath great influence, nay, the whole influence, in all human affairs: but then, were I to chuſe, I ſhould prefer the fortune of Athens (if you yourſelves will aſſert your own cauſe, with the leaſt degree of vigour) to this man's fortune. For we have many better reaſons to depend upon the favour of Heaven, than

than this man. But our preſent ſtate is, in my opinion, a ſtate of total inactivity; and he who will not exert his own ſtrength, cannot apply for aid, either to his friends or to the gods. It is not then ſurpriſing, that he who is himſelf ever amidſt the dangers and labours of the field; who is every-where; whom no opportunity eſcapes; to whom no ſeaſon is unfavourable! ſhould be ſuperior to you, who are wholly engaged in contriving delays, and framing decrees, and inquiring after news. I am not ſurpriſed at this, for the contrary muſt have been ſurpriſing: if we, who never act in any ſingle inſtance, as becomes a ſtate engaged in war, ſhould conquer him, who, in every inſtance, acts with an indefatigable vigilance. This indeed ſurpriſes me; that you, who [K] fought the cauſe of Greece againſt Lacedemon, and generouſly declined all the many favourable opportunities of aggrandiſing yourſelves; who, to ſecure their property to others, parted with your own, by your contributions; and bravely expoſed yourſelves in battle; ſhould now decline the ſervice of the field, and delay the neceſſary ſupplies, when called to the defence

[K] See note on Philip. 1. page 2.

of

of your own rights: that you, in whom Greece in general, and each particular ſtate, hath often found protection, ſhould ſit down quiet ſpectators of your own private wrongs. This I ſay ſurpriſes me: and one thing more; that not a man among you can reflect how long a time we have been at war with Philip, and in what meaſures, this time hath all been waſted. You are not to be informed, that, in delaying, in hoping that others would aſſert our cauſe, in accuſing each other, in impeaching, then again entertaining hopes, in ſuch meaſures as are now purſued, that time hath been intirely waſted. And are you ſo devoid of apprehenſion, as to imagine, when our ſtate hath been reduced from greatneſs to wretchedneſs, that the very ſame conduct will raiſe us from wretchedneſs to greatneſs! No! this is not reaſonable, it is not natural; for it is much eaſier to defend, than to acquire dominions. But, now, the war hath left us nothing to defend: we muſt acquire. And to this work you yourſelves alone are equal.

This, then, is my opinion. You ſhould raiſe ſupplies; you ſhould take the field with alacrity. Proſecutions ſhould be all ſuſpended

pended until you have recovered your affairs; let each man's ſentence be determined by his actions: honour thoſe who have deſerved applauſe; let the iniquitous meet their puniſhment: Let there be no pretences, no deficiencies on your part; for you cannot bring the actions of others to a ſevere ſcrutiny, unleſs you have firſt been careful of your own duty. What indeed can be the reaſon, think ye, that every man whom ye have ſent out at the head of an army, hath deſerted your ſervice, and ſought out ſome private expedition? (if we muſt ſpeak ingenuouſly of theſe our generals alſo,) The reaſon is this: When engaged in the ſervice of the ſtate, the prize for which they fight is yours. Thus, ſhould Amphipolis be now taken, you inſtantly poſſeſs yourſelves of it: the commanders have all the danger, the rewards they do not ſhare. But, in their private enterpriſes, the dangers are leſs; the acquiſitions are all ſhared by the generals and ſoldiers; as were [L] Lampſacus,

[L] *Lampſacus, Sigæum, &c.* Chares received theſe two cities of Aſia Minor, from the Satrap Artabazus, in return for his ſervice, (ſee note on Ph. 1. p. 8.) This general, inſtead of employing the fleet he had been intruſted with, for the recovery of Amphipolis, according to his inſtructions,

ſacus, Sigæum, and thoſe veſſels which they plundered. Thus are they all determined by their private intereſt. And, when you turn your eyes to the wretched ſtate of your affairs, you bring your generals to a trial; you grant them leave to ſpeak; you hear the neceſſities they plead; and then acquit them. Nothing then remains for us, but to be diſtracted with endleſs conteſts and diviſions: (ſome urging theſe, ſome, thoſe meaſures) and to feel the public calamity. For in former times, Athenians, you divided into claſſes, [M] to raiſe ſupplies.

ſtructions, joined with ſome pirates, and committed conſiderable outrages in the Ægean Sea. He was accuſed of this at his return, but eſcaped, by flying from public juſtice, until his faction grew powerful enough to reinſtate him in his former command. TOUR.

[M] *Claſſes, &c.* [Συμμορίαι.] Each of the ten tribes elected one hundred and twenty of the richer citizens, out of their own body, who were obliged to perform the public duties, and to raiſe ſupplies for the exigencies of ſtate, out of their private fortunes. The twelve hundred perſons, thus choſen, were divided into two parts, and each of theſe into ten claſſes called Συμμορίαι. Theſe were again ſubdivided into two parts, according to the eſtates of thoſe who compoſed them. And thus out of the ten firſt claſſes were appointed the THREE HUNDRED, that is, ſuch a number of the wealthy citizens, who were on all occaſions to ſupply the commonwealth with money; and with the reſt of the twelve hundred to perform all extraordinary duties

ſupplies. Now the buſineſs of theſe claſſes is to govern; each hath an orator at its head, and a general, who is his creature; the THREE HUNDRED are aſſiſtants to theſe, and the reſt of you divide, ſome to this, ſome to that party. You muſt rectify theſe diſorders: you muſt appear yourſelves: you muſt leave the power of ſpeaking, of adviſing, and of acting, open to every citizen. But if you ſuffer ſome perſons to iſſue out their mandates, as with [N] a royal authority; if one ſet of men be forced to fit out ſhips, to raiſe ſupplies, to take up arms; while others are only to make decrees againſt them, without any charge, any employment beſides; it is not poſſible that any thing can be effected ſeaſonably and ſucceſsfully: for the injured

ties in their turns——It ſeems however, that, in the time of Demoſthenes, theſe claſſes ſought pretences to avoid their duty, and contended for the power of throwing the whole weight of public buſineſs on each other.

[N] *As with a royal, &c.* Eubulus, Ariſtophon, Hyperides, and Lycurgus, governed every thing with an abſolute power, in the aſſemblies; the conduct of military affairs was intirely ingroſſed by Diopithes, Meneſtheus, Leoſthenes, and Chares. Thus the adminiſtration of affairs was ſhared among a few men as it were by lot; ſo that the popular government degenerated into an oligarchy. *See* Plutar. in Phocion. TOUR.

party ever will deſert you; and then your ſole reſource will be to make them feel your reſentment inſtead of your enemies.

To ſum up all, my ſentiments are theſe:—That every man ſhould contribute in proportion to his fortune; that all ſhould take the field in their turns, until all have ſerved; that whoever appears in this place, ſhould be allowed to ſpeak: and that, when you give your voices, your true intereſt only ſhould determine you, not the authority of this or the other ſpeaker. Purſue this courſe, and then your applauſe will not be laviſhed on ſome orator, the moment he concludes; you yourſelves will ſhare it hereafter, when you find how greatly you have advanced the intereſts of your ſtate.

2 AP 57

End of the FIRST OLYNTHIAC.

THE SECOND

OLYNTHIAC ORATION:

PRONOUNCED

In the SAME YEAR.



INTRODUCTION.

TO remove the impreſſion made on the minds of the Athenians by the preceding oration, Demades and other popular leaders in the intereſts of Philip roſe up, and oppoſed the propoſitions of Demoſthenes, with all their eloquence. Their oppoſition, however, proved ineffectual: for the aſſembly decreed, that relief ſhould be ſent to the Olynthians: and thirty gallies and two thouſand forces were accordingly diſpatched, under the command of Chares. But theſe ſuccours, conſiſting intirely of mercenaries, and commanded by a general of no great reputation, could not be of conſiderable ſervice: and were beſides ſuſpected, and ſcarcely leſs dreaded by the Olynthians than the Macedonians themſelves. In the mean time, the


BRITISH MUSEUM

INTRODUCTION.

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progreſs of Philip's arms could meet with little interruption. He reduced ſeveral places in the region of Chalcis, razed the fortreſs of Zeira, and, having twice defeated the Olynthians in the field, at laſt ſhut them up in their city. In this emergency, they again applied to the Athenians, and preſſed for freſh and effectual ſuccours. In the following oration, Demoſthenes endeavours to ſupport this petition; and to prove, that both the honour and the intereſt of the Athenians demanded their immediate compliance. As the expence of the armament was the great point of difficulty, he recommends the abrogation of ſuch laws, as prevented the proper ſettlement of the funds neceſſary for carrying on a war of ſuch importance. The nature of theſe laws will come immediately to be explained.

It appears, from the beginning of this oration, that other ſpeakers had ariſen before Demoſthenes, and inveighed loudly againſt Philip. Full of the national prejudices, or diſpoſed to flatter the Athenians in their notions of the dignity and importance of their ſtate, they breathed nothing but indignation againſt the enemy, and poſſibly, with ſome contempt of his preſent enterpriſes, propoſed to the Athenians

to correct his arrogance, by an invasion of his own kingdom. Demosthenes, on the contrary, insists on the necessity of self-defence; endeavours to rouse his hearers from their security, by the terror of impending danger; and affects to consider the defence of Olynthus, as the last and only means of preservsng the very being of Athens.

OLYNTHIAC THE SECOND.

I Am by no means affected in the ſame manner, Athenians! when I review the ſtate of our affairs, and when I attend to thoſe ſpeakers, who have now declared their ſentiments. They inſiſt, that we ſhould puniſh Philip: but our affairs, ſituated as they now appear, warn us to guard againſt the dangers with which we ourſelves are threatened. Thus far therefore I muſt differ from theſe ſpeakers, that I apprehend they have not propoſed the proper object of your attention. There was a time indeed, I know it well, when the ſtate could have poſſeſſed her own dominions in ſecurity, and ſent out her armies to inflict chaſtiſement on Philip. I my-

myſelf have ſeen that time when we enjoyed ſuch power. But, now, I am perſuaded we ſhould confine ourſelves to the protection of our allies. When this is once effected, then we may conſider the puniſhment his outrages have merited. But, 'till the firſt great point be well ſecured, it is weakneſs to debate about our more remote concernments.

And now, Athenians, if ever we ſtood in need of mature deliberation and counſel, the preſent juncture calls loudly for them. To point out the courſe to be purſued on this emergency I do not think the greateſt difficulty: but I am in doubt in what manner to propoſe my ſentiments; for all that I have obſerved, and all that I have heard, convinces me, that moſt of your misfortunes have proceeded from a want of inclination to purſue the neceſſary meaſures, not from ignorance of them. ——Let me intreat you, that, if I now ſpeak with an unuſual boldneſs, ye may bear it: conſidering only, whether I ſpeak truth, and with a ſincere intention to advance your future intereſts: for you now ſee, that by ſome orators, who ſtudy but to

to gain your favour, our affairs have been reduced to the extremity of diſtreſs.

I think it neceſſary, in the firſt place, to recal ſome late tranſactions to your thoughts. ——You may remember, Athenians, that, about three or four years ſince, you received advice that Philip was in Thrace, and had laid ſiege to the fortreſs of Heræa. It was then the month of [A] November. Great commotions and debates aroſe: It was reſolved to ſend out forty gallies; that all citizens [B] under the age of five and forty ſhould themſelves embark; and that ſixty talents ſhould be raiſed. Thus it was agreed; that year paſſed away; then came in the months [C] July, Auguſt, September. In this

[A] *Of November.* The reducing the Attic months to the Julian hath occaſioned ſome diſpute among the learned. As I thought it beſt to make uſe of Roman names in the tranſlation, I have followed the reduction of Scaliger.

[B] *Under the age of five and forty, &c.* This expreſſes their zeal, and their apprehenſions of the danger: for by the laws of Athens a citizen was exempted from military ſervice at the age of forty, except on ſome very urgent occaſion.

[C] *July, &c.* That is, the firſt months of the next year: for the reader is to obſerve, that the Attic year commenced

this laſt month, with great difficulty, when the myſteries had firſt been celebrated, you ſent out[D]Charidemus, with juſt ten veſſels unmanned, and five talents of ſilver. For when reports came of the ſickneſs, and the death of Philip, (both of theſe were affirmed) you laid aſide your intended armament, imagining, that at ſuch a juncture there was no need of ſuccours. And yet this was the very critical moment: for, had they been diſpatched with the ſame alacrity with which they were granted, Philip would not have then eſcaped, to become that formidable enemy he now appears.

menced on that new-moon, whoſe full-moon immediately ſucceeded the ſummer-ſolſtice.

[D] .*Charidemus*. That is, the worſt of all your generals: a foreigner, a ſoldier of fortune, who had ſometimes fought againſt you, ſometimes betrayed your cauſe, and who, on many occaſions, had proved himſelf unworthy of the confidence you repoſed in him.——Monſieur Tourreil tranſlates this paſſage thus, *ce fut en ce dernier mois qu'* IMMEDIATEMENT *après la célébration des myſteres*, *vous* DEPECHATES *d'ici Charidême*, *&c.* Here there are two unfortunate words, which expreſs haſte and expedition: whereas the deſcription, in the original, labours on in the ſloweſt and heavieſt manner poſſible. Every ſingle word marks out the tedioufneſs or the meanneſs of their armament.

But

But what was then done, cannot be amended. Now we have the opportunity of another war: that war I mean, which hath induced me to bring theſe tranſactions into view; that you may not once more fall into the ſame errors. How then ſhall we improve this opportunity? *This is the only queſtion.* For, if you are not reſolved to aſſiſt with all the force you can command, you are really ſerving under Philip, you are fighting on his ſide. The Olynthians are a people, whoſe power was thought conſiderable. Thus were the circumſtances of affairs: Philip could not confide in them; they looked with equal ſuſpicion upon Philip. We and they then entered into mutual engagements of peace and alliance: this was a grievous embarraſſment to Philip, that we ſhould have a powerful ſtate confederated with us, ſpies upon the incidents of his fortune. It was agreed, that we ſhould by all means engage this people in a war with him. And, now, what we all ſo earneſtly deſired, is effected: the manner is of no moment. What then remains for us, Athenians, but to ſend immediate and effectual ſuccours, I cannot ſee. For beſides the diſgrace that muſt attend us, if any of our intereſts are

ſupinely

ſupinely diſregarded; I have no ſmall apprehenſions of the conſequence, (the [E] Thebans affected as they are towards us, and the Phocians exhauſted of their treaſures) if Philip be left at full liberty to lead his armies into theſe territories, when his preſent enterpriſes are accompliſhed. If any one among you can be ſo far immerſed in indolence, as to ſuffer this, he muſt chuſe to be witneſs of the miſery of his own country, rather than to hear of that which ſtrangers ſuffer; and to ſeek aſſiſtants for himſelf, when it is now in his power to grant aſſiſtſtance to others. That this muſt be the conſequence, if we do not exert ourſelves on the preſent occaſion, there can ſcarcely remain the leaſt doubt among us.

But, as to the neceſſity of ſending ſuccours, this, it may be ſaid, we are agreed in; this is our reſolution. But how ſhall we be in-

[E] *The Thobans, &c.* They had a mortal hatred to the Athenians, as they had favoured Lacedemon after the battles of Leuctra and Mantinea, and had lately taken part with the Phocians againſt them, in the ſacred war. [And even before theſe times, at the concluſion of the Peloponneſian war, the Thebans ſtrenuouſly contended for the utter extirpation of Athens.]

abled?

abled? that is the point to be explained.—Be not ſurpriſed, Athenians, if my ſentiments on this occaſion ſeem repugnant to the general ſenſe of this aſſembly.——Appoint [F] magiſtrates for the inſpection of your laws: not in order to enact any new laws; you have already a ſufficient number; but to repeal thoſe, whoſe ill effects you now experience. I mean the laws relating to the [G] theatrical funds (thus openly I declare

[F] *Magiſtrates for, &c.* In the original Νομοθέτας. So were thoſe citizens called, who were intruſted by the people with the regulation of their laws. They were choſen by lot, to the number of 1001, that their votes might not be equal. Every citizen, at certain times, and in certain aſſemblies, had uſually a right to complain of any law. The preſident of the aſſembly propoſed the complaint to the people: five advocates were allowed to plead in defence of the law, and, after hearing them, the people referred the affair to the Nomothetæ. TOUR.

[G] *The theatrical funds.* The Athenians, as well as the other Greeks, were ever paſſionately fond of the entertainments of the theatre. Diſputes for places ſoon became remarkably inconvenient, and called for a regulation. The magiſtrates, therefore ordered, that a ſmall price ſhould be paid for places, to reimburſe the builders of the theatre, which as yet knew not that magnificence, which riches and luxury afterwards introduced. This purchaſing of places began to be complained of by the poorer citizens: and therefore Pericles, out of a pretended

clare it) and ſome about [H] the ſoldiery. By the firſt, the ſoldier's pay goes as theatrical expences to the uſeleſs and inactive; the others ſcreen thoſe from juſtice, who decline the ſervice of the field; and thus damp the ardor of thoſe diſpoſed to ſerve us. When you have repealed theſe, and rendered it conſiſtent with ſafety to adviſe you juſtly, then ſeek for ſome perſon to propoſe

tended zeal for their intereſt, propoſed, that a ſum of money (which had been depoſited in the treaſury, after the war of Egina, when they had made a thirty years peace with Lacedemon, and was intended asa public reſource in caſe of any invaſion of Attica) ſhould be diſtributed among the citizens, to defray the expence of their entertainments in time of peace only. The propoſal and the reſtriction were both agreed to. But as all indulgences of this kind degenerate, ſooner or later, into licentiouſneſs, the people began to conſider this diſtribution as their unalienable property. And, the very year of the Olynthiac orations, Eubulus, a popular leader, of a party oppoſite to Demoſthenes, prevailed to have a law paſſed, which forbad any man, on pain of death, to make a motion, or propoſal of a decree, for reſtoring what was now called the theatrical funds to the military, or any other public ſervice. This is the law which Demoſthenes here attacks.

[H] *About the ſoldiery.* The laws of Solon exacted perſonal ſervice from every citizen, with the utmoſt rigour. Thoſe which the orator complains of muſt have been made when the ſtate began to be corrupted.

[I] that

[1] that decree, which you all are ſenſible the common good requires. But, 'till this be done, expect not that any man will urge your true intereſt, when, for urging your true intereſt, you repay him with deſtruction. Ye will never will find ſuch zeal: eſpecially ſince the conſequence can be only this; he who offers his opinion, and moves for your concurrence, ſuffers ſome unmerited calamity; but your affairs are not in the leaſt advanced: nay, this additional inconvenience muſt ariſe, that for the future it will appear more dangerous to adviſe you, than even at preſent. And the authors of theſe laws ſhould alſo be the authors of their repeal. For it is not juſt that the public favour ſhould be beſtowed on them, who

[1] *That decree, which, &c.* A decree for the alienation of the theatrical funds. While Eubulus's law was in force, ſuch a decree could not be propoſed. The uſefulneſs and neceſſity of it, however, the orator ventures to inſinuate: for the penalty was not underſtood as extending to a man's barely declaring his ſentiments, provided he did not make the motion in form. In the latter part of this oration, he ſeems to propoſe another method of avoiding the ill conſequences of the law of Eubulus: and that is, that the theatrical diſtributions ſhould be ſtill continued; but that all thoſe who were in public offices, and who uſually received their ſeveral ſalaries and appointments, ſhould now ſerve the ſtate without fee or reward. The name only of theſe diſtributions would have then remained.

in framing theſe laws, have greatly injured the community; and that the odium ſhould fall on him, whoſe freedom and ſincerity are of important ſervice to us all.——Until theſe regulations be made, you are not to think any man ſo great, that he may violate theſe laws with impunity; or ſo devoid of reaſon, as to plunge himſelf into open and foreſeen deſtruction.

And be not ignorant of this, Athenians, that a decree is of no ſignificance, unleſs attended with reſolution and alacrity to execute it. For were decrees of themſelves ſufficient to engage you to perform your duty; could they even execute the things which they enact; ſo many would not have been made to ſo little, or rather to no good purpoſe; nor would the inſolence of Philip have had ſo long a date. For, if decrees can puniſh, he hath long ſince felt all their fury. But they have no ſuch power: for though propoſing and reſolving be firſt in order; yet, in force and efficacy, action is ſuperior. Let this then be your principal concern; the others you cannot want: for you have men among you capable of adviſing, and you are of all people moſt acute in apprehending:

ing: now, let your intereſt direct you, and it will be in your power to be as remarkable for acting. What ſeaſon indeed, what opportunity do you wait for, more favourable than the preſent? or when will you exert your vigour, if not now, my countrymen? Hath not this man ſeized all thoſe places that were ours? ſhould he become maſter of [K] this country too, muſt we not ſink into the loweſt ſtate of infamy? are not they whom we have promiſed to aſſiſt, whenever they are engaged in war, now attacked themſelves? Is he not our enemy? is he not in poſſeſſion of our dominions? is he not a [L] barbarian? is he not every baſe thing words can expreſs? If we are inſenſible to all this,

[K] *Of this country, &c.* That is, the country of Chalcis, where Philip took two and thirty cities, before he laid ſiege to Olynthus. TOUR.

[L] *A barbarian?* This was the term of reproach, which the Greeks applied to all other nations: nor were the Macedonians excepted. In the time of Xerxes, Alexander, King of Macedon, could not be admitted into the Olympic games, until he had proved his deſcent to be originally from Argos. And when he came over from the Perſian camp, to give the Greeks notice of the motions of Mardonius, he juſtified his perfidy by his ancient deſcent from Greece: which he needed not to have had recourſe to, if Macedon had not been then conſidered as a part of the barbarian world. TOUR.

if we almoſt aid his deſigns; Heavens! can we then aſk to whom the conſequences are owing? Yes, I know full well, we never will impute them to ourſelves. Juſt as in the dangers of the field: not one of thoſe who fly will accuſe himſelf; he will rather blame the general, or his fellow-ſoldiers: [M] yet every ſingle man that fled was acceſſary to the defeat: he who blames others might have maintained his own poſt; and, had every man maintained his, ſucceſs muſt have enſued. Thus then, in the preſent caſe, is there a man whoſe counſel ſeems liable to objection? let the next riſe, and not inveigh againſt him, but declare his own opinion. Doth another offer ſome more ſalutary counſel? purſue it, in the name of Heaven?—— "But then it is not pleaſing."——This is not the fault of the ſpeaker, [N] unleſs in that

[M] *Yet every ſingle, &c.* The orator did not foreſee, that, in ten years after, he himſelf would be guilty of this very crime; be branded with a name of infamy, for caſting away his ſhield at the battle of Chæronea, and have nothing to oppoſe to the reproaches of his enemies, but a weak and trifling pleaſantry. TOUR.

[N] *Unleſs in that he hath, &c.* This paſſage, which is tranſlated pretty exactly from the original, ſeems, at firſt view, to have ſomething of a forced and unnatural air. Indeed

that he hath neglected to expreſs his affection in prayers and wiſhes. To pray is eaſy, Athenians; and in one petition may be collected as many inſtances of good fortune as we pleaſe. To determine juſtly, when affairs are to be conſidered, is not ſo eaſy. But what is moſt uſeful ſhould ever be preferred to that which is agreeable, where both cannot be obtained.

But if there be a man who will leave us the theatrical funds, and propoſe other

Indeed it is not poſſible for us to perceive fully and clearly the ſtrength and propriety of every part of theſe orations. To this it would be requiſite to know the temper and diſpoſition of the hearers, at that particular time when each of them was delivered; and alſo to have before us every thing ſaid by other ſpeakers in the debate. In many places we find very plain alluſions to the ſpeeches of other orators. And it is not unreaſonable to think, that there are other more obſcure ones which eſcape our obſervation. If we ſuppoſe, for inſtance, that, in the preſent debate, before Demoſthenes aroſe, ſome other ſpeaker had amuſed the people with flattering hopes, with profeſſions of zeal and affection, with paſſionate exclamations, and prayers to the Gods for ſuch and ſuch inſtances of public ſucceſs; while at the ſame time he neglected to point out ſuch meaſures as were fit to be purſued, or perhaps recommended pernicious meaſures.——Upon ſuch a ſuppoſition, I ſay, this paſſage, conſidered as an indirect reproof of ſuch a ſpeaker, will perhaps appear to have ſufficient force and propriety.

ſubſidies for the ſervice of the war, are we not rather to attend to him? I grant it, Athenians! if that man can be found. But I ſhould account it wonderful, if it ever did, if it ever can happen to any man on earth, that, while he laviſhes his preſent poſſeſſions on unneceſſary occaſions, ſome future funds ſhould be procured, to ſupply his real neceſſities. But ſuch propoſals find a powerful advocate in the breaſt of every hearer. So that nothing is ſo eaſy as to deceive one's ſelf: for what we wiſh, that we readily believe: but ſuch expectations are oftentimes inconſiſtent with our affairs. On this occaſion, therefore, let your affairs direct you; then, will you be inabled to take the field; then you will have your full pay. And men, whoſe judgments are well directed, and whoſe ſouls are great, could not ſupport the infamy which muſt attend them, if obliged to deſert any of the operations of a war, from the want of money: they could not, after ſnatching up their arms, and marching againſt the [o] Corinthians

[o] *The Corinthians.* This alludes to an expedition that the Athenians had made about an age before. Some time after the Perſian war, when the Greeks began to quarrel

thians and [P] Megareans, ſuffer Philip to inſlave the ſtates of Greece, through the want of proviſions for their forces.—I ſay not this wantonly, to raiſe the reſentment of ſome among you. No; I am not ſo unhappily perverſe, as to ſtudy to be hated,

quarrel among themſelves, Corinth and Megara had ſome diſpute about their boundaries. The better to ſupport their quarrel, the Megareans quitted the Lacedemonians, and entered into an alliance with Athens. But, as this ſtate was then engaged both in Egypt and Egina, the Corinthians imagined they would not be able to give any aſſiſtance; and therefore invaded the territories of Megara. But the Athenians came immediately to the aſſiſtan ce of their allies, although they were obliged to commit the defence of their city to their old men and boys: and the Corinthians were repulſed.

TOUR.

[P] *The Megareans.* This war happened twelve years after that mentioned in the preceding note. The Megareans, after having put an Athenian garriſon to the ſword, that was ſtationed in their territory, joined with Lacedemon, and even with Corinth their mortal enemy, againſt whom the Athenians had eſpouſed their quarrel. This ſtate, incenſed at the ingratitude of their revolt, determined to reduce them to reaſon. They iſſued out a mandate, directing the Megareans to abſtain from cultivating a piece of ground conſecrated to Ceres and Proſerpine; and, on their refuſing to comply, publiſhed an edict, to exclude them from all commerce in Attica; and bound their generals by an oath to invade their territories once every year. TOUR.

when no good purpoſe can be anſwered by it: but it is my opinion, that every honeſt ſpeaker ſhould prefer the intereſt of the ſtate to the favour of his hearers. This (I am aſſured, and perhaps you need not be informed) was the principle which actuated the public conduct of thoſe of our anceſtors who ſpoke in this aſſembly: (men, whom the preſent ſett of orators are ever ready to applaud, but whoſe example they by no means imitate:) ſuch were Ariſtides, Nicias, the former Demoſthenes, and Pericles. But ſince we have had ſpeakers, who, before their public appearance, aſk you: "What do you deſire? what ſhall I propoſe? how can I oblige you?" the intereſt of our country hath been ſacrificed to momentary pleaſure and popular favour. Thus have we been diſtreſſed; thus have theſe men riſen to greatneſs, and you ſunk into diſgrace.

And here let me intreat your attention to a ſummary account of the conduct of your anceſtors, and of your own. I ſhall mention but a few things, and theſe well known: (for, if you would purſue the way to happineſs, you need not look abroad for leaders;

leaders; our own countrymen) point it out. Theſe our anceſtors therefore, whom the orators never courted, never treated with that indulgence with which you are flattered, held the ſovereignty of Greece, with general conſent, [Q] five and forty years; depoſited above ten thouſand talents in our public treaſury; kept the king of this country in that ſubjection, which a barbarian owes to Greeks; erected monuments of many and illuſtrious actions, which they themſelves atchieved, by land and ſea; in a word, are the only perſons who have tranſmitted to poſterity ſuch glory as is ſuperior to envy.——Thus great do they appear in

[Q] *Five and forty years.* In Wolfius's edition it is 65. But this reading is found in other copies, and is confirmed by the parallel paſſage in the oration on regulating the commonwealth. The orator computes from the death of Pauſanias, when the ſupreme command was given to the Athenians, to the beginning of the Peloponeſian war. Add to this the 27 years of that war, during which time the Athenians maintained their power, though not with conſent: and the whole will be 72 years compleat, and part of the 73d year. Agreeably to this laſt calculation, Demoſthenes ſays, in the third Philippic, that the Athenians commanded in Greece 73 years. Theſe two accounts are thus eaſily reconciled by diſtinguiſhing the times of the voluntary and the involuntary obedience of the Greeks. TOUR.

the

the affairs of Greece.——Let us now view them within the city, both in their public and private conduct. And, firſt, the edifices which their adminiſtrations have given us, their decorations of our temples, and the offerings depoſited by them, are ſo numerous and ſo magnificent, that all the efforts of poſterity cannot exceed them. Then, in private life, ſo exemplary was their moderation, their adherence to the ancient manners ſo ſcrupulouſly exact, that, if any of you ever diſcovered the houſe of Ariſtides, or Miltiades, or any of the illuſtrious men of thoſe times, he muſt know that it was not diſtinguiſhed by the leaſt extraordinary ſplendor. For they did not ſo conduct the public buſineſs, as to aggrandiſe themſelves; their ſole great object was to exalt the ſtate. And thus by their faithful attachment to Greece, by their piety to the Gods, and by that equality which they maintained among themſelves, they were raiſed (and no wonder) to the ſummit of proſperity.

Such was the ſtate of Athens at that time, when the men I have mentioned were in power. But what is your condition, under

theſe

theſe indulgent miniſters who now direct us? Is it the ſame, or nearly the ſame?— Other things I ſhall paſs over, though I might expatiate on them. Let it only be obſerved, that we are now, as you all ſee, left without competitors; the [R] Lacedemonians loſt; the Thebans [S] engaged at home; and not one of all the other ſtates of conſequence ſufficient to diſpute the ſovereignty with us. Yet at a time, when we might have enjoyed our own dominions in ſecurity, and been the umpires in all diſputes abroad; our territories have been wreſted from us; we have expended above one thouſand five hundred talents to no purpoſe; the [T] allies which we gained in war have been loſt in time of peace; and to this

[R] *The Lacedemonians loſt.* The Battles of Leuctra and Mantinæa had intirely deſtroyed their power. TOUR.

[S] *engaged, &c.* In the Phocian war.

[T] *The allies, &c.* Ulpian and Wolfius underſtand this of the peace, by which the Athenians conſented that the people of Chios, Rhodes, and Byzantium, and other revolters, ſhould all continue free. But it ſeems more natural to apply it to ſome prior events; as the taking of Pydna and Potidæa, and other cities of Thrace, that were then ſubject to Athens, and which Philip made himſelf maſter of, after he had concluded a peace with the Athenians, in the ſecond year of his reign. TOUR.

degree

degree of power have we raiſed an enemy againſt ourſelves. (For let the man ſtand forth, who can ſhew whence Philip hath derived his greatneſs, if not from us.)

" Well! if theſe affairs have but an unfa-
" vourable aſpect, yet thoſe within the city
" are much more flouriſhing than ever."
——Where are the proofs of this? The walls which have been whitened? the ways we have repaired? the ſupplies of water; and ſuch trifles?——Turn your eyes to the men, of whoſe adminiſtrations theſe are the fruits. Some of whom, from the loweſt ſtate of poverty, have ariſen ſuddenly to affluence; ſome from meanneſs to renown: others have made their own private houſes much more magnificent than the public edifices. Juſt as the ſtate hath fallen, their private fortunes have been raiſed.

And what cauſe can we aſſign for this? How is it that our affairs were once ſo flouriſhing, and now in ſuch diſorder? Becauſe, formerly, the people dared to take up arms themſelves; were themſelves maſters of thoſe in employment, diſpoſers themſelves of all emoluments: ſo that every citizen thought himſelf

himſelf happy to derive honours and authority, and all advantages whatever, from the people. But now, on the contrary, favours are all diſpenſed, affairs all tranſacted by the miniſters: while you, quite enervated, robbed of your riches, your allies, ſtand in the mean rank of ſervants and aſſiſtants: happy if theſe men grant you the theatrical appointments, and ſend you ſcraps [u] of the public meal. And, what is of all moſt ſordid, you hold yourſelves obliged to them for that which is your own: while they confine you within theſe walls, lead you on gently to their purpoſes, and ſoothe and tame you to obedience. Nor is it poſſible, that they who are engaged in low and groveling purſuits, can entertain great and generous ſentiments. No! Such as their employments are, ſo muſt their diſpoſitions prove.—And now I call Heaven to witneſs, that it will not ſurpriſe me, if I ſuffer more by mentioning this your condition, than they who have involved you in it! Freedom

[u] *Of the public meal.* Demetrius Phalereus records a ſaying of Demades, in ridicule of the cuſtom of diſtributing victuals to the people. *The State*, ſaid he, *is now become a feeble old woman, that ſits at home in her ſlippers, and ſups up her ptiſan.*

of

of ſpeech you do not allow on all occaſions; and that you have now admitted it excites my wonder.

But if you will at length be prevailed on to change your conduct; if you will take the field, and act worthy of Athenians; if theſe redundant ſums which you receive at home be applied to the advancement of your affairs abroad; perhaps, my countrymen! perhaps ſome inſtance of conſummate good fortune may attend you, and ye may become ſo happy as to deſpiſe thoſe pittances, which are like the morſels that a phyſician allows his patient. For theſe do not reſtore his vigour, but juſt keep him from dying. So, your diſtributions cannot ſerve any valuable purpoſe, but are juſt ſufficient to divert your attention from all other things, and thus increaſe the indolence of every one among you.

But I ſhall be aſked, "What then! is it "your opinion, that theſe ſums ſhould pay "our army?"——And beſides this, that the ſtate ſhould be regulated in ſuch a manner, that every one may have his ſhare of public buſineſs, and approve himſelf an uſeful citizen,

tizen, on what occaſion ſoever his aid may be required. Is it in his power to live in peace? He will live here with greater dignity, while theſe ſupplies prevent him from being tempted by indigence to any thing diſhonourable. Is he called forth by an emergency like the preſent? Let him diſcharge that ſacred duty which he owes to his country, by applying theſe ſums to his ſupport in the field. Is there a man among you paſt the age of ſervice? Let him, by inſpecting and conducting the public buſineſs, regularly merit his ſhare of the diſtributions which he now receives, without any duty injoined, or any return made to the community. And thus, with ſcarcely any alteration, either of aboliſhing or innovating, all irregularities are removed, and the ſtate compleatly ſettled; by appointing one general regulation, which ſhall intitle our citizens to receive, and at the ſame time oblige them to take arms, to adminiſter juſtice, to act in all caſes, as their time of life and our affairs require. But it never hath, nor could it have been moved by me, that the rewards of the diligent and active ſhould be beſtowed on the uſeleſs citizen: or that you ſhould ſit here, ſupine, languid,

and

and irreſolute, liſtening to the exploits of ſome general's foreign troops, (for thus it is at preſent)——Not that I would reflect on him who ſerves you, in any inſtance. But you yourſelves, Athenians, ſhould perform thoſe ſervices, for which you heap honours upon others; and not recede from that illuſtrious rank of virtue, the price of all the glorious toils of your anceſtors; and by them bequeathed to you.

Thus have I laid before you the chief points, in which I think you intereſted. It is your part to embrace that opinion, which the welfare of the ſtate in general, and that of every ſingle member, recommends to your acceptance.

2 AP 57

End of the SECOND OLYNTHIAC.

THE THIRD

OLYNTHIAC ORATION:

PRONOUNCED

In the SAME YEAR.


BRITISH MUSEUM

INTRODUCTION.

THE preceding oration had no further effect upon the Athenians, than to prevail on them to send orders to Charidemus, who commanded for them at the Hellespont, to make an attempt to relieve Olynthus. He accordingly led some forces into Chalcis, which, in conjunction with the forces of Olynthus, ravaged Pallene, a peninsula of Macedon, towards Thrace, and Bottia, a country on the confines of Chalcis, which among other towns contained Pella, the capital of Macedon.

But these attempts could not divert Philip from his resolution of reducing Olynthus, which he had now publicly avowed. The Olynthians, therefore, found it necessary to have once more recourse to Athens: and to request, that they would send troops, composed of citizens, animated with a sincere ardor for their interest, their own glory, and the common cause.

INTRODUCTION.

Demoſthenes, in the following oration, inſiſts on the importance of ſaving Olynthus; alarms his hearers with the apprehenſion of a war, which actually threatened Attica, and even the capital; urges the neceſſity of perſonal ſervice; and returns to his charge of the miſapplication of the public money; but in ſuch a manner, as ſheweth, that his former remonſtrances had not the deſired effect.

OLYN-

OLYNTHIAC THE THIRD.

I Am perſuaded, Athenians! that you would account it leſs valuable to poſſeſs [A] the greateſt riches, than to have the true intereſt of the ſtate on this emergency clearly laid before you. It is your part, therefore, readily and chearfully to attend to all who are diſpoſed to offer their opinions. For your regards need not be confined to thoſe, whoſe counſels are the

[A] *The greateſt riches.* Ulpian finds out a particular propriety in this exordium. He obſerves, that, as the orator intends to recommend to them to give up their theatrical appointments, he prepares them for it by this obſervation; and, while he is endeavouring to perſuade them to a juſt diſregard of money, appears as if he only ſpoke their ſentiments.

effect of [B] premeditation: it is your good fortune to have men among you, who can at once ſuggeſt many points of moment. From opinions, therefore, of every kind, you may eaſily chuſe that moſt conducive to your intereſt.

And now, Athenians, the preſent juncture calls upon us; we almoſt hear its voice, declaring loudly, that you yourſelves muſt engage in theſe affairs, if you have the leaſt attention to your own ſecurity. You entertain I know not what ſentiments, on this occaſion: my opinion is, that the reinforcements ſhould be inſtantly decreed; that they ſhould be raiſed with all poſſible expedition; that ſo our ſuccours may be ſent from this city, and all former inconveniencies be avoided; and that you ſhould ſend ambaſſa-

[B] *Premeditation.* Monſieur Tourreil admires the greatneſs of mind of Demoſthenes, who, though he gloried in the pains and labour his orations coſt him, was yet ſuperior to that low and malignant paſſion, which oftentimes prompts us to decry thoſe talents which we do not poſſeſs. I ſuſpect however, that this paſſage was occaſioned by ſome particular circumſtance in the debate. Perhaps ſome ſpeaker, who oppoſed Demoſthenes, might have urged his opinion ſomewhat dogmatically, as the reſult of mature reflection and deliberation.

ders

dors to notify theſe things, and to ſecure our intereſts by their preſence. For as he is a man of conſummate policy, compleat in the art of turning every incident to his own advantage; there is the utmoſt reaſon to fear, that partly by conceſſions, where they may be ſeaſonable; partly by menaces, (and his [c] menaces may be believed) and partly by rendering us and our abſence ſuſpected; he may tear from us ſomething of the laſt importance, and force it into his own ſervice.

Thoſe very circumſtances, however, which contribute to the power of Philip, are happily the moſt favourable to us. For that uncontrolled command, with which he governs all tranſactions public and ſecret; his intire direction of his army, as their leader, their ſovereign, and their treaſurer; and his diligence, in giving life to every part of it, by his preſence; theſe things greatly contribute to carrying on a war with expedition and ſucceſs, but are powerful obſtacles to that accomodation, which he would gladly make with the Olynthians. For the Olyn-

[c] *His menaces may, &c.* Although his *promiſes* could by no means be relied on.

thians ſee plainly, that they do not now fight for glory, or for part of their territory, but to defend their ſtate from diſſolution and ſlavery. They know how he rewarded thoſe traitors of Amphipolis, who made him maſter of that city; and thoſe of Pydna, who opened their gates to him. In a word, free ſtates, I think, muſt ever look with ſuſpicion on an abſolute monarchy: but a neighbouring monarchy muſt double their apprehenſions.

Convinced of what hath now been offered, and poſſeſſed with every other juſt and worthy ſentiment; you muſt be reſolved, Athenians; you muſt exert your ſpirit; you muſt apply to the war, now, if ever: your fortunes, your perſons, your whole powers, are now demanded. There is no excuſe, no pretence left, for declining the performance of your duty. For that which you were all ever urging loudly, that the Olynthians ſhould be engaged in a war with Philip, hath now happened of itſelf; and this in a manner moſt agreeable to our intereſt. For, if they had entered into this war at our perſuaſion, they muſt have been precarious allies, without ſteadineſs or reſolution:

ſolution: but, as their private injuries have made them enemies to Philip, it is probable that enmity will be laſting, both on account of what they fear, and what they have already ſuffered. My countrymen! let not ſo favourable an opportunity eſcape you: do not repeat that error which hath been ſo often fatal to you. For when, at our return from aſſiſting the [D] Eubœans, Hierax and Stratocles, citizens of Amphipolis, mounted this [E] gallery, and preſſed you to ſend out your navy, and to take their city under your protection; had we diſcovered that reſolution in our own cauſe, which we exerted for the ſafety of Eubœa; then had Amphipolis been yours; and all thoſe difficulties had been avoided, in which you have been ſince involved. Again, when we received advice of the ſieges of Pydna, Potidæa,

[D] *The Eubœans.* This refers to the expedition in favour of the Eubœans againſt the Thebans; which is mentioned in the note on Phil. 1. page 11. The Athenians prepared for this expedition in three days, according to Demoſthenes; in five, according to Æſchines. And their ſucceſs was as ſudden as their preparation.

[E] *This gallery*, in the original τουτὶ τὸ BHMA. That eminence where all the public ſpeakers were placed, and from whence the people were addreſſed on all occaſions.

Methone,

Methone, Pagaſæ, and other places, (for I would not detain you with a particular recital) had we ourſelves marched with a due ſpirit and alacrity to the relief of the firſt of theſe cities, we ſhould now find much more compliance, much more humility in Philip. But by ſtill neglecting the preſent, and imagining our future intereſts will not demand our care; we have aggrandiſed our enemy, we have raiſed him to a degree of eminence, greater than any king of Macedon hath ever yet enjoyed.—Now we have another opportunity. That which the Olynthians, of themſelves, preſent to the ſtate: one no leſs conſiderable than any of the former.

And, in my opinion, Athenians! if a man were to bring the dealings of the Gods towards us to a fair account, though many things might appear not quite agreeable to our wiſhes, yet he would acknowledge that we had been highly favoured by them; and with great reaſon: for that many places have been loſt in the courſe of war is truly to be charged to our own weak conduct. But that the difficulties, ariſen from hence, have not long affected us; and that an alliance now preſents itſelf, to remove them, if we are

diſpoſed

diſpoſed to make the juſt uſe of it; this I cannot but aſcribe to the divine goodneſs. But the ſame thing happens in this caſe, as in the uſe of riches. If a man be careful to ſave thoſe he hath acquired, he readily acknowledges the kindneſs of fortune: but if by his imprudence they be once loſt; with them he alſo loſes the ſenſe of gratitude. So in political affairs, they who neglect to improve their opportunities, forget the favours which the Gods have beſtowed; for it is the ultimate event which generally determines mens judgment of every thing precedent. And, therefore, all affairs hereafter ſhould engage your ſtricteſt care; that, by correcting our errors, we may wipe off the inglorious ſtain of paſt actions. But ſhould we be deaf to theſe men too, and ſhould he be ſuffered to ſubvert Olynthus; ſay, what can prevent him from marching his forces into whatever territory he pleaſes?

Is there not a man among you, Athenians! who reflects by what ſteps, Philip, from a beginning ſo inconſidreable, hath mounted to this height of power? Firſt, he took Amphipolis: then he became maſter of Pydna; then Potidæa fell; then Methone: then

then came his inroad into Theſſaly: after this, having diſpoſed affairs at Pheræ, at Pagaſæ, at Magneſia, intirely as he pleaſed, he marched [F] into Thrace. Here, while engaged in expelling ſome, and eſtabliſhing other princes, he fell ſick. Again, recovering, he never turned a moment from his courſe to eaſe or indulgence, but inſtantly

[F] *Into Thrace. Here, while engaged, &c.* Thrace was inhabited by an infinite number of different people whoſe names Herodotus hath tranſmitted. And he obſerves, that could they have united under a ſingle chief, or connected themſelves by intereſt or ſentiment, they would have formed a body infinitely ſuperior to all their neighbours. After Teres, the Thracians had divers kings. This prince had two ſons, Sitalces and Sparadocus, among whoſe deſcendants various conteſts aroſe, 'till, after a ſeries of uſurpations and revolutions, Seuthes recovered part of the territory of his father Mæſades, and tranſmitted the ſucceſſion peaceably to Cotis the father of Cerſobleptes, (as Demoſthenes ſays, not his brother, as Diodorus.) At the death of Cotis the diviſions recommenced, and in the place of one king Thrace had three, Cerſobleptes, Beriſades, and Amadocus; Cerſobleptes diſpoſſeſſed the other two, and was himſelf dethroned by Philip. Frontinus reports, that Alexander, when he had conquered Thrace, brought the princes of that country with him in his expedition into Aſia, to prevent their raiſing any commotions in his abſence. A proof that Philip and Alexander had eſtabliſhed ſeveral petty kings in Thrace, who were vaſſals to Macedon. TOURREIL.

attacked

attacked the Olynthians. His expeditions againſt the Illyrians, the Pæonians, againſt [G] Arymbas, I paſs all over.——But I may be aſked, why this recital, now?——That you may know and ſee your own error, in ever neglecting ſome part of your affairs, as if beneath your regard: and that active ſpirit with which Philip purſueth his deſigns: which ever fires him: and which never can permit him to reſt ſatisfied with thoſe things he hath already accompliſhed. If then he determines firmly and invariably to purſue his conqueſts; and if we are obſtiſtately reſolved againſt every vigorous and effectual meaſure: think, what conſequences may we expect! In the name of Heaven, can any man be ſo weak, as not to know, that, by neglecting this war, we are tranſ-

[G] *Arymbas.* He was the ſon of Alcetas, king of Epirus, and brother to Neoptolemus, whoſe daughter Olympias Philip married. About three years before the date of this oration, the death of their father produced a diſpute between the brothers about the ſucceſſion: Arymbas was the lawful heir; yet Philip obliged him, by force of arms, to divide the kingdom with Neoptolemus: and not contented with this, at the death of Arymbas, he found means by his intrigues and menaces, to prevail on the Epirots to baniſh his ſon, and to conſtitute Alexander the ſon of Neoptolemus ſole monarch. TOURREIL.

ferring

ferring it from that country to our own? And ſhould this happen, I fear, Athenians! that as they who inconſiderately borrow money upon high intereſt, after a ſhort-lived affluence are deprived of their own fortunes; ſo we, by this continued indolence, by conſulting only our eaſe and pleaſure, may be reduced to the grievous neceſſity of engaging in affairs the moſt ſhocking and diſagreeable, and of expoſing ourſelves in the defence of this our native territory.

To cenſure, ſome one may tell me, is eaſy, and in the power of every man: but the true counſellor ſhould point out that conduct which the preſent exigence demands.—Senſible as I am, Athenians, that, when your expectations have in any inſtance been diſappointed, your reſentment frequently falls not on thoſe who merit it, but on him who hath ſpoken laſt; yet I cannot, from a regard to my own ſafety, ſuppreſs what I deem of moment to lay before you. I ſay then, this occaſion calls for a twofold armament. Firſt, we are to defend the cities of the Olynthians; and for this purpoſe to detach a body of forces: in the next place, in order to infeſt his kingdom, we are

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to ſend out our navy manned with other levies. If you neglect either of theſe, I fear your expedition will be fruitleſs. For, if you content yourſelves with infeſting his dominions, this he will endure, until he is maſter of Olynthus; and then he can with eaſe repel the invaſion: or, if you only ſend ſuccours to the Olynthians, when he ſees his own kingdom free from danger, he will apply with conſtancy and vigilance to the war, and at length weary out the beſieged to a ſubmiſſion. Your levies therefore muſt be conſiderable enough to ſerve both purpoſes.——Theſe are my ſentiments, with reſpect to our armament.

And now as to the expence of theſe preparations. You are already provided for the payment of your forces better than any other people. This proviſion is diſtributed among yourſelves in the manner moſt agreeable; but if you reſtore it to the army, the ſupplies will be compleat without any addition; if not, an addition will be neceſſary; or the whole, rather, will remain to be raiſed. "How then! (I may be aſked) do "you move for a decree to apply thoſe funds "to the military ſervice?" By no means!

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it is my opinion indeed, that an army muſt be raiſed; that this money really belongs to the army; and that the ſame regulation which intitles our citizens to receive, ſhould oblige them alſo to act. At preſent you expend theſe ſums on entertainments, without regard to your affairs. It remains then that a general contribution be raiſed: a great one, if a great one be required: a ſmall one, if ſuch may be ſufficient. Money muſt be found: without it nothing can be effected: various ſchemes are propoſed by various perſons: do you make that choice which you think moſt advantageous; and, while you have an opportunity, exert yourſelves in the care of your intereſts.

[H] It is worthy your attention to conſider how the affairs of Philip are at this time circum-

[H] *It is worthy, &c.* Hitherto the orator has painted Philip in all his terrors. He is politic and vigilant and intrepid: he has riſen gradually to the higheſt pitch of power; and is now ready to appear before the walls of Athens, if he is not inſtantly oppoſed: but, leſt this deſcription ſhould diſpirit the Athenians, he is now repreſented in a quite different manner. His power is by no means real and ſolid; his allies are prepared to revolt: his kingdom is threatened with war and deſolation: and he is juſt ready to be cruſhed by

circumſtanced. For they are by no means ſo well diſpoſed, ſo very flouriſhing, as an inattentive obſerver would pronounce. Nor would he have engaged in this war at all, had he thought he ſhould have been obliged to maintain it. He hoped that, the moment he appeared, all things would fall before him. But theſe hopes were vain. And this diſappointment, in the firſt place, troubles and diſpirits him. Then the Theſſalians alarm him; a people remarkable for their [1] perfidy on all occaſions, and to all perſons. And juſt as they have ever proved,

by the very firſt effort that is made to diſtreſs him: but as it was neceſſary that the danger, to which they were expoſed, ſhould make the deepeſt impreſſion upon the minds of his hearers, he returns to his former deſcription, and concludes with the dreadful image of a formidable enemy, ravaging their territory, and ſhutting them up within their walls.

[1] *Their perfidy.* This people had a bad character from the earlieſt times, ſo as to become even proverbial; and Greece and Athens particularly had experienced their want of faith on very important occaſions. They invited Xerxes into Greece, and were not aſhamed to join Mardonius after the battle of Salamis, and to ſerve him as guides in his invaſion of Attica; and in the heat of a battle between Athens and Sparta, they on a ſudden deſerted their allies, the Athenians, and joined the enemy. *See* Thucyd. Book 1. TOURREIL.

even ſo he finds them now. For they have reſolved in council to demand the reſtitution of Pagaſæ, and have oppoſed his attempt to fortify Magneſia: and I am informed, that for the future he is to be excluded from their ports and markets, as theſe conveniences belong to the ſtates of Theſſaly, and are not to be intercepted by Philip. And, ſhould he be deprived of ſuch a fund of wealth, he muſt be greatly ſtreightened to ſupport his foreign troops. Beſides this, we muſt ſuppoſe that the Pæonian and the Illyrian, and all the others, would prefer freedom and independence to a ſtate of ſlavery. They are not accuſtomed to ſubjection, and the inſolence of this man, it is ſaid, knows no bounds; nor is this improbable: for great and unexpected ſucceſs is apt to hurry weak minds into extravagancies. Hence it often proves much more difficult to maintain acquiſitions, than to acquire. It is your part, therefore, to regard the time of his diſtreſs as your moſt favourable opportunity: improve it to the utmoſt; ſend out your embaſſies; take the field yourſelves, and excite a general ardor abroad; ever conſidering how readily Philip would attack us, if he were favoured by any incident

incident like this, if a war had broken out on our borders. And would it not be ſhameful to want the reſolution to bring that diſtreſs on him, which, had it been equally in his power, he certainly would have made you feel?

This too demands your attention, Athenians! that you are now to determine whether it be moſt expedient to carry the war into his country, or to fight him here. If Olynthus be defended, Macedon will be the ſeat of war: you may harraſs his kingdom, and enjoy your own territories free from apprehenſions. But, ſhould that nation be ſubdued by Philip, who will oppoſe his marching hither? will the Thebans? let it not be thought ſevere when I affirm that they [K] will join readily in the invaſion. Will the Phocians? a people [L] ſcarcely

[K] *Join readily in the invaſion.* The reaſons of Thebes's hatred to Athens have been already aſſigned. *See* Note on Olynth. 2. p. 74.

[L] *Scarcely able, &c.* The Phocians were at this time reduced to a very low ſtate, by a continued ſeries of ill ſucceſs in the ſacred war. Philomelus and Onomarchus had periſhed; Phayllus and Phalecus, their ſucceſſors, had been frequently defeated; and the Thebans were continually gaining advantages over them. TOURREIL.

able to defend their own country, without your aſſiſtance. [M] Will any others?—— "But, Sir," cries ſome one, "he would "make no ſuch attempt."——This would be the greateſt of abſurdities; not to execute thoſe threats, when he hath full power, which, now when they appear ſo idle and extravagant, he yet dares to utter. And I think you are not yet to learn how great would be the difference between our engaging him here, and there. Were we to be only thirty days abroad, and to draw all the neceſſaries of the camp from our own lands, even were there no enemy to ravage them, the damage would, in my opinion, amount to more than the whole expence [N] of the late war. Add then the preſence of an enemy, and how greatly muſt the calamity be increaſed: but, further, add the infamy; and to thoſe who judge rightly, no

[M] *Will any others?* He avoids all mention of the Theſſalians; becauſe he had juſt ſhewed that they were ill-affected to Philip, and therefore might be ſuppoſed willing to join with the Athenians.

[N] *Of the late war.* That is, their expedition into Thrace, in order to recover Amphipolis, which, according to the calculation of Æſchines, coſt them 1500 talents.

TOURREIL.

diſtreſs

diſtreſs can be more grievous than the ſcandal of miſconduct.

It is incumbent therefore, upon us all, (juſtly influenced by theſe conſiderations) to unite vigorouſly in the common cauſe, and repel the danger that threatens this territory. Let the rich *exert themſelves on this occaſion*; that, by contributing a ſmall portion of their affluence, they may ſecure the peaceful poſſeſſion of the reſt. Let thoſe who are of the age for military duty; that, by learning the art of war in Philip's dominions, they may become formidable defenders of their native land. Let our orators, that they may ſafely ſubmit their conduct to the public inſpection. For your judgment of their adminiſtrations will ever be determined by the event of things. And may we all contribute to render that favourable!

End of the THIRD OLYNTHIAC.

2 AP 57


THE

ORATION on the PEACE:

PRONOUNCED IN THE

ARCHONSHIP of ARCHIAS,

Three Years after the OLYNTHIAC ORATIONS.



INTRODUCTION.

THE Athenians ſent thoſe ſuccours to Olynthus, which were recommended in the preceding oration. But they could not defend that ſtate againſt its domeſtic enemies; for, the year following, two of its citizens, Laſthenes and Euthycrates, betrayed the city to Philip. He razed it, threw part of the inhabitants in chains, ſold another part, and diſtinguiſhed the two traitors only by the cruelty of their death. His two brothers, who had been harboured in Olynthus, he alſo ſacrificed to his jealouſy and revenge.

Theſe events, no leſs than the repeated inſtances of Demoſthenes, prevailed on the Athenians to declare war againſt Philip in form. Hitherto he had kept ſome meaſures with them, and

and had ſought various pretences for gloſſing over his hoſtilities; but now he fell with the utmoſt fury upon all their tributary ſtates, and obliged Demoſthenes to appear once more in the aſſembly, to perſuade the Athenians to defend the Iſlanders, and their colonies, which lay upon the Helleſpont. But ſcarcely had the war been declared, when the vigour of their enemy, and their own fickleneſs and indolence, made them weary of it. Cteſiphon and Phyrnon were ſent to ſound Philip's diſpoſitions towards a ſeparate peace. This was as he could wiſh. The Phocian war was at preſent the object of his views: and his arts had juſt regained the Theſſalians over to the confederacy, who had been prevailed on to ſtand neuter. To the Athenian miniſters, therefore, he made ſuch profeſſions, that Demoſthenes, and nine others, were ſent to negotiate the peace; who proceeded as far as they were authoriſed, and returned with Antipater, Parmenio, and Eurylochus, on the part of Philip. Ambaſſadors were ſent, ſoon after, from Athens, with full powers to conclude the treaty. In the firſt of theſe embaſſies, Demoſthenes had met with ſome Athenian priſoners in Macedon, whom he promiſed to redeem at his own expence, and took this opportunity to perform it, while his collegues, in the mean time,

time, were to proceed, with all expedition, in order to conclude with Philip. Three months elapſed, however, before they came to an audience with the king, who was all this time making himſelf maſter of thoſe places in Thrace, which the Athenians claimed as their right. At laſt the terms of the treaty were agreed to; but by affected delays, and by corrupting the ambaſſadors, he found means to defer the execution of it, until he had advanced his troops into Theſſaly, in order to proceed againſt the Phocians. He then concluded the peace, and, on their return, the ambaſſadors, who had conducted the treaty, (and Æſchines in particular) exſpatiated upon his candor and ſincerity. They declared, at the very time when he was giving Thebes the moſt ſolemn aſſurances that he would exterminate the Phocians, that his ſole views were to ſcreen this people from the fury of their enemies, and to controul the inſolence of the Thebans. They alſo vouched for his performing ſeveral things in favour of the ſtate, not formally ſtipulated in the treaty. Thus were the Athenians amuſed, and Philip ſuffered to paſs the ſtreights of Thermopylæ, and to purſue his march into Phocis.

His

His reputation and approach ſtruck ſuch a terror into the Phocians, that, although they received a reinforcement of a thouſand Spartans, they yet ſent to treat, or rather to ſubmit. He allowed Phalecus, with eight thouſand mercenaries, to retire into Peloponneſus; but the reſt, who were inhabitants of Phocis, were left at his mercy. The diſpoſal of theſe he referred to the Amphictyons, from an affected regard to the authority of an aſſembly compoſed of the repreſentatives of the ſtates of Greece. They thundered out the ſevereſt decrees againſt this wretched people. Among other things, it was enacted, that they ſhould loſe their ſeat in the Amphictyonic council, and that the double voice which they had enjoyed in it, ſhould be tranſferred to Philip, who, by the ſame reſolution, gained the ſuperintendency of the Pythian games, which the Corinthians forfeited by taking part with the Phocians.

The Athenians had not been preſent at Philip's election into this council; and probably, to avoid all oppoſition, he had aſſembled only ſuch Amphictyons as were devoted to his intereſt. He thought it proper, however, to ſend circular letters to the abſent ſtates, inviting them to aſſemble at Delphos, and to ratify his election.

Athens,

INTRODUCTION.

Athens, among others, received the invitation; and as Philip's ambitious designs could be no longer concealed, many were for violent measures. The proposal raised a ferment in the assembly; which seems to have breathed nothing but indignation and opposition. On this occasion, Demosthenes thought it his duty to moderate their heat; and, in the following oration, endeavours to prevent their being betrayed into any rash and imprudent measures.

THE

[A] THE ORATION ON THE PEACE.

ATHENIANS!

I See that this debate muſt be attended with many difficulties and great commotion: not only becauſe many of our intereſts are already given up, and therefore unneceſſary to be now laid before you; but becauſe it is impoſſible to agree on ſuch expe-

[A] I ſhall here take the liberty to tranſcribe a remark from the authors of the Univerſal Hiſtory.

Libanius and Photius have taken pains to prove that the oration to which we refer above, ought not to be aſcribed to Demoſthenes. We might well enough defend ourſelves, by alledging, that it has been generally eſteemed his, and, as ſuch, as conſtantly maintained its place

expedients as may ſecure what yet remain; but that a variety of claſhing opinions muſt divide

place in his works. This would be ſufficient for our purpoſe; but, in truth, the arguments on which the oppoſite ſentiment is built, are ſo eaſily overturned, that we might be juſtly blamed for neglecting ſo favourable an occaſion of ſetting this point in its true light. Demoſthenes, ſay thoſe who will not allow this oration to be his, charged Æſchines with betraying his country, on account of his recommending warmly a peace with Philip; they cannot therefore think, that Demoſthenes would run openly into thoſe meaſures, which he had ſo lately and ſo warmly decried; or that he, who, on every other accaſion, ſingly oppoſed Philip, and ran all hazards to bring him into odium with the people, ſhould now be ſingle on the other ſide, and attempt to croſs the diſpoſition of the Athenians, in favour of peace and Philip. Theſe objectors forget, that Demoſthenes was a patriot as well as an orator; that he did not purſue Philip with implacable hatred, becauſe he was king of Macedon, but becauſe he thought him both willing and able to obſtruct the deſigns of Athens, and even to reduce her, from that ſplendid pre-eminence which ſhe now held in Greece, to the ordinary rank of a ſtate, in name free, but in truth dependent upon him; this was the motive of Demoſthenes's heat on other occaſions; and the motive to his coolneſs now was the ſtrict alliance between Philip and the other Grecian ſtates, which rendered it a thing impracticable for Athens to contend with him and them alone. Beſides, as he rightly obſerves in the harangue, it would have been ridiculous for thoſe, who refuſed to enter into an equal war for rich cities and fertile provinces, to have ruſhed ſuddenly into a moſt unequal contempt

divide the aſſembly. Then, to adviſe, is naturally a difficult and diſtreſſing part. But you, Athenians, have rendered it yet more diſtreſſing: for all other people naturally ſeek counſel, while affairs are yet depending: you deliberate, when the event hath made it too late. Hence hath it happened, through the whole courſe of my obſervation, that the man who arraigns your conduct is heard with eſteem, and his ſentiments approved; yet have your affairs ever miſcarried, and the objects of your deliberation have all been loſt. But, although this be too true, ſtill I am perſuaded, (and from this perſuaſion I aroſe to ſpeak) that if you will put an end to tumult and oppoſition, and grant me that attention which becomes thoſe who are conſulting for their country, and upon ſo important an occaſion; I have ſome points to

into a moſt unequal conteſt about an empty title, or, as he emphatically expreſſes it, *To take away the ſhadow of Delphos from him who was maſter of Delphos itſelf.* We therefore acknowledge this to be the oration of Demoſthenes, becauſe he was worthy of it.

It is ſcarcely worth while to take notice of a ſmall miſtake in this remark. Libanius does not deny that Demoſthenes was the author of this oration. He allows it to have been written by him, but is of opinion that he never ventured to pronounce it.

urge, ſome meaſures to propoſe, which may ſerve our preſent intereſts, and repair our paſt miſcarriages.

Senſible as I am, Athenians, that to expatiate on thoſe counſels one hath formerly given, and to ſpeak of one's ſelf, is the moſt ſucceſsful artifice of thoſe who dare to practiſe ſuch artifice; yet to me it is ſo odious, ſo deteſtable, that, although I ſee it neceſſary, yet I loath it. However, it will aſſiſt your judgment, I preſume, on this occaſion, if you recal to mind ſomething of what I formerly have mentioned. —— You may remember, that during the diſorders of Eubœa, when certain perſons perſuaded you [B] to aſſiſt Plutarchus, and to undertake an inglorious

[B] *To aſſiſt Plutarchus.* Philip had long regarded Eubœa, as very proper, by its ſituation, to favour the deſigns he meditated againſt Greece. He therefore took pains to form a party in the iſland, and fomented diviſions and factions in the ſeveral ſtates of which it was compoſed. Plutarch, the governor of Eretria, one of the principal cities of Eubœa, applied to the Athenians for aſſiſtance againſt ſome attempts of Philip, and obtained it; but afterwards (having probably been gained over to Philip's party) he took up arms againſt the very auxiliaries he had invited. But this perfidy did not diſconcert Phocion who commanded them. He gained a victory over the Macedonians,

inglorious and expenſive war; I was the firſt, the only one who roſe up to oppoſe it, and ſcarcely eſcaped their fury, who for a trifling gain were urging you to many highly pernicious meaſures. In a little time, when the load of infamy had fallen upon you, and that you had ſuffered ſuch treatment as no people ever received from thoſe they had aſſiſted; you were all made ſenſible of the iniquity of your ſeducers, and the juſtneſs and integrity of my counſels. Again, when I ſaw [c] Neoptolemus the player (in that full ſecurity which his profeſſion gave him) involving the ſtate in the greateſt diſtreſs, and, in all his public conduct, devoted to Philip: I appeared, and warned you of the danger; and this from no ſecret motive,

nians, and drove Plutarch out of Eretria. Phocion was afterwards recalled, and Moloſſus, his ſucceſſor in this war, was defeated and taken priſoner by Philip.

TOUR.

[c] *Neoptolemus the player.* This Neoptolemus was alſo a great tragic poet, though the orator only mentions the leſs honourable diſtinction. Not that the profeſſion of a player was held in diſeſteem in Greece. Players were the favourites of princes, and were raiſed to the higheſt employments in the ſtate. This very man was nominated, the year before, one of the ten ambaſſadors that were to conclude the peace with Philip. TOUR.

no [D] private enmity, no officious baſeneſs, as the event itſelf diſcovered. But it is not the defenders of Neoptolemus that I accuſe, (for he was not depending on a ſingle one) but you yourſelves: for, had you been ſpectators in the theatre, not engaged in affairs of the higheſt and moſt intimate concernment to the public, you could not have heard him with more indulgence, nor me with more reſentment. And now you all know, that he who then went over to the enemy, pretending to collect ſome debts, that he might bring them hither, (as he ſaid) to inable him to ſerve the ſtate; that he who was perpetually inveighing againſt the cruelty of accuſing a man for thus tranferring his effects from that country hither; the moment that a peace freed him from all apprehenſions, converted that [E] eſtate into money, which he acquired here, and brought it off with him to Philip.

[D] *No private enmity, &c.* Probably, this is a repetition of the very words of Neoptolemus's party.

[E] *That eſtate.* The text has it, οὐσίαν φανερὰν. The Athenians diſtinguiſhed two ſorts of goods or eſtates, *apparent*, by which they underſtood *lands*; and *not-apparent*, that is, *money*, *ſlaves*, *moveables*, *&c.*

Theſe

Theſe two inſtances, which I have produced, ſhew with what fidelity and truth I ſpoke on thoſe occaſions. I ſhall mention one, and but one more, and then proceed to the point now to be debated. When we had received the ſolemn ratification of the treaty, and that the embaſſy returned home; when certain perſons aſſured you, that [F] Theſpia and Platæa were to be repeopled; that, if Philip became maſter of the Phocians, he would ſpare them; that Thebes [G] was to ſubmit to his regulation; that

[E] *That Theſpia and Platæa were to be repeopled.* Theſpia had been razed by the Thebans, under Epaminondas. Platæa had been twice deſtroyed by them; once, when Archidamus, King of Sparta, obliged the Platæans to ſurrender at diſcretion, in the fifth year of the Peloponneſian war. The Thebans, who were then joined with Lacedemon, inſiſted, that they ſhould be exterminated. The treaty of Antalcidas reſtored them; but this did not laſt long; for, three years before the battle of Leuctra, the Thebans reduced them to their former wretched ſtate, becauſe they refuſed to join with them againſt the Lacedemonians. TOUR.

[G] *That Thebes was to ſubmit to his regulation.* In the Greek it is διοικεῖν *adminiſtraturum.* Philip made uſe of this ſoft expreſſion, to perſuade the Athenians that he would reduce the Thebans to reaſon, and put it out of their power to undertake any act of outrage or injuſtice; and, at the ſame time, to avoid alarming the Thebans, or ali-

that [H] Oropus was to be our's; that [I] Eubœa ſhould be given up to us, as an equivalent for Amphipolis; with other ſuch inſidious promiſes, which, in ſpite of intereſt, of juſtice, and of honour, drove you to abandon Phocis; I never attempted to deceive you, I was not ſilent; no, you muſt remember I declared that I knew of none, that I expected none of theſe things; but thought that whoever mentioned them could ſcarcely be ſerious.

And theſe inſtances of my ſuperior foreſight I do by no means aſcribe to any extraordinary penetration: I ſpeak it not from boaſting or arrogance: nor do I pretend

enating them from his party. Wolfius thinks, that διοικεῖν is put for διοικιζεῖν, and tranſlates it *diſſipaturum, that he would exterminate the Thebans.* But I cannot think that he would have expreſſed himſelf in a manner ſo harſh, and ſo likely to make the Thebans his enemies. TOUR.

[H] *That Oropus, &c.* This city had been taken from the Athenians, the third year of the 103d Olympiad, by Themiſion, the tyrant of Eretria, and afterwards put into the hands of the Thebans. Their mutual pretenſions to this city had oftentimes embroiled theſe two ſtates. TOUR.

[I] *Eubœa ſhould be given up, &c.* For he had by this this time gained a great authority in that iſland, and ſtationed his garriſons in moſt of its cities.

to

to any ſuperiority but what ariſes from theſe two cauſes. The firſt is fortune: which I find more powerful than all the policy and wiſdom of man: the other that perfect diſintereſtedneſs, with which my judgments are ever formed: ſo that no man can hold out any advantage to my view, to influence my public conduct. Hence it is, that, on all occaſions of debate, your true intereſt ſtrikes my eye directly. But when a bribe is, as it were, caſt into one ſcale, it then preponderates, and forces down the judgment with it: ſo that it is not poſſible that a perſon thus influenced can ever offer good and ſalutary counſel.

And now, to give my ſentiments on the preſent occaſion. Whether ſubſidies, or alliances, or whatever ſchemes are concerting for the public good, one point muſt be ſecured; the continuance of the preſent peace. Not that it is ſo very excellent, or ſo worthy of you: but, of what kind ſoever it may be, it were more for the intereſt of your affairs that it had never been concluded, than that now, when it is concluded, you ſhould infringe it: for we have ſuffered ourſelves to be de-

prived of many advantages, which would have given our arms much more ſecurity and ſtrength.

In the next place we muſt be careful not to drive thoſe to extremities, who are now aſſembled, and call themſelves the council of Amphictyons; nor to afford them a pretence for a general war againſt us. Were we again engaged with Philip for Amphipolis, or any ſuch private matter of diſpute, in which neither Theſſalians, nor Argians, nor Thebans, were concerned; in my opinion, none of theſe would join againſt us; and leaſt of all,——let me be heard out without interruption, —— the Thebans: not that they wiſh well to us, or would not willingly recommend themſelves to Philip: but they are perfectly ſenſible (however mean their underſtandings may be thought) that, were they to engage in a war with you, [K] the evils would all fall on them; the advantages others would lie ready to intercept. They would therefore

[K] *The evils would all fall on them, &c.* Sparta only waited for this rupture, to aſſert its power once more. And from Philip's former conduct it appeared very plainly, that he knew how to avail himſelf of ſuch a quarrel.

never

never be betrayed into ſuch a quarrel, unleſs the cauſe were general. In like manner, another war with the Thebans for Oropus, or any ſuch private cauſe, could not, I think, diſtreſs us: for there are thoſe who would join either with us or them, to repel an invaſion, but, in offenſive meaſures, would concur with neither. This is the true nature, the very ſpirit of alliances. There are none ſo much attached to us or Thebes, as to deſire that we ſhould maintain our own power and triumph over our competitor. To be ſecure, they would all wiſh us for their own ſakes, but that either of us ſhould reduce the other to ſubjection, and ſo be inabled to give law to them, not one would bear.

Where then lies the danger? what are you to guard againſt? that general pretence for uniting againſt us, which the war now in agitation may afford the ſtates. For if [L] the Argians, and the Meſſenians, and

[L] *For if the Argians, &c.* When the Spartan power was broken by Thebes, theſe people, who had been dependent on Sparta, aſſerted their freedom. This occaſioned ſome conteſts which ſtill ſubſiſted, and in which the Spartans were favoured by Athens. TOUR.

the

the Megalopolitans, and ſuch other of the Peloponneſians as are in the ſame intereſt, ſhould make it a cauſe of quarrel, that we have ſought a treaty with the Lacedemonians, and ſeem [M] to have favoured their deſigns: if the Thebans, incenſed as they are ſaid to be at preſent, ſhould become yet more incenſed at [N] our harbouring their exiles, and taking every occaſion of declaring ourſelves implacably averſe to them; if the Theſſalians ſhould reſent our reception of the fugitive Phocians; and Philip our oppoſing his admiſſion into the council of Amphictyons; I fear, that, to revenge theſe private quarrels, they may uſe the authority of this council, to give ſanction to a general

[M] *To have favoured their deſigns, &c.* The deſigns of the Lacedemonians, of reducing theſe people to their former ſubjection. Tourreil tranſlates ἐκδέχεσθαι, *to approve.* Suidas renders it ſtronger. To forward, to promote, ἐκδέχεσθαι, *ſignificat aliquid ab altero accipere, quod ipſe deinde tractandum ſuſcipias.* Wolfius applies ἐκείνοις to the Argians, &c. and tranſlates the paſſage thus, *propter acta quædam ſua impedita.* But I have choſen the other interpretation as the moſt natural.

[N] *At our harbouring their exiles.* Many of the cities of Bœotia favoured the Phocians in the ſacred war. But when this war was ended, and the Thebans became maſters of theſe cities, they treated the inhabitants with great cruelty, and obliged them to take ſhelter at Athens.

war

war againſt us; and, in the violence of reſentment, forget even their own intereſt; as it happened in the Phocian war. You are not ignorant that the Thebans and Philip, and the Theſſalians, although they had by no means the ſame views, have yet all concurred in the ſame ſcheme of conduct. The Thebans, for inſtance, were not able to hinder Philip from paſſing, and becoming maſter of Thermopylæ, nor from coming in, after all their toils, and depriving them of the glory; (for, as [o] to poſſeſſions, and the acquiſition of territories, the Thebans have ſucceeded happily; but, in point of honour and reputation, they have ſuffered moſt ſhamefully.) If Philip did not paſs, they were to expect nothing: it was highly diſagreeable to them; yet for the ſake of [p] Orchomenus and Coronea, which they greatly deſired, but were not able to take, they choſe to endure all this. And yet there are perſons who dare to aſſert that Philip did not ſurrender theſe cities to the Thebans freely, but was compelled. Away with ſuch

[o] *As to poſſeſſions, &c.* All Phocis wus given up to them immediately after the war.

[p] *Orchomenus and Coronea, &c.* The Phocians had taken theſe two cities from them the year before.

pretences!

pretences! I am ſatisfied that this was equally his concern, with the gaining the ſtreights, the glory of the war, the honour of deciding it, and the direction of the Pythian games; and theſe were the greateſt objects of his moſt earneſt wiſhes. As to the Theſſalians, they neither deſired to ſee the Thebans aggrandiſed, nor Philip; (for in their power they ſaw danger to themſelves) but two things they greatly deſired, [Q] a ſeat in the council of Amphictyons, and the wealth of Delphos; and thence were they induced to join in the confederacy. Thus you may obſerve that private intereſt oftentimes engages men in meaſures quite oppoſite to their inclinations. And therefore it is your part to proceed with the utmoſt caution.

"What then?" ſaith ſome one, "ſhall "theſe apprehenſions make us yield to his "demands? is this your motion?" Not at all! I only mean to ſhew you, how you may maintain your dignity, avoid a war, and approve your moderation and juſtice to the

[Q] *A ſeat in the council, &c.* Of which they had been deprived by the Phocians making themſelves maſters of Delphos, where this council aſſembled.

world.

world. As to thoſe violent men who think we ſhould brave all dangers, nor foreſee the difficulties attending upon arms, I wiſh them to conſider this. We allow the Thebans to poſſeſs Oropus: were we aſked the motive; we ſhould anſwer, to avoid a war. In like manner, by the preſent treaty, we yield Amphipolis to Philip; [R] we ſuffer the Cardians to be diſtinguiſhed from the other inhabitants of the Cherſoneſus; the king of Caria [S] to poſſeſs Chios, and Cos, and Rhodes; and the Byzantines [T] to cruiſe for prizes: and this,

[R] *We ſuffer the Cardians to be diſtinguiſhed, &c.* This is explained in the introduction to the oration on the ſtate of the Cherſoneſus.

[S] *The king of Caria.* Mauſolus, king of that country, had aſſiſted theſe iſlands againſt Athens, in the ſocial war: and when, at the concluſion of this war, the Athenians were obliged to declare them free and independent, their ally made himſelf maſter of them. Upon the death of Mauſolus, his wife Artemiſia maintained his dominion in theſe new conquered iſlands. She ſurvived her huſband but two years, and was ſucceeded by her brother Hidrieas, who reigned in Caria at the time that this oration was pronounced. TOUR.

[T] *And the Byzantines, &c.* Theſe people had alſo revolted from the Athenians, and joined with the iſlanders in the ſocial war:——How far, or on what pretence they were ſuffered to commit thoſe outrages upon the ſeas, does not appear. TOUR.

becauſe

becauſe we think that peace and tranquillity will produce more advantages than violence and conteſts about theſe points. And if thus directed in our conduct towards each particular ſtate, and where our intereſt is highly and intimately concerned; it would be perfect weakneſs and abſurdity to provoke the reſentment of them all, for a ſhadow [U].

[U] *For a ſhadow.* In the Greek: Περὶ τῆς ἐν Δελφοῖς σκιᾶς, *for a ſhadow in Delphos.* That is, for an empty title of Amphictyon, or of a protector of the temple of Delphos.

2. AP 57

End of the ORATION *on the* PEACE.

THE SEVENTH
ORATION againſt PHILIP:

Commonly called the SECOND.

PRONOUNCED IN THE

ARCHONSHIP of LYCISCUS,

Two Years after the Oration on the PEACE.


BRITISH MUSEUM

INTRODUCTION.

THE Greeks thought it proper to confirm, or at leaſt not to oppoſe Philip's admiſſion into the council of Amphictyons, where he immediately aſſumed a deſpotic power. In every enterpriſe he armed himſelf with one of their decrees, and, under pretence of executing them, made a merit of oppreſſing ſeveral ſtates of Greece.

The Thebans opened him an entrance into Peloponneſus, where, from their inveterate hatred to the Lacedemonians, they were conſtantly fomenting diviſions. They ſolicited Philip to join with them, the Meſſenians, and the Argians, to reduce the power of Lacedemon, who, without any right but that of the ſtrongeſt, had erected itſelf into a kind of ſovereignty, to the prejudice of the neighbouring ſtates. Philip willingly liſtened to an over-

ture, which agreed ſo well with his own views. He propoſed, or rather dictated a decree to the Amphictyons, that the Lacedemonians ſhould ſuffer Argos and Meſſene to enjoy an abſolute independence; and, under the pretence of ſupporting their authority, at the ſame time marched a great body of forces towards thoſe parts.

The Lacedemonians juſtly alarmed, applied to Athens for ſuccour; and ſtrongly urged, by their ambaſſadors, the concluſion of a league which was neceſſary for their common ſafety. All the powers, intereſted in croſſing this league, uſed their utmoſt diligence to that end. Philip, by his miniſters, repreſented to the Athenians, that they could not with juſtice declare againſt him: and that, if he had not come to a rupture with the Thebans, he had in this done nothing contrary to his treaty with Athens. And this indeed was true, with reſpect to the public articles of the peace; whatever private aſſurances he might have given their ambaſſadors. The repreſentatives of Thebes, Argos, and Meſſene, preſſed the Athenians on their part; and reproached them with having already too much favoured the Lacedemonians,

thoſe

thoſe enemies of Thebes, and tyrants of Peloponneſus. The ſtrength of thoſe remonſtrances ſomewhat ſtaggered the Athenians. They were unwilling to break with Philip, and then, on the other hand, could not but ſee danger to themſelves in the ruin of Lacedemon. They were therefore in doubt what anſwer to give to the Lacedemonian ambaſſadors: on which occaſion Demoſthenes pronounced the following oration.

PHILIPPIC THE SECOND.

ATHENIANS!

WHEN the hoſtile attempts of Philip, and thoſe outrageous violations of the peace, which he is perpetually committing, are at any time the ſubject of our debates; the ſpeeches on your ſide I find [A] humane and juſt; and that the ſenti-

[A] *Humane and juſt.* An oppoſition to the growing power of Macedon the orator ever affects to conſider as the cauſe of liberty, of juſtice, and of Greece. The intereſt of the nation, that is, of the whole aſſemblage of the Græcian ſtates, was, profeſſedly, the firſt great object of regard, to every member of every community. This was their

ments of thoſe who inveigh againſt Philip never fail of approbation: but as to the neceſſary meaſures; to ſpeak out plainly, not one hath been purſued, nor any thing effected even to reward the attention to theſe harangues. Nay, to ſuch circumſtances is our ſtate reduced, that the more fully and evidently a man proves that Philip is acting contrary to his treaty, and harbouring deſigns againſt Greece, the greater is his difficulty in pointing out your duty.

their moſt extenſive affection. The diſtinction of Greek and Barbarian precluded the reſt of mankind from a juſt ſhare in their philanthropy. At leaſt, it was not generally conſidered, as a duty, to extend their benevolence farther than the boundaries of their nation. Theſe included all that were really conſidered of the ſame *kind*. And hence it is, as I conceive, that the love of their countrymen was called, by the moſt extenſive term, the love of mankind. The word, therefore, in the original [φιλανθρώπες] which is rendered *humane*, the tranſlator underſtood as expreſſive of a regard to the general welfare of Greece. Nor was it owing to any deſign of concealing his ignorance, that this explanation was not originally allowed a place in the notes on this oration. What is, or is imagined to be clear to us, we are apt to flatter ourſelves, muſt, at firſt glance, appear to others exactly in the ſame light. Juſt as we ſometimes ſuppoſe, that the difficulty we ourſelves cannot conquer, is, in itſelf, abſolutely inſuperable.

The

The reaſon is this. They who aſpire to an extravagant degree of power, are to be oppoſed by force, and action, not by ſpeeches: and yet, in the firſt place, we public ſpeakers are unwilling to recommend or to propoſe any thing to this purpoſe, from the fear of your diſpleaſure: but confine ourſelves to general repreſentations of the grievous, of the outrageous nature of his conduct; and the like. Then, you who attend, are better qualified than Philip, either to plead the juſtice of your cauſe; or to apprehend it, when inforced by others: but, as to any effectual oppoſition to his preſent deſigns, in this, you are intirely inactive. You ſee then the conſequence, the neceſſary, the natural conſequence; each of you excels in that which hath engaged your time and application: he, in acting; you, in ſpeaking. And if, on this occaſion, it be ſufficient that we ſpeak with a ſuperior force of truth and juſtice, this may be done with the utmoſt eaſe: but if we are to conſider how to rectify our preſent diſorders; how to guard againſt the danger of plunging inadvertently into ſtill greater; againſt the progreſs of a power which may at laſt bear down all oppoſition; then muſt our debates proceed in a different manner; and all they who ſpeak,

and all you who attend, muſt prefer the beſt and moſt ſalutary meaſures to the eaſieſt and moſt agreeable.

Firſt then, Athenians, if there be a man who feels no apprehenſions at the view of Philip's power, and the extent of his conqueſts; who imagines that theſe portend no danger to the ſtate, or that his deſigns are not all aimed againſt you; I am amazed! and muſt intreat the attention of you all, while I explain thoſe reaſons briefly, which induce me to entertain different expectations, and to regard Philip as our real enemy: that if I appear to have looked forward with the more penetrating eye, you may join with me; if they, who are thus ſecure and confident in this man, you may yield to their direction.

In the firſt place therefore, I conſider the acquiſitions made by Philip when the peace was juſt concluded: Thermopylæ, and the command of Phocis. What uſe did he make of theſe?——He choſe to ſerve the intereſt of Thebes, not that of Athens. And why? As ambition is his great paſſion, univerſal empire the ſole object of his views; not peace, not tranquillity, not any juſt purpoſe; he

he knew this well, that neither our conſtitution nor our principles would admit him to prevail upon you, (by any thing he could promiſe, by any thing he could do) to ſacrifice one ſtate of Greece to your private intereſt: but that, as you have the due regard to juſtice, as you have an abhorrence of the leaſt ſtain upon your honour, and as you have that quick diſcernment which nothing can eſcape; the moment his attempt was made, you would oppoſe him with the ſame vigour, as if you yourſelves had been immediately attacked. The Thebans, he ſuppoſed, (and the event confirmed his opinion) would, for the ſake of any private advantage, ſuffer him to act towards others as he pleaſed; and far from oppoſing or impeding his deſigns, would be ready at his command to fight upon his ſide. From the ſame perſuaſion he now heaps his favours on the Meſſenians and Argians. And this reflects the greateſt luſtre upon you, my countrymen! for by theſe proceedings you are declared the only invariable aſſertors of the rights of Greece; the only perſons, whom no private attachment, no views of intereſt, can ſeduce from their affection to the Greeks.

And that it is with reaſon he entertains theſe ſentiments of you, and ſentiments ſo different of the Thebans and the Argians; he may be convinced, not from the preſent only, but from a review of former times. For he muſt have been informed, I preſume, he cannot but have heard, that your anceſtors, when by ſubmitting to the KING, they might have purchaſed the ſovereignty of Greece, not only ſcorned to liſten, [B] when Alexander this man's anceſtor was made the meſſenger of ſuch terms, but choſe to abandon their city, encountered every poſſible difficulty, and, after all this, performed ſuch exploits, as men are ever eager to recite, yet with the juſt force and dignity, no man ever could expreſs: and therefore it becomes me to be ſilent on this ſubject: for in reality their actions are ſuperior to the power of words.

[B] *When Alexander, &c.* The reader may find the hiſtory here alluded to in the eighth and ninth books of Herodotus. The expreſſions in the original are as contemptuous as poſſible, ὁ τάτε; or as ſome editions have it, ὁ τάτε Πρόγονος, the anceſtor of *theſe wretches the Macedonians*; and then, not Πρέσβευς, *ambaſſador*, but ΚΗΡΥΞ, *herald* or *crier*, *the ſlave or menial officer of his maſter Mardonius*. *Avec le titre d' ambaſſadeur* (as Tourreil tranſlates it) ſuggeſts the honourable idea which Demoſthenes takes ſuch pains to keep out of view.

As

As to the anceſtors of the Thebans and the Argians, the [c] one, he knows, fought for the Barbarian; the others did not oppoſe him. He knew then, that both theſe people would attend but to their private intereſt, without the leaſt regard to the common cauſe of Greece: ſhould he chuſe you for allies, you would ſerve him ſo far only, as juſtice would permit; but, if he attached himſelf to them, he gained aſſiſtants in all the ſchemes of his ambition. This it is that

[c] *The one, he knows, fought for the Barbarian; the others did not oppoſe him.* The readineſs with which the Thebans granted earth and water, the tokens of ſubmiſſion, to the Perſian, the regret with which they joined Leonidas at Thermopylæ, their joining openly with Xerxes, when his arms had the appearance of ſucceſs, and other circumſtances, confirmed by the united teſtimony of hiſtorians, all warrant the aſſertion of Demoſthenes. The Argians were engaged to a neutrality, by an artifice of the Perſians, who pretended to derive their deſcent from Perſeus, the ſon of Acriſius, one of the kings of Argos. This pretence, how groſs ſoever, was ſufficient for a people who choſe to be deceived: and would not reflect that this monarchy had not the title of Perſian, till the reign of Cyrus. Their infidelity to the cauſe of Greece they concealed under the veil of ambition; for they profeſſed themſelves ready to concur in the common defence, provided that they were admitted to an equal ſhare of the command with Lacedemon: which propoſal was rejected, as they deſired.

then

then determined him, this it is that now determines him to their ſide rather than to your's: not that he ſees they have [D] a greater naval force than we; or that, having gained the ſovereignty in the inland countries, he declines the command of the ſeas, and the advantages of commerce; or that he hath forgotten thoſe pretences, thoſe promiſes which obtained him the peace.

But I may be told, "it is true, he did act "thus; but not from ambition, or from "any of thoſe motives of which I accuſe "him; but as he thought the cauſe of "Thebes [E] more juſt than our's."—This of all pretences he cannot now alledge.

[F] Can

[D] *A greater naval force, &c.* Athens, as a maritime power, was ſuperior to all the other Greeks. At the battle of Salamis, of the three hundred veſſels which compoſed the Grecian fleet, two hundred were Athenian. Three hundred ſhips ſailed from the port of Athens upon the expedition to Sicily; and their fleet was afterwards increaſed to four hundred. TOUR.

[E] *The cauſe of Thebes more juſt than, &c.* The union of Philip with the Thebans had a very plauſible colour: that of eſpouſing the cauſe of Apollo, and puniſhing the ſacrilegious profaners of his temple. It was not convenient to diſplay this at large, and therefore he cuts it ſhort by one vague expreſſion. For the art of an orator appears

no

[F] Can he, who commands the Lacedemonians to quit their claim to Meſſene, pretend that, in giving up Orchomenus and Coronea to the Thebans, he acted from regard to juſtice? But now comes his laſt ſubterfuge. He was compelled: and yielded theſe places, quite againſt his inclinations, being encompaſſed by the Theſſalian horſe and Theban infantry. Fine pretence!——Juſt ſo, they cry, he is to entertain ſuſpicions of the Thebans: and ſome ſpread rumours of their own framing, that he is to [G] fortify Elatea. Yes! theſe things are yet to be, and ſo will they remain, in my opinion; but his at tack on Lacedemon, in conjunction with the Thebans and Argians, is not yet

no leſs in ſuppreſſing ſuch things as may prove unfavourable to his deſign, than in dwelling on thoſe points which may aſſiſt it. TOUR.

[F] *Can he who commands the Lacedemonians, &c.* Becauſe the pretenſions of each were of the ſame nature. Lacedemon aſſumed the ſupreme power in Peloponneſus. Thebes affected the like power in Bœotia.

[G] *To fortify Elatea.* This was the moſt conſiderable city in Phocis; and by, it's ſituation, very well fitted to keep the Thebans in awe. So that ſome years after, when Philip perceived that the Thebans were growing cool to him, his firſt ſtep was to take poſſeſſion of Elatea. TOUR.

to be made. No! he is actually detaching forces, ſupplying money; and is himſelf expected at the head of a formidable army. The Lacedemonians therefore, the enemies of Thebes, he now infeſts. And will he then reſtore the Phocians, whom he hath but juſt now ruined? who can believe this? I, for my part, can never think, if Philip had been forced into thoſe former meaſures, or if he had now abandoned the Thebans, that he would make this continued oppoſition to their enemies. No! his preſent meaſures prove that all his paſt conduct was the effect of choice; and from all his actions it appears, that all his actions are directly levelled againſt this ſtate. And there is in ſome ſort a neceſſity for this. Conſider: he aims at empire, and from you alone he expects oppoſition. He hath long loaded us with injuries: and of this he himſelf is moſt intimately conſcious: for thoſe of our poſſeſſions, which he hath reduced to his ſervice, he uſes as a barrier to his other territories: ſo that, if he ſhould give up Amphipolis and Potidæa, he would not think himſelf ſecure even in Macedon. He is therefore ſenſible, that he entertains deſigns againſt you, and that you perceive them.

Then,

Then, as he thinks highly of your wiſdom, he concludes that you muſt hold him in that abhorrence which he merits: hence is he alarmed: expecting to feel ſome effects of your reſentment, (if you have any favourable opportunity) unleſs he prevents you by his attack. Hence is his vigilance awakened: his arm raiſed againſt the ſtate: he courts ſome of the Thebans, and ſuch of the Peloponneſians as have the ſame views with him; whom he deems too mercenary to regard any thing but preſent intereſt, and too perverſely ſtupid to foreſee any conſequences. And yet perſons of but moderate diſcernment may have ſome manifeſt examples to alarm them, [H] which I had occaſion to mention to the Meſſenians, and to the Argians. Perhaps it may be proper to repeat them here.

[H] *Which I had occaſion to, &c.* When Philip firſt began to intereſt himſelf in the diſputes between theſe ſtates and Lacedemon, the Athenians ſent an embaſſy to endeavour to weaken his intereſt in Peloponneſus, and to diſſuade the Meſſenians and Argians from accepting of his interpoſition. On this occaſion it was, that Demoſthenes made the oration from which he now quotes this paſſage.

"Meſſe-

" Meſſenians!" ſaid I, " how highly " (think ye) would the Olynthians have " been offended, if any man had ſpoken " againſt Philip at that time when he gave " them up [1] Anthemus, a city which " the former kings of Macedon had ever " claimed? when he drove out the Athe- " nian colony, and gave them Potidæa? " when he took all our reſentment on him- " ſelf, and left them to enjoy our domi- " nions? Did they expect to have ſuffered " thus? had it been foretold, would they " have believed it? you cannot think it! " Yet, after a ſhort enjoyment of the terri- " tories of others, they have been for ever " deſpoiled of their own by this man. In- " glorious has been their fall, not conquered " only, but betrayed and ſold by one ano- " ther. For thoſe intimate correſpondences " with tyrants ever portend miſchief to free " ſtates. Turn your eyes, ſaid I, to the " Theſſalians! think ye, that when he firſt " expelled their tyrants, when he then gave

[1] *Anthemus.* This city of Macedon had been poſſeſſed by the anceſtors of Philip from the earlieſt ages; for we learn from Herodotus, B. 5. that about two hundred years before, Amyntas made an offer of Anthemus to Hippias the ſon of Piſiſtratus. TOUR.

them

" them up [K] Nicæa and Magneſia, that
" they expected ever to have been ſubjected
" to thoſe [L] governors now impoſed on
" them? or that the man who reſtored them
" to their ſeat in the Amphictyonic coun-
" cil, would have deprived them of their
" own proper revenues? yet, that ſuch was
" the event, the world can teſtify. In like
" manner, you now behold Philip laviſhing
" his gifts and promiſes upon you. If you
" are wiſe, you will pray that he may ne-
" ver appear to have deceived and abuſed
" you. Various are the contrivances for
" the defence and ſecurity of cities: as bat-
" tlements, and walls, and trenches, and
" every other kind of fortification; all

[K] *Nicæa.* This city of Locris had been given up to Philip, by Phalecus, at the concluſion of the ſacred war. TOUR.

[L] *Thoſe governors, &c.* The tyranny ſaid to have been impoſed by Philip on the Theſſalians, is, in the original of this paſſage, called a government of TEN: yet, in the third Philippic, it is ſtyled a tetrarchy, or government of FOUR. Hence, there are grounds to preſume, that an error has crept into the antient copies. Unleſs it be ſuppoſed that Philip divided the country of Theſſaly into four diſtricts, and over each of thoſe eſtabliſhed ten governors; if, by ſuch a ſuppoſition, the authority of the copies may be preſerved.

" which are the effects of labour, and at-
" tended with continual expence. But
" there is one common bulwark, with
" which men of prudence are naturally
" provided, the guard and ſecurity of all
" people, particularly of free ſtates, againſt
" the aſſaults of tyrants. What is this?
" Diſtruſt. Of this be mindful: to this
" adhere: preſerve this carefully, and no
" calamity can affect you. " What is it
" you ſeek?" ſaid I: Liberty? And do
" ye not perceive that nothing can be more
" adverſe to this than the very titles of Phi-
" lip? every monarch, every tyrant is an
" enemy to liberty, and the oppoſer of laws.
" Will ye not then be careful, leſt, while
" ye ſeek to be freed from war, ye find
" yourſelves his ſlaves?"

But although they heard theſe things, and loudly expreſt their approbation; though the like points were frequently urged by the ambaſſadors, while I was preſent; and probably were afterwards repeated; yet ſtill they have no leſs dependence on the friendſhip and the promiſes of Philip. But it is not ſtrange that the Meſſenians and ſome of the Peloponneſians ſhould act contrary to the

the dictates of nature, reaſon, and reflection. Even you, who are yourſelves fully ſenſible, and conſtantly reminded by your public ſpeakers, that there are deſigns forming againſt you, that the toils of your enemies are ſurrounding you; will, I fear, be plunged by your ſupineneſs into all thoſe dangers that threaten you: ſo prevalent is the pleaſure and indulgence of a moment over all your future intereſts.——But, as to the courſe neceſſary to be purſued, prudence requires, that this be debated hereafter among yourſelves. At preſent, I ſhall propoſe ſuch an anſwer to theſe miniſters, as may be worthy of your concurrence [M] * * * * *

It would be juſt, Athenians, to call the men before you, who gave thoſe promiſes which induced you to conclude the peace. For neither would I have undertaken the embaſſy, nor would you (I am convinced) have laid down your arms, had it been ſuſ-

[M] Though none of our editors take notice of it; in this place, the proper officer muſt have propoſed the orator's motion in form. Unleſs we ſuppoſe, that this oration has deſcended to us imperfect: for, as the text now ſtands, there is a manifeſt want of connexion between this ſentence and what follows. OLIVET.

pected that Philip would have acted thus, when he had obtained a peace. No! the aſſurances he then gave were quite different from his preſent actions. There are others alſo to be ſummoned. Who are theſe? The men, who, at my return from the ſecond embaſſy, (ſent for the ratification of the treaty) when I ſaw the ſtate abuſed, and warned you of your danger, and teſtified the truth, and oppoſed with all my power the giving up Thermopylæ and Phocis; the men, I ſay, who then cried out that I, the water-drinker, was moroſe and peeviſh; but that Philip, if permitted to paſs, would act agreeably to your deſires; would fortify Theſpia and Platæa; reſtrain the inſolence of Thebes; [N] cut through the Cherſoneſus at his own expence; and give you up Eubœa and Oropus, as an equivalent for Amphipolis.——That all this was poſitively affirmed, you cannot, I am ſure, forget, though not remarkable for remembering

[N] *Cut through the Cherſoneſus, &c.* When Cerſobleptes has given up the Cherſoneſus to the Athenians, it became perpetually expoſed to the incurſions of Thrace. The only way of putting a ſtop to them was to cut through the Iſthmus, (for the Thracians had no ſhips.) And this Philip promiſed to do in favour of the Athenians and their colonies.

bering injuries. And, to compleat the diſgrace, you have engaged your poſterity to the ſame treaty, in full dependence on thoſe promiſes; ſo intirely have you been ſeduced.

And now, to what purpoſe do I mention this? and why do I deſire that theſe men ſhould appear?——I call the Gods to witneſs, that without the leaſt evaſion I ſhall boldly declare the truth!——Not that, by breaking [o] out into invectives, I may expoſe

[o] *Not that, by breaking out into invectives.* Wolfius, whom the tranſlator here follows, hath been ſeverely cenſured for this interpretation by the Italian commentator, who renders the former part of the ſentence thus: Eos non ideo vocari velim, ut qui olim convitiis dehoneſtatus fui, æque nunc mihi a vobis famam conciliem——παρ' ὑμῖν ought not to be rendered a vobis, but apud vos: or, as the tranſlator, who follows Luccheſini's authority, has juſtly explained it, in his note, *in your preſence.* But my objection to this interpretation does not ariſe from grammatical nicety, but from a regard to the context, the ſureſt comment. If Demoſthenes, inſtead of the diſgraceful treatment he formerly received, both from the partizans of Macedon and from the people, was now to be received with applauſe, and to triumph over his oppoſers; how could theſe have another opportunity of receiving Philip's gold? Such wages were only paid when earned. They were beſtowed, not on ineffectual efforts, but real ſervices:

poſe myſelf to the like treatment, and once more give my old enemies an opportunity of receiving Philip's gold: nor yet that I may indulge an impertinent vanity of haranguing. But I apprehend the time muſt come, when Philip's actions will give you more concern than at preſent. His deſigns, I ſee are ripening: I wiſh my apprehenſions may not prove juſt: but I fear that time is not far off. And when it will no longer be in your power to diſregard events; when neither mine nor any other perſon's information, but your own knowledge, your own ſenſes will aſſure you of the impending danger;

and theſe his friends could not perform, if diſgraced and diſcouraged by the aſſembly. The whole ſentiment of the orator, as tranſlated by Wolfius, is this: "I do not wiſh "that theſe men may appear, in order to indulge my in- "dignation and reſentment againſt them, that ſo they may "retort my accuſations with double virulence (as was the "caſe when we firſt returned from our embaſſy) and thus "by once more gaining your favour, and triumphing over "me, they may have an opportunity of boaſting their ſer- "vices to Philip, and obtaining their reward." The paſſage manifeſtly alludes to the tranſactions of the aſſembly, when the ten ambaſſadors returned, who had been ſent to treat with Philip about a peace: and which are particularly deſcribed by Demoſthenes, in his oration *on the embaſſy*. And we may ſafely appeal to the reader, who conſults that oration, as to the propriety of the preſent interpretation.

then

then will your ſevereſt reſentment break forth. And as your ambaſſadors have concealed certain things, influenced (as they themſelves are conſcious) by corruption; I fear that they who endeavour to reſtore what theſe men have ruined, may feel the weight of your diſpleaſure: for there are ſome, I find, who generally point their anger not at the deſerving objects, but thoſe moſt immediately at their mercy.

While our affairs, therefore, remain not abſolutely deſperate; while it is yet in our power to debate; give me leave to remind you all of one thing, though none can be ignorant of it.—[P] Who was the man that perſuaded you to give up Phocis and Thermopylæ? which once gained, he alſo gained free acceſs for his troops, to Attica and to Peloponneſus: and obliged us to turn our thoughts from the rights of Greece, from all foreign intereſts, to a defenſive war, in theſe very territories: whoſe approach muſt be ſeverely felt by every one of us: and that very day gave

[P] *Who was the man, &c.* The perſon pointed at is Æſchines. Theſe two ſtateſmen accuſed each other, when the bad conſequences of this treaty came to be univerſally felt and acknowledged.

birth to it: for, had we not been then deceived, the ſtate could have nothing to apprehend. His naval power could not have been great enough to attempt Attica by ſea, nor could he have paſſed by land through Thermopylæ and Phocis. But he muſt have either confined himſelf within the bounds of juſtice, and lived in a due obſervance of his treaty, or have inſtantly been involved in a war, equal to that which obliged him to ſue for peace.

Thus much may be ſufficient to recal paſt actions to your view. May all the Gods forbid that the event ſhould confirm my ſuſpicions! for I by no means deſire that any man ſhould meet even the deſerved puniſhment of his crimes, when the whole community is in danger of being involved in his deſtruction.

2 AP 57

End of the SECOND PHILIPPIC.

THE
ORATION
ON THE
STATE of the CHERSONESUS:
PRONOUNCED IN THE
ARCHONSHIP of SOCIGENES,
Two YEARS after the SECOND PHILIPPIC.

BRITISH MUSEUM

INTRODUCTION.

IN the foregoing oration, the vehemence of Demoſthenes determined the Athenians to oppoſe the attempts of Philip; and his repreſentations to the Argians and Meſſenians inſpired them with ſuſpicion, and at length detached them from all connexions with Macedon. When Philip therefore found his practices in Peloponneſus unſucceſsful, he began to turn his thoughts to other enterpriſes: to purſue his conqueſts in Thrace, and croſs the Athenian intereſt in the Cherſoneſus. This peninſula had, with ſome little interruption, been for many years in the hands of the Athenians. Cotys, as king of the country, had lately wreſted it from them, and left it in ſucceſſion to his ſon Cerſobleptes. But, he being unable to ſupport himſelf againſt the power of Philip, reſigned it again to the Athenians; and they, according to cuſtom, ſent in a colony, which the inhabitants received, and freely

freely ſhared their lands and habitations with their new gueſts. The people of Cardia, the principal city, however, ſtill aſſerted their independence: and, when Diopithes, the commander of the Athenian colony, would have reduced them by force of arms, had recourſe to Philip; who immediately detached a body of forces to their ſupport. Diopithes conſidered this proceeding as an act of hoſtility againſt Athens; without waiting for inſtructions from his ſtate, raiſed a conſiderable force; and, while Philip was engaged in war, in the inland parts of Thrace, entered the maritime parts (which were his territories) with fire and ſword, and brought off a great booty, which he lodged ſafe in the Cherſoneſus. Philip was not at leiſure to repel this inſult: he therefore contented himſelf with complaining by letters, to the Athenians, of this conduct of their general. The penſioners which he had at Athens immediately exerted themſelves for their maſter. They inveighed loudly againſt Diopithes, accuſed him of violating the peace which then ſubſiſted between them and Philip, of involving the ſtate in war; of exaction, rapine, and piracy; and preſſed for his being recalled.

Demoſthenes,

INTRODUCTION.

Demoſthenes, judging, that at ſuch a juncture, the public intereſt was connected with that of Diopithes, undertakes his defence in the following oration; throws the whole blame of the exactions and piracies he is accuſed of, upon the Athenians themſelves; turns their attention to Philip and his hoſtilities; and concludes, that whoever oppoſes or diſtreſſes him in any manner, does a ſervice to the ſtate; and that, inſtead of diſavowing what Diopithes had done, or directing him to diſmiſs his army, they ſhould reinforce him, and ſhew the king of Macedon, they know how to protect their territories, and to maintain the dignity of their country, as well as their anceſtors.

It appears, from the beginning of this oration, that before Demoſthenes aroſe, the affair had been violently conteſted in the aſſembly. Poſſibly the heat of oppoſition added to the natural fire of the orator. For the ſtyle of the oration is (in my opinion) remarkably animated: and we find an extraordinary degree of ſeverity and indignation breaking out in every part of it.

THE

THE ORATION ON THE STATE of the CHERSONESUS.

IT were to be wiſhed, Athenians, that they who ſpeak in public would never ſuffer hatred or affection to influence their counſels; but, in all that they propoſe, be directed by unbiaſſed reaſon; particularly, when affairs of ſtate, and thoſe of higheſt moment, are the object of our attention. But ſince there are perſons, whoſe ſpeeches are partly dictated by a ſpirit of contention, partly by other like motives; it is your duty, Athenians, to exert that power which your numbers give you; and in all your reſolu-

tions,

tions, and in all your actions, to conſider only the intereſt of your country.

Our preſent concernment is about the affairs of the Cherſoneſus, and Philip's expedition into Thrace, which hath now engaged him eleven months: but moſt of our orators inſiſt upon the actions and deſigns of Diopithes. As to crimes objected to thoſe men, whom our laws can puniſh when we pleaſe; I, for my part, think it quite indifferent, whether they be conſidered now, or at ſome other time; nor is this a point to be violently conteſted, by me or any other ſpeaker. But when Philip, the enemy of our country, is now actually [A] hovering about the Helleſpont, with a numerous army, and making attempts on our dominions, which if one moment neglected, the loſs may be irreparable; here, our attention is inſtantly demanded; we ſhould reſolve, we ſhould prepare with all poſſible expedition, and not run from our main concern, in the midſt of foreign clamours and accuſations.

[A] *Hovering about the Helleſpont.* By the Helleſpont we are to underſtand not the ſtreight itſelf, that ſeparates Europe from Aſia, but the cities and countries all along the coaſt.

I have

I have frequently been ſurpriſed at aſſertions made in public; but never more, than when I lately heard it affirmed [B] in the ſenate, that there are but two expedients to be propoſed, either abſolutely to declare war, or to continue in peace. The point is this: if Philip acts as one in amity with us; if he does not keep poſſeſſion of our dominions, contrary to his treaty; if he be not everywhere ſpiriting up enemies againſt us; all debates are at an end; we are undoubtedly obliged to live in peace, and I find it perfectly agreeable to you. But if the articles of our treaty, ratified by the moſt ſolemn oaths, remain upon record, open to public inſpection; if it appears, that long before the departure of Diopithes and his colony, who are now accuſed of involving us in a war, Philip had unjuſtly ſeized many of our poſſeſſions, (for which I appeal to your own decrees;) if, ever ſince that time, he has been conſtantly arming himſelf with all the powers of Greeks and Barbarians, to deſtroy

[B] *In the ſenate.* Into which Demoſthenes had been admitted, in the archonſhip of Themiſtocles, a little after the taking of Olynthus. And (if we may believe Æſchines) not in the regular manner, but by intrigue and bribery.

us; what do theſe maen men, who affirm we are either abſolutely to declare war, or to obſerve the peace? You have no choice at all; you have but one juſt and neceſſary meaſure to purſue, which they induſtriouſly paſs over. And what is this? to repel force by force. Unleſs they will affirm, that, while Philip keeps from Attica and [c] the Piræus, he does our ſtate no injury, makes no war againſt us. If it be thus they ſtate the bounds of peace and juſtice, we muſt all acknowledge that their ſentiments are inconſiſtent with the common rights of mankind, with the dignity and the ſafety of Athens.

Beſides, they themſelves contradict their own accuſation of Diopithes. For ſhall

[c] *The Piræus.* This is the firſt time the orator mentions this celebrated port of Athens. It was at firſt detached from the city, but afterwards joined to it, by two long walls which the Greeks called the Legs of the Piræus; and from that time, by the advice of Themiſtocles, the Athenians made this their principal harbour. It could contain 400 ſhips of war; was well fortified, and furniſhed with a market, to which all the trading part of Greece reſorted. Hiſtorians call it the *triple port*, for it really contained three: the firſt called Κάνθαρος, from an hero of that name: the ſecond Ἀφροδίσιον, from two temples of Venus that were erected in it: the third Ζέα, becauſe it was the mart for corn. TOUR.

Philip

Philip be left at full liberty to purſue all his other deſigns, provided he keeps from Attica; and ſhall not Diopithes be permitted to aſſiſt the Thracians? and if he does, ſhall we accuſe him of involving us in a war?——But this is their inceſſant cry, "our foreign troops com-"mit outrageous devaſtations on the Hel-"leſpont: Diopithes, without regard to "juſtice, ſeizes and plunders veſſels! Theſe "things muſt not be ſuffered!" Be it ſo: I acquieſce! but while the yare labouring to have our troops diſbanded, by inveighing againſt that man, whoſe care and induſtry ſupport them: (if they really ſpeak from a regard to juſtice) they ſhould ſhew us, that, if we yield to their remonſtrances, Philip's army alſo will be diſbanded: elſe, it is apparent that their whole aim is to reduce the ſtate to thoſe circumſtances which have occaſioned all the loſſes we have lately ſuffered. For, be aſſured of this, that nothing hath given Philip ſuch advantage over us, as his ſuperior vigilance in improving all opportunities. For, as he is conſtantly ſurrounded by his troops, and his mind perpetually engaged in projecting his deſigns, he can, in a moment, ſtrike the blow where he pleaſes. But we wait till ſome event alarms

us: then we are in motion, then we prepare. To this alone I can impute it, that the conqueſts he hath lately made he now enjoys in full ſecurity; while all your efforts are too late, all your vaſt expences ineffectual: your attempts have ſerved only to diſcover your enmity, and inclination to oppoſe him; and the conſequences of your miſconduct are ſtill farther aggravated by the diſgrace.

Know then, Athenians, that all our orators alledge at preſent are but words, but idle pretences. Their whole deſigns, their whole endeavours are to confine you within the city; that, while we have no forces in the field, Philip may be at full liberty to act as he pleaſes. Conſider the preſent poſture of affairs. Philip is now ſtationed in Thrace, at the head of a large army; and (as we are here informed) ſends for reinforcements from Macedon and Theſſaly. Now, ſhould he watch the blowing of the Eteſian winds, march his forces to Byzantium, and inveſt it; in the firſt place, can you imagine that the Byzantines would perſiſt in their preſent folly; or that they would not have recourſe to you for aſſiſtance? I cannot think it.

No:

No: [D] if there were a people in whom they leſs confided than in us, they would receive even theſe into their city, rather than give it up to him; unleſs prevented by the quickneſs of his attack. And, ſhould we be unable to ſail thither, ſhould there be no forces ready to ſupport them, nothing can prevent their ruin.——"But the extrava-" gance and folly of theſe men exceed all " bounds."——I grant it. Yet ſtill they ſhould be ſecured from danger; for this is the intereſt of our ſtate. Beſides, it is by no means clear, that he will not march into the Cherſoneſus itſelf. On the contrary, if we may judge from the letter which he ſent

[D] *If there were a people in whom they leſs confided, &c.* In the third year of the 105th olympiad, the Byzantines entered into a league with Chios, Cos, and Rhodes, againſt the Athenians, and withdrew themſelves from their dominion. This is what Demoſthenes calls their *folly and extravagance*. They had reaſon to think the Athenians would regard them as rebellious ſubjects, and treat them with the reſentment of offended ſovereigns; "however, " ſays the orator, if they were reduced to the alternative " of either ſubmitting to Philip, or having recourſe to you " for protection, they would without heſitation chuſe the " latter." The event confirmed his prediction. Philip beſieged Byzantium, the Byzantines had recourſe to the Athenians, and Phocion at the head of their army obliged Philip to raiſe the ſiege, TOUR.

to you, he is determined to oppoſe us in that country. If then the forces ſtationed there be ſtill kept up, we may defend our own dominions, and infeſt thoſe of our enemy; if they be once diſperſed and broken, what ſhall we do, if he attempt the Cherſoneſus?—— "Bring Diopithes to a trial."——And how will that ſerve us?——"No: but we will "diſpatch ſuccours from hence:"——What if the winds prevent us?——"But he will "not turn his arms thither."——Who will be our ſurety for this? Conſider, Athenians! is not the ſeaſon of the year approaching, in which it is thought by ſome, that you are to withdraw your forces from the Helleſpont, and abandon it to Philip? But ſuppoſe, (for this too merits our attention) that, at his return from Thrace, he ſhould neither bend his force againſt the Cherſoneſus, nor Byzantium; but fall on Chalcis or Megara, as he lately did [E] upon Oreum; which would be the wiſer courſe, to oppoſe him here, and make Attica the ſeat of war, or to find him employment abroad? I think, the latter.

[E] *As he lately did upon Oreum.* In the third Philippic, we ſhall find a particular account of the manner in which he reduced this city to his obedience.

Let

Let theſe things ſink deep into our minds: and let us not raiſe invidious clamours againſt thoſe forces which Diopithes is endeavouring to keep up for the ſervice of his country; or attempt to break them: let us rather prepare to reinforce them; grant their general the neceſſary ſupplies of money, and in every other inſtance favour his deſigns with an hearty zeal. Imagine this queſtion propoſed to Philip: "which would be moſt agreeable "to you, that the forces commanded by Di-"opithes"—(of whatever kind they be, for I ſhall not diſpute on that head) "ſhould con-"tinue in full ſtrength and good eſteem at "Athens, and be reinforced by detachments "from the city; or that the clamours and "invectives of certain perſons ſhould pre-"vail to have them broken and diſbanded?" I think he would chuſe this latter. And are there men among us labouring for that which Philip would intreat the Gods to grant him? and, if ſo, is it ſtill a queſtion, whence our diſtreſſes have ariſen?

Let me intreat you to examine the preſent ſtate of Athens, with an unbiaſſed freedom; *to conſider*, how we are acting, and how our affairs are conducted. We are neither willing

to raiſe contributions, nor do we dare to take the field, nor do we ſpare the public funds, nor do we grant ſupplies to Diopithes, nor do we approve of thoſe ſubſidies he hath procured himſelf: but we malign him, we pry into his deſigns, and watch his motions. Thus we proceed, quite regardleſs of our intereſts; and while in words we extol thoſe ſpeakers who aſſert the dignity of their country, our actions favour their oppoſers.— It is uſual, when a ſpeaker riſes, to aſk him, "What are we to do?" Give me leave to propoſe the like queſtion to you: "What "am I to ſay?" For, if you neither raiſe contributions, nor take the field, nor ſpare the public funds, nor grant ſubſidies to Diopithes, nor approve of thoſe proviſions he hath made himſelf, nor take the due care of our intereſts, I have nothing to ſay. If you grant ſuch unbounded licence to informers, as even to liſten to their accuſations of a man, for what they pretend he will do, before it be yet done; what can one ſay?——

[F] But it is neceſſary to explain to ſome of you the effect of this behaviour: (I ſhall ſpeak

[F] *But it is neceſſary to explain to ſome of you the effect of this behaviour.* To the ſame purpoſe hath the ſentence been

ſpeak with an undaunted freedom, for in no other manner can I ſpeak.)——It has been the

tranſlated by Wolfius and Tourreil. But this interpretation, which is acknowledged conſonant to grammatical rules of conſtruction, hath yet been ſtigmatiſed, as a total perverſion of the author's reaſoning, and the ſenſe of the context. Clamours had been raiſed againſt an Athenian general, who had exacted contributions from the iſlanders and Græcian ſettlements along the coaſt of Aſia. Demoſthenes appears as his advocate. He proceeds, as it is obſerved, to ſhew, that it had ever been the cuſtom of other commanders to raiſe the like contributions. Hence it is inferred, that the meaning of the phraſe, here quoted, muſt be, that *the general is warranted, by juſtice and cuſtom, to act as he had done.* The orator, indeed, doth proceed to give inſtances of this cuſtom. But this concluſion I cannot admit; for, whatever deference and reſpect the writers, who have adopted it, may juſtly claim, a greater deference and reſpect is due to the original, where we find a concluſion of a different nature, deduced in expreſs terms. " It hath been the conſtant cuſtom," ſaith Demoſthenes, " of all the commanders, who have ſailed from this city, " (if I advance a falſhood, let me feel the ſevereſt puniſh- " ment) to take money from the Chians, and from the " Erythrians, and from any people that would give it; I " mean of the inhabitants of Aſia. They who have but " one or two ſhips take a talent; they who command a " greater force raiſe a larger contribution. And the peo- " ple who give this money, whether more or leſs, do not " give it for nothing: (they are not ſo mad) no; it is the " price they pay to ſecure their trading veſſels from rapine " and piracy, to provide them with the neceſſary convoys,

" and

the conſtant cuſtom of all the commanders who have ſailed from this city, (if I advance a falſehood, let me feel the ſevereſt puniſhment) to take money from the Chians, and from the Erythrians, and from any people that would give it; I mean of the inhabitants of Aſia. They who have but one or two ſhips take a talent; they who command a greater force raiſe a larger contribution. And the people who give this money, whether more or leſs, do not give it for nothing; (they are not ſo mad) no; it is the price they pay, to ſecure their trading veſſels from rapine and piracy, to provide them with the neceſſary convoys, and the like; however they may pretend friendſhip and affection, and dignify thoſe payments with the name

" and the like: however they may pretend friendſhip and " affection, and dignify thoſe payments with the name of " free gifts. It is therefore evident, that, as Diopithes is " at the head of a conſiderable power, the ſame contribu- " tions will be granted to him. Elſe, how ſhall he pay his " ſoldiers; how ſhall he maintain them, who receives no- " thing from you, and has nothing of his own? From the " ſkies? No; but from what he can collect, and beg, and " borrow." Then follows the concluſion from the whole: Οὐδὲ ΟΥΝ ἄλλο ποιῆσαι οἱ καὶπλορᾶνῖλες ἐν ὑμῖν, ἢ προλέλεπται ἅπασι, &c. So THAT *the whole ſcheme of his accuſers* [or the whole effect of their accuſations] *is to warn all people to grant him nothing*, &c. *This is the meaning* [*or this is the* TENDENCY] *of their clamours.*

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of free gifts. It is therefore evident, that as Diopithes is at the head of a conſiderable power, the ſame contributions will be granted to him. Elſe, how ſhall he pay ſoldiers? how ſhall he maintain them, who receives nothing from you, and has nothing of his own? from the ſkies? no; but from what he can collect, and beg, and borrow. So that the whole ſcheme of his accuſers is to warn all people to grant him nothing; as he is to ſuffer puniſhment for crimes yet to be committed, not for any he hath already committed, or in which he hath already aſſiſted. This is the meaning of their clamours. "He is going to form ſieges! he "leaves the Greeks expoſed." Have theſe men all this tenderneſs for the Grecian colonies of Aſia? They then prefer the intereſts of foreigners to that of their own country. This muſt be the caſe, if they prevail to have another general ſent to the Helleſpont. If Diopithes commits outrages, if he be guilty of piracy, [G] one ſingle edict, Athenians,

[G] *One ſingle edict.* In the Greek Πινάκιον, which in this place may either ſignify the tablet which was fixed up in public, containing a citation of the accuſed party, and an account of the crimes of which he was accuſed; or that

nians, a ſingle edict will put a ſtop to ſuch proceedings. This is the voice of our laws; that ſuch offenders ſhould [H] be impeached; [I] and not oppoſed with ſuch vaſt preparations

that which was given to the judges who ſat on his trial, to write their ſentences upon. I have choſen the firſt of theſe ſenſes.

[H] *That ſuch offenders ſhould be impeached.* The Greek words Εἰσαγγέλειν, and Εἰσαγγελία, which I have tranſlated *to impeach*, and *impeachment*, are terms in the Athenian judicature; and relate to thoſe particular kind of actions, which were not referred to any court of juſtice, but immediately brought before the ſenate of 500, or aſſembly of the people, and ſometimes before the Archon: and in which, both the accuſation and defence were made by word of mouth, without any written articles.

[I] *And not oppoſed &c.* The accuſers of Diopithes raiſed loud clamours againſt his conduct. They inſiſted, that he had committed depredations on the Grecian colonies, and was meditating farther hoſtilities againſt them, contrary to his commiſſion and inſtructions. They declared, that a force ſhould be diſpatched to defend them; which Demoſthenes calls raiſing an army againſt Diopithes. "It is againſt our enemies," ſaith he, "whom our laws "cannot reach, that we are to raiſe our forces; when ci- "tizens have offended, we can impeach them, &c." But this interpretation hath been loaded with the heavy charge of abſurdity. If the tranſlator had a right to pronounce ſo peremptorily and ſo ſeverely, he would declare, that, by the ſame rule, every ardent expreſſion, every bold figure, every lively image, in ſhort, every thing in eloquence, not literally and ſtrictly conſonant to metaphyſical truth, might be

rations of ſhips and money; (this would be the height of madneſs:) it is againſt our enemies, whom the laws cannot touch, that we ought, we muſt maintain our forces, ſend out our navies, and raiſe our contributions. But, when citizens have offended, we can decree, we can impeach, [K] we can recall. Theſe are

be pronounced equally abſurd. The meaning of the paſſage, here quoted, is ſaid to be, "We are not to protect "the iſlanders by our armies, but to employ them againſt "our enemies." But why were they to raiſe their armies againſt their enemies? Becauſe their enemies were not puniſhable by the laws. Thoſe, therefore, againſt whom they were not to raiſe their armies, muſt have been ſuch as were puniſhable by the laws. This concluſion might, perhaps, be deemed natural and neceſſary, even if the orator had not expreſsly pointed out both thoſe againſt whom they were, and were not to raiſe their armies. Ἐπὶ τὰς ἐχθρὰς; *Againſt enemies.* And, ἐπὶ δ' αὐτοὺς τάς; BUT *againſt ourſelves*, i. e. our own citizens.

[K] *We can recall.* In the original, *we have the* Πάραλος, that is, the galley, called ſo (from the hero Paralus, who with Theſeus ſignalized himſelf againſt the Thebans). The Athenians had two gallies, the Salaminian, and Paralian, appointed for the moſt preſſing occaſions of the ſtate. In alluſion to this uſage, Pericles was called the Salaminian galley, becauſe he affected to appear in public only upon extraordinary emergencies. When Lyſander had beaten the Athenian fleet at the Helleſpont, the Paralian galley was diſpatched with the melancholy news to the people. And when Alcibiades was recalled from Sicily.

are arms ſufficient; theſe are the meaſures befitting men of prudence: they who would raiſe diſorder and confuſion in the ſtate, may have recourſe to ſuch as theſe men propoſe.

But, dreadful as it is to have ſuch men among us, yet the dreadful circumſtance of all is this. You aſſemble here, with minds ſo diſpoſed, that, if any one accuſes Diopithes, or [L] Chares, or [M] Ariſtophon, or any

Sicily, to defend himſelf againſt the charge of impiety, the Salaminian galley was ordered to bring him home. Both the one and the other were employed to recall ſuch generals as were ſuperſeded. TOUR.

[L] *Or Chares.* This apology (ſays monſieur Tourreil) ſavours a little of faction and cabal: their ill ſucceſs might with great juſtice have been charged upon Chares. Indeed what could have been expected from a general no leſs incapable than luxurious, who in all his military expeditions drew after him a train of muſicians, whom he kept in pay at the expence of his troops? accordingly his enterpriſes were unſucceſsful; and, to crown all his miſcarriages, he loſt the battle of Chæronea. And yet this Chares was able to ſupport himſelf to the laſt, by the credit of thoſe orators who protected him.

[M] *Or Ariſtophon.* Another Athenian general. Ariſtotle (Rhet. l. 2. c. 23.) mentions a ſmart anſwer made to him by Iphicrates. Ariſtophon accuſed him of having betrayed the fleet which he commanded. Iphicrates, with that confidence which an eſtabliſhed reputation inſpires, aſked

any citizen whatever, as the cauſe of our misfortunes, you inſtantly break forth into acclamations and applauſe. But if a man ſtands forth, and thus declares the truth, "this is all trifling, Athenians! It is to "Philip we owe our calamities: he hath "plunged us in theſe difficulties: for, had "he obſerved his treaty, our ſtate would be "in perfect tranquillity." This you cannot deny; but you hear it with the utmoſt grief, as if it were the account of ſome dreadful misfortune. The cauſe is this; (for, when I am to urge the intereſt of my country, let me ſpeak boldly.)—Certain perſons, who have been intruſted with public affairs, have for a long time paſt rendered you daring and terrible in council; but, in all affairs of war, wretched and contemptible. Hence it is, that if a citizen, ſubject to your own power and juriſdiction, be pointed out as the author of your misfortunes, you hear the accuſation with applauſe; but if they are charged upon a man, who muſt firſt be conquered before he can

aſked him, *would you be guilty of ſuch a piece of treachery? By no means*, anſwered he. *What!* returned the other, *can Iphicrates have committed what Ariſtophon would refuſe to do?*

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be puniſhed, then you are utterly diſconcerted: that truth is too ſevere to be borne. Your miniſters, Athenians, ſhould take a quite contrary courſe. They ſhould render you gentle and humane in council, where the rights of citizens and allies come before you: in military affairs, they ſhould inſpire you with fierceneſs and intrepidity; for here you are engaged with enemies, with armed troops. But now, by leading you gently on to their purpoſes, by the moſt abject compliance with your humours, they have ſo formed and moulded you, that in your aſſemblies you are delicate, and attend but to flattery and entertainment; in your affairs, you find yourſelves threatened with extremity of danger.

And now, in the name of Heaven, [N] ſuppoſe that the ſtates of Greece ſhould thus demand

[N] *Suppoſe that the ſtates of Greece ſhould thus demand &c.* After the taking of Olynthus, when the Athenians were at laſt prevailed upon to declare war in form againſt Philip, they ſent embaſſies to all the ſtates of Greece to repreſent the danger of his growing power, and to engage them to join againſt him. From hence the orator takes occaſion to introduce this beautiful Proſopopœia, by which he throws out the bittereſt reproaches

demand an account of thoſe opportunities which your indolence hath loſt. " Men of " Athens! you are ever ſending embaſſies " to us; you aſſure us that Philip is pro- " jecting our ruin, and that of all the " Greeks; you warn us to guard againſt " this man's deſigns." (And, it is too true, we have done thus.) " But, O moſt " wretched of mankind! when this man " had been ten months detained abroad; " when ſickneſs, and the ſeverity of winter, " and the armies of his enemies, rendered " it impoſſible for him to return home; " you neither reſtored the liberty of Eubœa, " nor recovered any of your own dominions. " But while you ſit at home in perfect eaſe " and health, (if ſuch a ſtate may be called " health) Eubœa is commanded by his two " tyrants [o]; the one, juſt oppoſite to At- " tica, to keep you perpetually in awe; the " other to Scyathus. Yet you have not at-

proaches againſt his countrymen, ſo artfully, as not to give them offence, and yet at the ſame time ſets the ſhamefulneſs of their miſconduct in the ſtrongeſt light.

TOUR.

[o] *By his two tyrants.* Philiſtides and Clitarchus: the one fixed at Eretria, oppoſite to Attica; the other at Oreum, over-againſt Scyathus, an iſland ſubject to Athens.

" tempted to oppoſe even this. No; you " have ſubmitted; you have been inſenſible " to your wrongs; you have fully declared, " that, if Philip were ten times to die, it " would not inſpire you with the leaſt de- " gree of vigour. Why then theſe em- " baſſies, theſe accuſations, all this unne- " ceſſary trouble, to us?"—If they ſhould ſay this, what could we alledge? what anſwer could we give? I know not!

We have thoſe among us, who think a ſpeaker fully confuted by aſking, " What " then is to be done?" to whom I anſwer, with the utmoſt truth and juſtneſs, " not " what we are now doing."——But I ſhall be more explicit, if they will be as ready to follow, as to aſk advice.

Firſt then, Athenians, be firmly convinced of theſe truths: That Philip does commit hoſtilities againſt us, and has violated the peace; (and let us no longer accuſe each other of his crimes;)—that he is the implacable enemy of this whole city, of the ground on which this city ſtands, of every inhabitant within theſe walls; even of thoſe who imagine themſelves higheſt in his favour. If

they

they doubt this, let them think of Euthycrates and Laſthenes, the Olynthians. They who ſeemed the neareſt to his heart, the moment they betrayed their country, were diſtinguiſhed only by the ſuperior cruelty of their death. But it is againſt our conſtitution, that his arms are principally directed; nor, in all his ſchemes, in all his actions, hath he any thing ſo immediately in view, as to ſubvert it. And there is in ſome ſort a neceſſity for this. He knows full well, that his conqueſts, however great and extenſive, can never be ſecure, while you continue free; but that, if once he meets with any accident, (and every man is ſubject to many) all thoſe whom he hath forced into his ſervice will inſtantly revolt, and fly to you for protection. For you are not naturally diſpoſed to graſp at empire yourſelves; but to fruſtrate the ambitious attempts of others; to be ever ready to oppoſe uſurpation, and aſſert the liberty of mankind; this is your peculiar character. And therefore it is not without regret that he ſees, in your freedom, a ſpy upon the incidents of his fortune. Nor is this his reaſoning weak or trivial.

In the firſt place, therefore, we are to conſider him as the enemy of our ſtate, the implacable enemy of our free conſtitution. Nothing but the deepeſt ſenſe of this can give you a true, vigorous, and active ſpirit. In the next place be aſſured, that every thing he is now labouring, every thing he is concerting, he is concerting againſt our city; and that, wherever any man oppoſes him, he oppoſes an attempt againſt theſe walls. For none of you can be weak enough to imagine that Philip's deſires are centered in thoſe paltry villages of Thrace; (for what name elſe can one give to [P] Drongilus, and Cabyle and Maſtira, and all thoſe places he is now reducing to his obedience?) that he endures the ſeverity of toils and ſeaſons, and braves the utmoſt dangers for theſe; and has no deſigns upon the ports, and the arſenals, and the navies, and the ſilver-mines, and all

[P] *For what name elſe can one give to Drongilus, and Cabyle, and Maſtira, &c.* Drongilus and Cabyle, however the orator affects to treat them with contempt, are yet mentioned in hiſtory. As to Maſtira, it is intirely unknown: hence Harpocration ſuggeſted, that inſtead of Maſtira we ſhould read Baſtira; a town of Thrace of that name having been mentioned in a hiſtory of Philip, written by Anaximenes, a work a long time loſt. TOUR.

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the other revenues of Athens; but that he will leave them for you to enjoy; while, for ſome wretched hoards of grain in the cells of Thrace, he takes up his winter-quarters in [Q] the horrors of a dungeon? Impoſſible! No; theſe and all his expeditions are really intended to facilitate the conqueſt of Athens.

Let us then approve ourſelves men of wiſdom; and, fully perſuaded of theſe truths, let us ſhake off our extravagant and dangerous ſupineneſs. Let us ſupply the neceſſary expences; let us call upon our allies; let us take all poſſible meaſures for keeping up a regular army: ſo that, as he hath his force conſtantly prepared to injure and inſlave the Greeks, yours too may be ever ready to protect and aſſiſt them. If you depend upon occaſional detachments, you cannot ever expect the leaſt degree of ſucceſs: you muſt

[Q] *In the horrors of a dungeon.* In the original it is in a *Barathrum.* There was a ditch or cavern in Athens of that name, into which criminals were precipitated. So that by this figure he not only repreſents the dreadful and deadly nature of the country, but at the ſame time ſets Philip in the light of a wicked wretch, who merited the vileſt and moſt ignominious fate. TOUR.

keep an army conſtantly on foot, provide for its maintenance, appoint public treaſurers, and by all poſſible means ſecure your military funds: and, while theſe officers account for all diſburſements, let your generals be bound to anſwer for the conduct of the war. Let theſe be your meaſures, theſe your reſolutions, and you will compel Philip to live in the real obſervance of an equitable peace, and to confine himſelf to his own kingdom, (which is moſt for our intereſt) or we ſhall fight him upon equal terms.

If any man thinks that the meaſures I propoſe will require great expence, and be attended with much toil and trouble; he thinks juſtly. Yet let him conſider, what conſequences muſt attend the ſtate, if theſe meaſures be neglected; and it will appear, that we ſhall really be gainers, by engaging heartily in this cauſe. Suppoſe ſome God ſhould be our ſurety, (for no mortal ought to be relied on in an affair of ſuch moment) that, if we continue quiet, and give up all our intereſts, he will not at laſt turns his arms againſt us; it would yet be ſhameful; it would (I call all the powers of Heaven to witneſs!) be unworthy of you,

unworthy

unworthy the dignity of your country, and the glory of your anceſtors, to abandon the reſt of Greece to ſlavery, for the ſake of private eaſe. I, for my part, would die, rather than propoſe ſo mean a conduct: however, if there be any other perſon who will recommend it, be it ſo; neglect your defence; give up your intereſts! but if there be no ſuch counſellor; if, on the contrary, we all foreſee, that the farther this man is ſuffered to extend his conqueſts, the more formidable and powerful enemy we muſt find in him; why this reluctance? why do we delay? or when, my countrymen, will we perform our duty? Muſt ſome neceſſity compel us? What one may call the neceſſity of freemen not only preſſes us now, but hath long ſince been felt: that of ſlaves, it is to be wiſhed, may never approach us. And how do theſe differ? To a freeman, the diſgrace of paſt miſconduct is the moſt urgent neceſſity: to a ſlave, ſtripes and bodily pains. Far be this from us! It ought not to be mentioned!

I would now gladly lay before you the whole conduct of certain politicians: but I ſpare them. One thing only I ſhall obſerve:

The moment that Philip is mentioned, there is ſtill one ready to ſtart up, and cry, "what "a happineſs to live in peace! how grie- "vous the maintenance of a great army! "certain perſons have deſigns upon our "treaſury!" Thus they delay your reſolutions, and give him full liberty to act as he pleaſes: hence you gain eaſe and indulgence for the preſent; (which I fear may at ſome time prove too dear a purchaſe;) and theſe men recommend themſelves to your favour, and are well paid for their ſervice. But in my opinion there is no need to perſuade you to peace, who ſit down already thoroughly perſuaded. Let it be recommended to him, who is committing hoſtilities: if he can be prevailed on, you are ready to concur. Nor ſhould we think thoſe expences grievous which our ſecurity requires; but the conſequences which muſt ariſe, if ſuch expences be denied. Then as to plundering our treaſury, this muſt be prevented, by intruſting it to proper guardians, not by neglecting our affairs. For my own part, Athenians, I am filled with indignation, when I find ſome perſons expreſſing their impatience, as if our treaſures were expoſed to plunderers; and yet utterly unaffected at the progreſs of

Philip,

Philip, who is ſucceſſively plundering every ſtate of Greece; and this, that he may at laſt fall with all his fury upon you.

What then can be the reaſon, Athenians, that, notwithſtanding all his manifeſt hoſtilities, all his acts of violence, all the places he hath taken from us, theſe men will not acknowledge that he hath acted unjuſtly, and that he is at war with us; but accuſe thoſe of embroiling you in a war, who call upon you to oppoſe him, and to check his progreſs? I ſhall tell you. That popular reſentment which may ariſe from any diſagreeable circumſtances with which a war may be attended (and it is neceſſary, abſolutely neceſſary, that a war ſhould be attended with many ſuch diſagreeable circumſtances) they would caſt upon your faithful counſellors, that you may paſs ſentence upon them, inſtead of oppoſing Philip; and they turn accuſers, inſtead of meeting the puniſhment due to their preſent practices. This is the meaning of their clamours, that certain perſons would involve you in a war: hence have they raiſed all theſe cavils and debates. I know full well, that, before any Athenian had ever moved you to declare war

war againſt him, Philip had ſeized many of our dominions; and hath now ſent aſſiſtance to the Cardians. If you are reſolved to diſſemble your ſenſe of his hoſtilities, he would be the weakeſt of mankind, if he attempted to contradict you. But ſuppoſe he marches directly againſt us, what ſhall we ſay in that caſe? He will ſtill aſſure us that he is not at war: ſuch were his profeſſions to the people of Oreum, when his forces were in the heart of their country; and to thoſe of Pheræ, until the moment that he attacked their walls; and thus he at firſt amuſed the Olynthians, until he had marched his army into their territory. And will you ſtill inſiſt, even in ſuch a caſe, that they who call upon us to defend our country are embroiling us in a war? Then ſlavery is inevitable. There is no other medium between an obſtinate refuſal to take arms, on your part, and a determined reſolution to attack us, on the part of our enemy.

Nor is the danger which threatens us the ſame with that of other people. It is not the conqueſt of Athens which Philip aims at: no; it is our utter extirpation. He knows full well, that ſlavery is a ſtate you would

would not, or, if you were inclined, you could not ſubmit to; for ſovereignty is become habitual to you. Nor is he ignorant, that, at any unfavourable juncture, you have more power to obſtruct his enterprizes, than the whole world beſides.

Let us then be aſſured, that we are contending for the very being of our ſtate; let this inſpire us with abhorrence of thoſe who have ſold themſelves to this man; and let them feel the ſeverity of public juſtice: for it is not, it is not poſſible to conquer our foreign enemy, until we have puniſhed thoſe traitors who are ſerving him, within our walls. Elſe, while we ſtrike on theſe, as ſo many obſtacles, our enemies muſt neceſſarily prove ſuperior to us.——And whence is it that he dares treat you with inſolence, (I cannot give his preſent conduct any other name) that he utters menaces againſt you, while on others he confers acts of kindneſs (to deceive them at leaſt, if for no other purpoſe)? Thus, by heaping favours on the Theſſalians, he hath reduced them to their preſent ſlavery. It is not poſſible to recount the various artifices, by which he abuſed, he wretched Olynthians, from his firſt inſidious

gift of Potidæa. But now he ſeduced the Thebans to his party, by making them maſters of Bœotia, and eaſing them of a great and grievous war. And thus, by being gratified in ſome favourite point, theſe people are either involved in calamities known to the whole world, or wait with ſubmiſſion for the moment when ſuch calamities are to fall upon them. I do not recount all that you yourſelves have loſt, Athenians! but in the very concluſion of the peace, how have you been deceived? how have you been deſpoiled? Was not Phocis, was not Thermopylæ, were not our Thracian dominions, Doriſcum, Serrium, and [R] even our ally Cerſobleptes, all wreſted from us? Is he not at this time in poſſeſſion of Cardia? and does he not avow it? Whence is it, I ſay, that he treats you in ſo ſingular a manner? Becauſe our's is the only ſtate where there is allowed full liberty to plead the cauſe of

[R] *And even our ally Cerſobleptes.* The late treaty of peace, between Philip and the Athenians, was concluded without giving Cerſobleptes (then in alliance with Athens) an opportunity of acceding to it: nor was any proviſion made by it for his ſecurity and protection. By this means Philip found himſelf at liberty to turn his arms againſt him, and a few years after drove him from his kingdom, and obliged him to become his tributary.

an enemy; and the man who ſells his country may harangue ſecurely, at the very time that you are ſpoiled of your dominions. It was not ſafe to ſpeak for Philip at Olynthus, until the people of Olynthus had been gained by the ſurrender of Potidæa. In Theſſaly, it was not ſafe to ſpeak for Philip, until the Theſſalians had been gained by the expulſion of their tyrants, and the recovery of their rank of Amphictyons; nor could it have been ſafely attempted at Thebes, before he had reſtored Bœotia, and extirpated the Phocians. But at Athens, although he hath robbed us of Amphipolis, and the territory of Cardia; though he awes us with his fortifications in Eubœa; though he be now upon his march to [s] Byzantium; yet his partizans may ſpeak for Philip without any danger. Hence ſome of them, from the meaneſt poverty, have on a ſudden riſen to affluence; ſome, from obſcurity and diſgrace, to eminence and honour: while you, on the contrary, from glory, have ſunk into meanneſs; from riches, to poverty: for the riches of a ſtate I take to be it's allies, it's

[s] *To Byzantium.* See the introduction to the following oration.

credit,

credit, it's connexions; in all which you are poor. And by your neglect of theſe, by your utter inſenſibility to your wrongs, he is become fortunate and great, the terror of Greeks and Barbarians; and you abandoned and deſpiſed; [T] ſplendid indeed in the abundance of your markets; but, as to any real proviſion for your ſecurity, ridiculouſly deficient.

There are ſome orators, I find, who view your intereſts and their own in a quite dif-

[T] *Splendid indeed in the abundance, &c.* They who oppoſed Philip's intereſt in the Athenian aſſembly were ever urging the fallen condition of their country, and the diſhonour of ſuffering another power to wreſt that pre-eminence from her which had been enjoyed for ages. The ſpeakers on the other ſide at firſt affected to deſpiſe the power of Philip, or inſiſted on the ſincerity and uprightneſs of his intentions. But now, when the danger became too apparent, and his deſigns too flagrant to be diſſembled, it appears that they had recourſe to other arguments. They endeavoured to confine the views of the Athenians to what paſſed within their own walls; diſplayed the advantages of their trade, the flouriſhing ſtate of their commerce; and perhaps recommended it as their true policy, to attend only to theſe, without making themſelves a party in the quarrels of others, or loading the ſtate with the expence of maintaining wars to ſupport the power and intereſt of foreigners.

ferent

ferent light. They would perſuade you to continue quiet, whatever injuries are offered to you: they themſelves cannot be quiet, though no one offers them the leaſt injury. When one of theſe men riſes, I am ſure to hear, "What! will you not propoſe your "decree? will you not venture? No; you "are timid, you want true ſpirit."——I own, indeed, I am not, nor would I chuſe to be a bold, an importunate, an audacious ſpeaker. And yet, if I miſtake not, I have more real courage than they who manage your affairs with this raſh hardineſs. For he who, neglecting the public intereſts, is engaged only in trials, in confiſcations, in rewarding, in accuſing, doth not act from any principle of courage; but as he never ſpeaks but to gain your favour, never propoſes meaſures that are attended with the leaſt hazard: in this he has a pledge of his ſecurity; and therefore is he daring. But he who, for his country's good, oftentimes oppoſes your inclinations; who gives the moſt ſalutary, though not always the moſt agreeable counſel; who purſues thoſe meaſures whoſe ſucceſs depends more on fortune than on prudence, and is yet willing to be accountable for the event; this is the man of courage,

this

this is the true patriot: not they who, by flattering your paſſions, have loſt the moſt important intereſts of the ſtate: men whom I am ſo far from imitating, or deeming citizens of worth, that ſhould this queſtion be propoſed to me, "What ſervices have "you done your country?" though I might recount the gallies I have fitted out, and [u] the public entertainments I have exhibited, and the contributions I have paid, and [w] the captives I have ranſomed, and many like acts of benevolence, I would yet paſs them all by, and only ſay, that my public conduct hath ever been directly oppoſite to their's. I might, like them, have

[u] *The public entertainments I have exhibited.* In the original, it is the offices of *Choregus*, that I have diſcharged. Each of the ten tribes of Athens had their bands of muſicians, to perform in the feaſts of Bacchus, together with a poet, to compoſe the hymns and other pieces: and theſe bands contended for a prize. The feaſts were exhibited with great magnificence; and, in order to defray the charges, they appointed the richeſt citizen out of each tribe (or ſometimes he offered himſelf) to exhibit them at his own coſt. He was called the Choregus; and, if his band gained the prize, his name was inſcribed, together with thoſe of the tribe and the poet, upon the vaſe; which was the reward of the conquerors. TOUR.

[w] *The captives I have ranſomed.* See the preface to the Oration on the Peace.

turned

turned accuſer, have diſtributed rewards and puniſhments: but this is a part I never aſſumed: my inclinations were averſe; nor could wealth or honours prompt me to it. No; I confine myſelf to ſuch counſels as have ſunk my reputation; but, if purſued, muſt raiſe the reputation of my country. Thus much I may be allowed to ſay, without expoſing myſelf to envy.——I ſhould not have thought myſelf a good citizen, had I propoſed ſuch meaſures as would have made me the firſt among my countrymen, but reduced you to the laſt of ſtates: on the contrary, the faithful miniſter ſhould raiſe the glory of his country; and, upon all occaſions, adviſe the moſt ſalutary, not the eaſieſt meaſures. To theſe, nature itſelf inclines; thoſe are not to be promoted, but by the utmoſt efforts of a wiſe and faithful counſellor.

I have heard it objected, "that indeed I "ever ſpeak with reaſon; yet ſtill this is "no more than words: that the ſtate re-"quires ſomething more effectual, ſome "vigorous actions." Upon which, I ſhall give my ſentiments without the leaſt reſerve. The ſole buſineſs of a ſpeaker is, in

my opinion, to propoſe the courſe you are to purſue. This were eaſy to be proved. You know, that when the great Timotheus moved you to defend the Eubœans, againſt the tyranny of Thebes, he addreſſed you thus: "What, my countrymen! when the "Thebans are actually in the iſland, are "you deliberating what is to be done? what "part to be taken? Will you not cover the "ſeas with your navies? Why are you not "at the Piræus? why are you not embark-"ed?"——Thus Timotheus adviſed; thus you acted; and ſucceſs enſued. But had he ſpoken with the ſame ſpirit, and had your indolence prevailed, and his advice been rejected, would the ſtat have had the ſame ſucceſs? by no means And ſo, in the preſent caſe; vigour and execution is your part; from your ſpeakers you are only to expect wiſdom and integrity.

I ſhall juſt give the ſummary of my opinion, and then deſcend. You ſhould raiſe ſupplies, you ſhould keep up your preſent forces, and reform whatever abuſes may be found in them; (not break them intirely upon the firſt complaint). You ſhould ſend ambaſſadors into all parts, to reform, to remonſtrate,

monſtrate, to exert all their efforts in the ſervice of the ſtate. But, above all things, let thoſe corrupt miniſters feel the ſevereſt puniſhment; let them, at all times, and in all places, be the objects of your abhorrence; that wiſe and faithful counſellors may appear to have conſulted their own intereſts, as well as that of others.——If you will act thus, if you will ſhake off this indolence, perhaps, even yet perhaps, we may promiſe ourſelves ſome good fortune. But if you only juſt exert yourſelves in acclamations and, applauſes, and when any thing is to be done, ſink again into your ſupineneſs, I do not ſee how all the wiſdom of the world can ſave the ſtate from ruin, when you deny your aſſiſtance.

End of the ORATION *on the* CHERSONESUS.

2 AP 57

THE TENTH
ORATION againſt PHILIP:

Commonly called the THIRD.

PRONOUNCED

In the SAME YEAR.


BRITISH MUSEUM

INTRODUCTION.

THE former oration had its effect. For, inſtead of puniſhing Diopithes, the Athenians ſupplied him with money, in order to put him in a condition of continuing his expeditions. In the mean time Philip purſued his Thracian conqueſts, and made himſelf maſter of ſeveral places, which, though of little importance in themſelves, yet opened him a way to the cities of the Propontis, and above all to Byzantium, which he had always intended to annex to his dominions. He at firſt tried the way of negotiation, in order to gain the Byzantines into the number of his allies: but, this proving ineffectual, he reſolved to proceed in another manner. He had a party in the city, at whoſe head was the orator Python, that engaged to deliver him up one of the gates: but, while he was on his march towards the city, the conſpiracy was diſcovered, which immediately determined him to take another route. His ſudden countermarch,

intended to conceal the crime of Python, really ſerved to confirm it. He was brought to trial; but the credit, and the preſents of Philip, prevailed to ſave him.

The efforts of the Athenians to ſupport their intereſts in Eubœa, and the power which Philip had acquired there, and which every day increaſed, had intirely deſtroyed the tranquillity of this iſland. The people of Oreum, divided by the Athenian and Macedonian factions, were on the point of breaking out into a civil war; when, under pretence of reſtoring their peace, Philip ſent them a body of a thouſand forces, under the command of Hipponicus: which ſoon determined the ſuperiority to his ſide. Philiſtides, a tyrant, who had grown old in factions and public conteſts, was intruſted with the government of Oreum, which he adminiſtered with all poſſible ſeverity and cruelty to thoſe in the Athenian intereſt: while the other ſtates of the iſland were alſo ſubjected to other Macedonian governors. Callias, the Chalcidian, whoſe inconſtancy had made him eſpouſe the intereſts of Athens, of Thebes, and Macedon, ſucceſſively, now returned to his engagements with Athens. He ſent deputies thither, to deſire aſſiſtance, and

to prevail on the Athenians to make ſome vigorous attempt to regain their power in Eubœa.

In the mean time, the king of Perſia, alarmed by the accounts of Philip's growing power, made uſe of all the influence which his gold could gain at Athens, to engage the Athenians to act openly againſt an enemy equally ſuſpected by them both. This circumſtance perhaps diſpoſed them to give the greater attention to the following oration.

PHILIPPIC THE THIRD.

THOUGH we have heard a great deal, (Athenians!) in almoſt every aſſembly, of thoſe acts of violence which Philip hath been committing, ever ſince his treaty, not againſt our's only, but the other ſtates of Greece; though all (I am confident) are ready to acknowledge, even they who fail in the performance, that we ſhould, every one of us, exert our efforts, in council and in action, to oppoſe and to chaſtiſe his inſolence; yet to ſuch circumſtances are you reduced by your ſupineneſs, that I fear, (ſhocking as it is to ſay, yet) that, had we all agreed to propoſe, and you

to

to embrace ſuch meaſures, as would moſt effectually ruin our affairs, they could not have been more diſtreſſed, than at preſent. And to this, perhaps, a variety of cauſes have conſpired; nor could we have been thus affected by one, or two. But, upon a ſtrict and juſt inquiry, you will find it principally owing to thoſe orators, who ſtudy rather to gain your favour, than to advance your intereſts. Some of whom (attentive only to the means of eſtabliſhing their own reputation and power) never extend their thoughts beyond the preſent moment, and therefore think that your views are equally confined. Others, by their accuſations and invectives againſt thoſe at the head of affairs, labour only to make the ſtate inflict ſeverity upon itſelf; that, while we are thus engaged, Philip may have full power of ſpeaking and of acting as he pleaſes. Such are now the uſual methods of our ſtateſmen; and hence all our errors and diſorders.

Let me intreat you, my countrymen, that if I ſpeak ſome truths with boldneſs, I may not be expoſed to your reſentment. Conſider this: on other occaſions, you account liberty of ſpeech ſo general a privilege of all within

within your walls, that [A] aliens and ſlaves are allowed to ſhare it. So that many domeſtics may be found among you, ſpeaking their thoughts with leſs reſerve, than citizens in ſome other ſtates. But from your councils you have utterly baniſhed it. And the conſequence is this: in your aſſemblies, as you liſten only to be pleaſed, you meet with flattery and indulgence: in the circumſtances of public affairs, you find yourſelves threatened with the extremity of danger. If you have ſtill the ſame diſpoſitions, I muſt be ſilent: if you will attend to your true intereſts, without expecting to be flat-

[A] *Aliens and ſlaves.* The Athenians picqued themſelves upon being the moſt independent and moſt humane of all people. With them a ſtranger had liberty of ſpeaking as he pleaſed, provided he let nothing eſcape him againſt the government. So far were they from admitting him into their public deliberations, that a citizen was not permitted to touch on ſtate affairs in the preſence of an alien. Their ſlaves enjoyed a proportionable degree of indulgence. The Saturnalia, when they were allowed to aſſume the character of maſters, was originally an Athenian inſtitution, and adopted at Rome by Numa. At Sparta and Theſſaly, on the contrary, ſlaves were treated with ſuch ſeverity, as obliged them frequently to revolt. The humanity of Athens had its reward: for their ſlaves did them conſiderable ſervice on ſeveral occaſions: at Marathon, in the war of Egina, and at Arginuſæ. TOUR.

tered,

tered, I am ready to ſpeak. For although our affairs are wretchedly ſituated, though our inactivity hath occaſioned many loſſes, yet by proper vigour and reſolution you may ſtill repair them all. What I am now going to advance may poſſibly appear incredible; yet it is a certain truth. The greateſt of all our paſt misfortunes is a circumſtance the moſt favourable to our future expectations. And what is this? That the preſent difficulties are really owing to our utter diſregard of every thing which in any degree affected our intereſts. For, were we thus ſituated, in ſpite of every effort which our duty demanded, then we ſhould regard our fortune as abſolutely deſperate. But now Philip hath conquered your ſupineneſs and inactivity; the ſtate he hath not conquered. Nor have you been defeated; your force hath not even been exerted.

Were it generally acknowledged that Philip was at war with the ſtate, and had really violated the peace, the only point to be conſidered would then be, how to oppoſe him with the greateſt eaſe and ſafety. But ſince there are perſons ſo ſtrangely infatuated, that, although he be ſtill extending his conqueſts,

although

although he hath poſſeſſed himſelf of a conſiderable part of our dominions, although all mankind have ſuffered by his injuſtice, they can yet hear it repeated in this aſſembly, that it is ſome of us who are embroiling the ſtate in war. This ſuggeſtion muſt firſt be guarded againſt; elſe there is reaſon to apprehend, that the man who moves you to oppoſe your adverſary, may incur the cenſure of being author of the war.

And, firſt of all, I lay down this as certain: if it were in our power to determine whether we ſhould be at peace or war; if peace (that I may begin with this) were wholly dependent upon the option of the ſtate, there is no doubt but we ſhould embrace it. And I expect, that he who aſſerts it is will, without attempting to prevaricate, draw up his decree in form, and propoſe it to your acceptance. But if the other party hath drawn the ſword, and gathered his armies round him; if he amuſe us with the name of peace, while he really proceeds to all kinds of hoſtilities, what remains but to oppoſe him? To make profeſſions of peace, indeed, like him; —if this be agreeable to you, I acquieſce. But if any man takes that for peace, which

is

is inabling him, after all his other conqueſts, to lead his forces hither, his mind muſt be diſordered: at leaſt, it is our conduct only towards him, not his towards us, that muſt be called a peace. But this it is for which all Philip's treaſures are expended; that he ſhould carry on the war againſt you; but that you ſhould make no war on him.—Should we continue thus inactive, 'till he declares himſelf our enemy, we ſhould be the weakeſt of mortals. This he would not do, although he were in the heart of Attica, even at the Piræus; if we may judge from his behaviour to others. For it was not 'till he came [B] within a few miles of Olynthus, that he declared, that "either "the Olynthians muſt quit their city, or he "his kingdom." Had he been accuſed of this, at any time before, he would have reſented it, and ambaſſadors muſt have been diſpatched to juſtify their maſter. In like manner, while he was moving towards the Phocians, he ſtill affected to regard them as allies and friends: nay, there were actually ambaſſadors from Phocis, who attended him

[B] *A few miles, &c.* In the original, *forty ſtadia*, about five miles.

in

in his march: and among us were many, who inſiſted that this march portended no good to Thebes. Not long ſince, when he went into Theſſaly with all the appearance of amity, he poſſeſſed himſelf of Pheræ. And it is but now he told the wretched people of Oreum, that he had, in all affection, ſent ſome forces to inſpect their affairs: for that he heard they laboured under diſorders and ſeditions; and that true friends and allies ſhould not be abſent upon ſuch occaſions. And can you imagine, that he, who choſe to make uſe of artifice, rather than open force, againſt enemies by no means able to diſtreſs him, who, at moſt, could but have defended themſelves againſt him; that he will openly proclaim his hoſtile deſigns againſt you; and this, when you yourſelves obſtinately ſhut your eyes againſt them? Impoſſible! He would be the abſurdeſt of mankind, if, while his outrages paſs unnoticed, while you are wholly engaged in accuſing ſome among yourſelves, and endeavouring to bring them to a trial, he ſhould put an end to your private conteſts, warn you to direct all your zeal againſt him, and ſo deprive his penſioners of their moſt ſpecious pretence for ſuſpending your reſolutions; that of his not

being at war with the ſtate. Heavens! is there any man of a right mind, who would judge of peace or war by words, and not by actions? Surely no man. *To examine then the actions of Philip.*—When the peace was juſt concluded, before ever Diopithes had received his commiſſion, or thoſe in the Cherſoneſus had been ſent out, he poſſeſſed himſelf of Serrium and Doriſcum; and obliged the forces our general had ſtationed in the citadel of Serrium and the Sacred Mount to evacuate theſe places. From theſe proceedings, what are we to judge of him? The peace he had ratified by the moſt ſolemn oaths.——And [c] let it not be aſked, of what moment is all this? or how is the ſtate affected by it? Whether theſe things be of no moment, or whether we are affected by them or no, is a queſtion of another nature. Let the inſtance of violation be great or ſmall, the ſacred obligation of faith and juſtice is, in all inſtances, the ſame.

[c] *Let it not be aſked, &c.* The partizans of Philip affected to ſpeak with contempt of theſe places. To deny the right of Athens to them was dangerous and unpopular; they therefore endeavoured to repreſent them as beneath the public regard.

But

But further: when he ſends his forces into the Cherſoneſus, which the KING, which every ſtate of Greece acknowledged, to be ours; when he confeſſedly aſſiſts our enemies, and braves us with ſuch letters; what are his intentions? for they ſay he is not at war with us. For my own part, ſo far am I from acknowledging ſuch conduct to be conſiſtent with his treaty, that I declare, that by his attack of the Megareans, by his attempts upon the liberty of Eubœa, by his late incurſion into Thrace, by his practices in Peloponneſus, and by his conſtant recourſe to the power of arms, in all his tranſactions, he has violated the treaty, and is at war with you; unleſs you will affirm, that he who prepares to inveſt a city is ſtill at peace, until the walls be actually aſſaulted. You cannot, ſurely, affirm it! He whoſe deſigns whoſe whole conduct, tends to reduce me to ſubjection, that man is at war with me, though not a blow hath yet been given, not one weapon drawn. And, if any accident ſhould happen, to what dangers muſt you be expoſed! The Helleſpont will be no longer your's: your enemy will become maſter of Megara and Eubœa: the Pelopnneſians will be gained over to his

intereſt. And ſhall I ſay, that the man who is thus raiſing his engines, and preparing to ſtorm the city, that he is at peace with you? No: from that day, in which Phocis fell beneath his arms, I date his hoſtilities againſt you. If you will inſtantly oppoſe him, I pronounce you wiſe; if you delay, it will not be in your power when you are inclined. And ſo far, Athenians, do I differ from ſome other ſpeakers, that I think it now no time to debate about the Cherſoneſus or Byzantium: but that we ſhould immediately ſend reinforcements, and guard theſe places from all accidents, ſupply the generals ſtationed there with every thing they ſtand in need of, and extend our care to all the Greeks, now in the greateſt and moſt imminent danger. Let me intreat your attention, while I explain the reaſons which induce me to be apprehenſive of this danger: that, if they are juſt, you may adopt them, and be provident of your own intereſts at leaſt, if thoſe of others do not affect you: or, if they appear frivolous and impertinent, you may now, and ever hereafter, neglect me as a man of an unſound mind.

That

That Philip, from a mean and inconſiderable origin, hath advanced to greatneſs; that ſuſpicion and faction divide all the Greeks; that it is more to be admired that he ſhould become ſo powerful from what he was, than that now, after ſuch acceſſions of ſtrength, he ſhould accompliſh all his ambitious ſchemes: theſe, and other like points, which might be dwelt upon, I chuſe to paſs over. But there is one conceſſion, which, by the influence of your example, all men have made to him; which hath heretofore been the cauſe of all the Grecian wars. And what is this? An abſolute power to act as he pleaſes, thus to harraſs and plunder every ſtate of Greece ſucceſſively, to invade and to inſlave their cities. You held the ſovereignty of Greece [D] ſeventy-three years: the Lacedemonians commanded for the ſpace of [E] twenty-nine years: and in theſe latter times, after the battle of Leuctra, the The-

[D] *Seventy-three years.* See a note on Olynth. 2. page 85.

[E] *Twenty-nine years.* That is, from the deſtruction of Athens by Lyſander, in the laſt year of the 93d olympiad, to the firſt war in which the Athenians, when reeſtabliſhed by Conon, engaged againſt Sparta, to free themſelves and the other Greeks from the Spartan yoke, in the laſt year of the 100th olympiad. TOUR.

bans were in ſome degree of eminence. Yet neither to you, nor to the Thebans, nor to the Lacedemonians, did the Greeks ever grant this uncontrouled power: far from it. On the contrary, when you, or rather the Athenians of that age, ſeemed to treat ſome perſons not with due moderation, it was univerſally reſolved to take up arms; even they who had no private complaints eſpouſed the cauſe of the injured. And, when the Lacedemonians ſucceeded to your power, the moment that they attempted to enlarge their ſway, and to make ſuch changes in affairs, as betrayed their ambitious deſigns, they were oppoſed by all, even by thoſe who were not immediately affected by their conduct. But why do I ſpeak of others? We ourſelves, and the Lacedemonians, though from the firſt we could alledge no injuries againſt each other, yet, to redreſs the injured, thought ourſelves bound to draw the ſword. And all the faults of the Lacedemonians in their thirty years, and of our anceſtors in their ſeventy years, do not amount to the outrages which Philip hath committed againſt the Greeks, within leſs than [F] thirteen

[F] *Thirteen years of power.* Philip had now reigned nineteen

teen years of power; or, rather, do not all make up the ſmalleſt part of them. This I ſhall eaſily prove in a few words.

Olynthus, and Methone, and Apollonia, and the two and thirty cities of Thrace, I paſs all over; every one of which felt ſuch ſevere effects of his cruelty, that an obſerver could not eaſily determine whether any of them had ever been inhabited or no. The deſtruction of the Phocians, a People ſo conſiderable, ſhall alſo paſs unnoticed. But think on the condition of the Theſſalians. Hath he not ſubverted their ſtates and cities? hath he not eſtabliſhed his tetrarchs over them, that not only ſingle towns, but whole [G] countries, might pay him vaſſalage? are not the ſtates of Eubœa in the hands of tyrants, and this in an iſland bordering on

nineteen years. But, being at firſt engaged in wars with his neighbours, he did not begin to make any conſiderable figure in Greece until the eighth year of his reign; when, after the taking of Methone, he expelled the tyrants of Theſſaly, and cut off the Phocian army commanded by Onomarchus. From this period Demoſthenes begins his computation. TOUR.

[G] *Whole countries, &c.* The word in the original ſignifies a number of different people dependent on one principal ſtate or city.

Thebes and Athens? are not theſe the expreſs words of his letters; "they who are "willing to obey me may expect peace from "me?" And he not only writes, but confirms his menaces by actions. He marches directly to the Helleſpont: but juſt before he attacked Ambracia: [H] Elis, one of the chief cities of Peloponneſus, is in his poſſeſſion: not long ſince he entertained deſigns againſt Megara. All Greece, all the barbarian world, is too narrow for this man's ambition. And, though we Greeks ſee and hear all this, we ſend no embaſſies to each other, we expreſs no reſentment: but into ſuch wretchedneſs are we ſunk (blocked up within our ſeveral cities) that even to this day we have not been able to perform the leaſt part of that, which our intereſt or our duty demanded; to engage in any aſſociations, or to form any confederacies: but look with unconcern upon this man's growing power: each fondly imagining (as far as I can judge) that the time in which another

[H] *Elis, &c.* He made himſelf maſter of this place by treaty, not by force of arms. Elis entered into the league of the Amphictyons, by which Philip was acknowledged as their chief; and maintained its freedom till after the death of Alexander. TOUR.

is deſtroyed is gained to him, without ever conſulting or acting for the cauſe of Greece; although no man can be ignorant, that, like the regular periodic return of a fever, or other diſorder, he is coming upon thoſe who think themſelves moſt remote from danger.

You are alſo ſenſible, that whatever injuries the Greeks ſuffered by the Lacedemonians, or by us, they ſuffered by the true ſons of Greece. And one may conſider it in this light. Suppoſe a lawful heir, born to an affluence of fortune, ſhould, in ſome inſtances, be guilty of miſconduct: he indeed lies open to the juſteſt cenſure and reproach; yet it cannot be ſaid that he hath laviſhed a fortune to which he had no claim, no right of inheritance. But ſhould a ſlave, ſhould a pretended ſon, waſte thoſe poſſeſſions which really belonged to others, how much more heinous would it be thought! how much more worthy of reſentment! And ſhall not Philip and his actions raiſe the like indignation? he, who is not only no Greek, no way allied to Greece; but ſprung from a part of the barbarian world, unworthy to be named; a vile Macedonian; where

where formerly we could not find a ſlave fit to purchaſe. And hath his inſolence known any bounds? Beſides the deſtruction of cities, doth he not appoint [1] the Pythian games, the common entertainment of Greece: and, if abſent himſelf, ſend his ſlaves to preſide? Is he not maſter of Thermopylæ? Are not the paſſes into Greece poſſeſſed by his guards and mercenaries? Hath he not aſſumed [K] the honours of the temple, in oppoſition to our claim, to that of the Theſſalians, that of the Doreans, and of the other Amphictyons; honours, to which even the Greeks do not all pretend? Doth he not ſend out his forces, ſome to Porthmus, to

[1] *The Pythian games, &c.* To this honour he was admitted by being made an Amphictyon, and declared head of the ſacred league. By *his ſlaves*, we are to underſtand no more than his ſubjects: for thoſe old republicans affected to ſpeak thus of the ſubjects of every king or tyrant. TOUR. and OLIV.

[K] *The honours of the temple, &c.* Προμαντείαν, the right of precedency in conſulting the oracle of Delphos. This the Phocians had enjoyed, as being in poſſeſſion of the temple: and Philip was inveſted with it, as well as their other privileges. It was thought of conſiderable conſequence by the Greeks, as appears from the firſt article of a peace made between the Athenians and the allies of Lacedemon. See Thucyd. B. 5. TOUR.

expel

expel the Eretrian colony; ſome to Oreum, to make Philiſtides tyrant? And yet the Greeks ſee all this without the leaſt impatience. Juſt as at the fall of hail: every one prays it may not alight on his ground; but no one attempts to fend againſt it: ſo they not only ſuffer the general wrongs of Greece to paſs unpuniſhed, but carry their inſenſibility to the utmoſt, and are not rouſed even by their private wrongs. Hath he not attacked Ambracia and Leucas, cities of the Corinthians? Hath he not [L] wreſted Naupactus from the Achæans, and engaged by oath to deliver it to the Ætolians? Hath he not robbed the Thebans of [M] Echinus? Is

[L] *Wreſted Naupactus from the Achæans, &c.* Naupactus was not a city of the Achæans, but of the Locri Ozolæ. Poſſibly Demoſthenes ſpeaks with the liberty of an orator; and founds his aſſertion on ſome alliance which Naupactus might have had with the Achæans, againſt the Ætolians, its inveterate enemies. This city, thus delivered up, remained ever after under the juriſdiction of Ætolia, and is mentioned by Livy and Polybius as the principal city of that country.

TOUR.

[M] *Echinus.* There were two places of this name; the one in Acarnania; the other, which is here ſpoken of, founded by the Thebans on the Maliac Gulph.

TOUR.

he

he not on his march [N] againſt the Byzantines? And are they not our allies? I ſhall only add, that Cardia, the chief city of the Cherſoneſus, is in his poſſeſſion. Yet theſe things do not affect us: we are all languid and irreſolute: we watch the motions of thoſe about us, and regard each other with ſuſpicious eyes: and this when we are all ſo manifeſtly injured. And, if he behaves with ſuch inſolence towards the general body, to what extravagancies, think ye, will he proceed, when maſter of each particular ſtate?

And now, what is the cauſe of all this? (for there muſt be ſome cauſe, ſome good reaſon to be aſſigned, why the Greeks were

[N] *Againſt the Byzantines.* He had threatened them already, but had not as yet executed his threats: for we learn from hiſtory, that Philip, having for a conſiderable time beſieged Perinthus, raiſed the ſiege in order to march to that of Byzantium. If the ſiege of Perinthus had preceded this oration, Demoſthenes could not have forgotten ſo memorable an expedition in recounting the enterpriſes of Philip. Probably this prince made a feint of marching to Byzantium, in order to conceal his deſigns againſt Perinthus. TOUR.

In the introduction to this oration, the reader has another account of Philip's firſt march againſt Byzantium.

once

once ſo jealous of their liberty, and are now ſo ready to ſubmit to ſlavery.) It is this, Athenians! Formerly, men's minds were animated with that which they now feel no longer, which conquered all the opulence of Perſia, maintained the freedom of Greece, and triumphed over the powers of ſea and land: but, now that it is loſt, univerſal ruin and confuſion overſpread the face of Greece. What is this? Nothing ſubtile or myſterious: nothing more than an unanimous abhorrence of all thoſe who accepted bribes from princes, prompted by the ambition of ſubduing, or the bare intent of corrupting Greece. To be guilty of ſuch practices was accounted a crime of the blackeſt kind; a crime which called for all the ſeverity of public juſtice: no petitioning for mercy, no pardon was allowed. So that neither orator nor general could ſell thoſe favourable conjunctures, with which fortune oftentimes aſſiſts the ſupine againſt the vigilant, and renders men utterly regardleſs of their intereſts ſuperior to thoſe who exert their utmoſt efforts: nor were mutual confidence among ourſelves, diſtruſt of tyrants and barbarians, and ſuch-like noble principles, ſubject to the power of gold. But now are all

all theſe expoſed to ſale, as in a public mart; and, in exchange, ſuch things have been introduced, as have affected the ſafety, the very vitals of Greece. What are theſe? Envy, when a man hath received a bribe; laughter, if he confeſs it; pardon, if he be convicted; reſentment, at his being accuſed; and all the other appendages of corruption. For, as to naval power, troops, revenues, and all kinds of preparations, every thing that is eſteemed the ſtrength of a ſtate, we are now much better, and more amply provided, than formerly: but they have loſt all their force, all their efficacy, all their value, by means of theſe traffickers.

That ſuch is our preſent ſtate, you yourſelves are witneſſes; and need not any teſtimony from me. That our ſtate, in former times, was quite oppoſite to this, I ſhall now convince you, not by any arguments of mine, but by a decree of your anceſtors, which they inſcribed upon a brazen column erected in the citadel; not with a view to their own advantage, (they needed no ſuch memorials to inſpire them with juſt ſentiments) but that it might deſcend to you, as an example of the great attention due to ſuch

ſuch affairs. Hear then the inſcription: [o] "LET ARTHMIUS OF ZELIA, "THE SON OF PYTHONAX, BE "ACCOUNTED INFAMOUS, AND "AN ENEMY TO THE ATHENIANS "AND THEIR ALLIES, BOTH HE "AND ALL HIS RACE." Then comes the reaſon of his ſentence: "BECAUSE "HE BROUGHT GOLD FROM ME-"DIA INTO PELOPONNESUS."—Not to Athens. This is the decree. And now, in the name of all the Gods, reflect on this! think what wiſdom, what dignity appeared in this action of our anceſtors! One Arth-

[o] *LET ARTHMIUS, &c.* This, in a few words, was the occaſion of publiſhing this terrible decree againſt Arthmius, of which Themiſtocles was the author. Egypt had thrown off the yoke of Artaxerxes Longimanus. A formidable army marched to reduce the rebels; but failed of ſucceſs, as Athens had provided for their defence. The reſentment of Artaxerxes then turned againſt the Athenians. He ſent Megabyzus, and other ſecret agents, into Peloponneſus, to raiſe up enemies againſt them by the force of bribery; and to blow up the flame of reſentment and jealouſy in Sparta, which was ever ready to break out. But the attempt was ineffectual. Arthmius probably was one of the king of Perſia's agents in this affair; and Diodorus, who does not name him, includes him however in the general appellation of *the emiſſaries of Artaxerxes.* TOUR.

mius

mius of Zelia, a ſlave of the KING's, (for Zelia is a city of Aſia) in obedience to his maſter, brings gold, not into Athens, but Peloponneſus. This man they declare an enemy to them and their confederates, and that he and his poſterity ſhall be infamous. Nor was this merely a mark of ignominy; for how did it concern this Zelite whether he was to be received into the community of Athens or no? The ſentence imported ſomething more: for, in the laws relating to capital caſes, it is enacted, that, WHEN THE LEGAL PUNISHMENT OF A MAN'S CRIME CANNOT BE INFLICTED, HE MAY BE PUT TO DEATH. And it was accounted meritorious to kill him. "LET NOT THE "INFAMOUS MAN," ſaith the law, "BE PERMITTED TO LIVE." Intimating, that he is free from guilt, who executes this ſentence.

Our fathers, therefore, thought themſelves bound to extend their care to all Greece: elſe they muſt have looked with unconcern at the introduction of bribery into Peloponneſus. But we find they proceeded to ſuch ſeverity againſt all they could detect in it, as

to

to raiſe monuments of their crimes. Hence it was (and no wonder) that the Greeks were a terror to the Barbarians, not the Barbarians to the Greeks. But now it is not ſo: for you do not ſhew the ſame ſpirit, upon ſuch, or any other occaſions. How then do you behave? you need not be informed. Why ſhould the whole cenſure fall on you? the conduct of the reſt of Greece is no leſs blameable. It is my opinion, therefore, that the preſent ſtate of things demands the utmoſt care, and moſt ſalutary counſel. What counſel? Shall I propoſe it? and will ye not be offended?—Read this memorial.

[*Here the ſecretary reads. And the ſpeaker reſumes his diſcourſe.*]

And here I muſt take notice of one weak argument made uſe of, to inſpire us with confidence: That Philip is not yet ſo powerful as the Lacedemonians once were, who commanded by ſea and land, [P] were

[P] *Were ſtrengthened by the alliance of the KING.* After the expedition into Sicily, an expedition as unfortunate as it was imprudent, the Athenians might ſtill have ſupported themſelves, if the king of Perſia had not concurred

to

ſtrengthened by the alliance of the KING, were abſolute and uncontrouled; and yet we made a brave ſtand againſt them; nor was all their force able to cruſh our ſtate. In anſwer to this, I ſhall obſerve, that, amidſt all the alterations and improvements which have happened in affairs of every kind, nothing hath been more improved than the art of war: for, in the firſt place, I am informed, that at that time the Lacedemonians, and all the other Greeks, uſed to keep the field four or five months, juſt the convenient ſeaſon; and having ſo long continued their invaſion, and infeſted the territories of the enemy, with their heavy-armed, and domeſtic forces, they retired into their own country. Then, ſuch was the ſimplicity, [Q] I ſhould ſay the national ſpirit of that age,

to precipitate their ruin. Tiſſaphernes, the Satrap of Darius Nothus, conducted the firſt alliance between his maſter and the Lacedemonians. This alliance had at that time no very great effect. But when Cyrus the younger was ſent, by order of his father, to command in Aſia Minor, Lyſander gained the affection of this young prince, who ſoon made him able to give law to Athens. It is this period which Demoſthenes points out.

TOUR.

[Q] *I ſhould ſay the national ſpirit, &c.* Circumſtances peculiar to any people, ſingular cuſtoms, particular relations,

age, that the power of gold was never called to their aſſiſtance; but all their wars were fair and open. Now, on the contrary, we ſee moſt defeats owing to treachery; no formal

tions, and the like, give riſe to words and phraſes, incapable of being preciſely rendered into any other language. And ſuch I take to be the word πολιτικῶς. Every particular ſtate of Greece was a member of a larger political body, that of the nation, in which all the ſeveral communities were united by national laws, national cuſtoms, and a national religion. This I have explained, at large, on another occaſion. (See Prelim. Diſſert. to the Life of PHILIP.) The word πολιτικῶς, therefore, I underſtand as expreſſive of that duty which each ſtate owed to the HELLENIC BODY, which preſcribed bounds and laws to their wars, and forbad their paſſions, conteſts, and animoſities againſt each other, to break out into any exceſſes which might affect the welfare of the nation. They were to fight, not as inveterate foes, but competitors for power and honour. To recur to bribery, in order to defeat their antagoniſts, was to be guilty of corrupting the morals of what, in an extenſive ſenſe, may be called their country. In like manner, the word CIVILIS, in Latin, is uſed in a ſenſe ſomewhat analogous to this, as denoting the regard which every citizen ſhould pay to the rights of others, in oppoſition to deſpotiſm, pride, imperiouſneſs, and all thoſe paſſions which are enemies to liberty and the general good. Thus we find in Tacitus, "Juveni CIVILE ingenium, "mira comitas. Ann. 1. Silentium ejus non CIVILE, ut "crediderat, ſed in ſuperbiam accipiebatur." Ann. 6. And of Tiberius the hiſtorian ſays, "Liberatus metu, CIVI-"LEM ſe admodum inter initia, ac paulo minus quam pri-

mal engagements, nothing left to the deciſion of arms. For you find the rapid progreſs of Philip is not owing to the force of regular troops, but to armies compoſed of light horſe and foreign archers. With theſe he pours down upon ſome people, already engaged by civil diſcord and commotions: and, when none will venture out in defence of their ſtate, on account of their private ſuſpicions, he brings up his engines, and attacks their walls. Not to mention his abſolute indifference to heat and cold, and that there is no peculiar ſeaſon which he gives to pleaſure. Let theſe things ſink deep

" vatum egit." I have obſerved, in a note on the exordium of the ſecond Philippic, that a regard to the intereſt of Greece was generally the moſt extenſive affection in the minds of it's inhabitants. And, that the extenſive ſocial affections were denoted by the Greek word πολιτικὸν, we learn from Cicero. Let the following quotation, from the fifth book of his treatiſe DE FINIBUS, ſuffice, on this occaſion: " Cum ſic hominis natura generata ſit, ut habeat " quiddam innatum quaſi CIVILE & populare quod Græci " Πολιτικὸν vocant, quicquid aget quæque virtus, id a com- " munitate, & ea quam expoſui charitate, atque ſocietate " humana, non abhorrebit." The authority of a writer, who devoted ſo much of his attention to the moral and political learning of the Greeks, and took ſo much pains to explain it to his countrymen, may ſurely be deemed deciſive.

into

into all our minds: let us not ſuffer his arms to approach theſe territories: [R] let us not proudly depend on our ſtrength, by forming our judgments from the old Lacedemonian war: but let us attend, with all poſſible precaution, to our intereſts and our armaments: and let this be our point in view; to confine him to his own kingdom; not to engage him upon equal terms in the field. For if you be ſatisfied with committing hoſtilities, there, nature hath given you [s] many advantages (let us but do our part). The ſituation of his kingdom, for inſtance, expoſes it to all the fury of an enemy; not to ſpeak of many other circumſtances. But if we once come to a regular engagement, there his experience muſt give him the ſuperiority.

But theſe are not the only points that require your attention: nor are you to oppoſe

[R] *Let us not proudly, &c.* In the original ἐκλοιχησθῆναι, which, beſides the ſignification which Wolfius aſſigns it, is frequently rendered *inſoleſcere, ſuperbire.*

[s] *Many advantages.* Although the Athenians had loſt Amphipolis, Pydna, and Potidæa, they were ſtill in poſſeſſion of Thaſſus, Lemnos, and the adjacent iſlands, from whence they might readily have attempted a deſcent on Macedon. TOUR.

him only by the arts of war. It is alſo neceſſary that reaſon and penetration ſhould inſpire you with an abhorrence of thoſe who plead his cauſe before you: ever bearing in mind the abſolute impoſſibility of conquering our foreign enemy, until we have puniſhed thoſe who are ſerving him within our walls. But this, I call the powers of heaven to witneſs, ye cannot, ye will not do! No: ſuch is your infatuation, or madneſs. or——I know not what to call it, (for I am oftentimes tempted to believe, that ſome power, more than human, is driving us to ruin) that through malice, or envy, or a ſpirit of ridicule, or ſome like motive, you command hirelings to ſpeak, (ſome of whom dare not deny that they are hirelings) and make their calumnies ſerve your mirth. Yet, ſhocking as this is, there is ſomething ſtill more ſhocking: theſe men are allowed to direct the public affairs with greater ſecurity than your faithful counſellors.—And now obſerve the dreadful conſequences of liſtening to ſuch wretches. I ſhall mention facts well known to you all.

In Olynthus, the adminiſtration of affairs was divided between two parties. The one, in

in the intereſt of Philip, intirely devoted to him; the other, inſpired by true patriotiſm, directed all their efforts to preſerve the freedom of their country. To which of theſe are we to charge the ruin of the ſtate? or who betrayed the troops, and by that treachery deſtroyed Olynthus? The creatures of Philip. Yet, while their city ſtood, theſe men purſued the advocates for liberty, with ſuch malicious accuſations and invectives, that an aſſembly of the people was perſuaded even to baniſh Apollonides.

But this is not the only inſtance. The ſame cuſtom hath produced the ſame calamities in other places. In Eretria, at the departure of Plutarchus and the foreign troops, when the people had poſſeſſion of the city, and of Porthmus, ſome were inclined to ſeek our protection, ſome to ſubmit to Philip. But, being influenced by this latter party, on moſt, or, rather, all occaſions, the poor unfortunate Eretrians were at length perſuaded to baniſh their faithful counſellors. And the conſequence was this: Philip, their confederate and friend, detached a thouſand mercenaries under the command of Hipponicus, razed the fortifications

of Porthmus, ſet three tyrants over them, Hipparchus, Automedon, and Clitarchus; and, after this, when they diſcovered ſome inclination to ſhake off the yoke, drove them twice out of their territory; once by the forces commanded by Eurylochus: and, again, by thoſe under Parmenio.

To give but one inſtance more. In Oreum, Philiſtides was the agent of Philip; as were Menippus, and Socrates, and Thoas, and Agapæus, the preſent maſters of that city. And this was univerſally known. But there was one Euphræus, a man for ſome time reſident at Athens, who ſtood up againſt captivity and ſlavery. Much might be ſaid of the injurious and contemptous treatment which he received from the people of Oreum, upon other occaſions. But the year before the taking of the city, as he ſaw through the traiterous deſigns of Philiſtides and his accomplices, he brought a formal impeachment againſt them. Immediately, conſiderable numbers form themſelves into a faction, (directed and ſupported by Philip) and hurry away Euphræus to priſon, as a diſturber of the public peace. The people of Oreum were witneſſes of this; but, inſtead

ſtead of defending him, and bringing his enemies to condign puniſhment, ſhewed no reſentment towards them; but approved, and triumphed in his ſufferings. And now the faction, poſſeſſed of all the power they wiſhed for, laid their ſchemes for the ruin of the city, and were carrying them into execution. Among the people, if any man perceived this, he was ſilent; ſtruck with the remembrance of Euphræus and his ſufferings. And to ſuch dejection were they reduced, that no one dared to expreſs the leaſt apprehenſion of the approaching danger, until the enemy drew up before their walls, and prepared for an aſſault. Then ſome defended, others betrayed their ſtate. When the city had thus been ſhamefully and baſely loſt, the faction began to exerciſe the moſt tyrannic power; having, either by baniſhment or death, removed all thoſe who had aſſerted their own cauſe, and that of Euphræus; and were ſtill ready for any noble enterpriſe. Euphræus himſelf put an end to his own life: and thus gave proof, that, in his oppoſition to Philip, he had been actuated by a juſt and pure regard to the intereſt of his country.

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And now what could be the reaſon (you may poſſibly aſk with ſurpriſe) that the people of Olynthus, and thoſe of Eretria, and thoſe of Oreum, all attended with greater pleaſure to the advocates of Philip, than to their own friends? The ſame reaſon which prevails here. Becauſe they, who are engaged on the part of truth and juſtice, can never, even if they were inclined, advance any thing to recommend themſelves to favour: their whole concern is for the welfare of their ſtate. The others need but to ſoothe and flatter, in order to ſecond the deſigns of Philip. The one preſs for ſupplies; the others inſiſt that they are not wanted: the one call their countrymen to battle, and alarm them with apprehenſions of danger; the others are ever recommending peace, until the toils come too near to be eſcaped. And thus, on all occaſions, one ſet of men ſpeak but to inſinuate themſelves into the affections of their fellow-citizens; the other to preſerve them from ruin: 'till, at laſt, the intereſts of the ſtate are given up; not corruptly or ignorantly, but from a deſperate purpoſe of yielding to the fate of a conſtitution thought to be irrecoverably loſt. And, by the powers of heaven! I dread,

that this may prove your caſe; when you find that reflection cannot ſerve you! And, when I turn my eyes to the men who have reduced you to this, [T] it is not terror that I feel; it is the utmoſt deteſtation. For, whether they act through deſign or ignorance, the diſtreſs to which they are reducing us is manifeſt. But far be this diſtreſs from us, Athenians! It were better to die ten thouſand deaths, than to be guilty of a ſervile complaiſance to Philip, and to abandon any of your faithful counſellors! The people of Oreum have now met a noble return for their confidence in Philip's creatures, and their violence towards Euphræus. The Eretrians are nobly rewarded for driving out our ambaſſadors, and committing their affairs to Clitarchus. Captivity and ſtripes,

[T] *It is not terror, &c.* The word in the original ſignifies the moſt abject fear and diſmay: and the whole paſſage ſeems to have a particular reference or alluſion. Poſſibly ſome of Philip's partizans might have accuſed Demoſthenes of being thus affected at their ſight; while they magnified their own integrity and reſolution, their true diſcernment, and patriot zeal for the intereſt of their country; and poſſibly might have called out for ſevere puniſhment on the man who dared to utter the moſt bitter invectives againſt a powerful prince in alliance with Athens.

and

and racks are their reward. Great was his indulgence to the Olynthians, for chuſing Laſthenes their general, and baniſhing Apollonides. It were folly and baſeneſs to be amuſed with ſuch falſe hopes as their's, when neither our counſels direct us, nor our inclinations prompt us, to the purſuit of our true intereſts; and to ſuffer thoſe who ſpeak for our enemies to perſuade us that the ſtate is too powerful to be affected by any accident whatever. It is ſhameful to cry out, when ſome event hath ſurpriſed us, "Heavens! who could have expected this? "We ſhould have acted thus and thus; "and avoided theſe and theſe errors." There are many things, the Olynthians can now mention, which, if foreſeen in time, would have prevented their deſtruction. The people of Oreum can mention many: thoſe of Phocis many: every ſtate that hath been deſtroyed can mention many ſuch things. But what doth it avail them now? while the veſſel is ſafe, whether it be great or ſmall, the mariner, the pilot, every perſon ſhould exert himſelf in his particular ſtation, and preſerve it from being wrecked, either by villainy or unſkilfulneſs. But, when the ſea hath once broken in, all care

is

is vain. And therefore, Athenians, while we are yet ſafe, poſſeſſed of a powerful city, favoured with many reſources, our reputation illuſtrious——what are we to do? (perhaps ſome have ſat with impatience to aſk.) ——I ſhall now give my opinion, and propoſe it in form; that, if approved, your voices may confirm it.

Having, in the firſt place, provided for your defence, fitted out your navy, raiſed your ſupplies, and arrayed your forces: (for, although all other people ſhould ſubmit to ſlavery; you ſhould ſtill contend for freedom;) having made ſuch a proviſion, (I ſay) and this, in the ſight of Greece, then we are to call others to their duty; and, for this purpoſe, to ſend ambaſſadors into all parts, to Peloponneſus, to Rhodes, to Chios, and even to the KING: (for he is by no means unconcerned in oppoſing the rapidity of this man's progreſs.) If ye prevail, ye will have ſharers in the dangers and expence which may ariſe; at leaſt you will gain ſome reſpite: and, as we are engaged againſt a ſingle perſon, and not the united powers of a commonwealth, this may be of advantage; as were thoſe embaſſies of laſt year into

into Peloponneſus, and thoſe remonſtrances which were made in ſeveral places by me, and Polydatus, that true patriot, and Hegeſippus, and Clitomachus, and Lycurgus, and the other miniſters; which checked his progreſs, prevented his attack of Ambracia, and ſecured Peloponneſus from an invaſion.

I do not mean that we ſhould endeavour to raiſe that ſpirit abroad, which we ourſelves are unwilling to aſſume. It would be abſurd to neglect our own intereſts, and yet pretend a regard to the common cauſe; or, while we are inſenſible to preſent dangers, to think of alarming others with apprehenſions of futurity. No: let us provide the forces in the Cherſoneſus with money, and every thing elſe that they deſire. Let us begin with vigour on our part; then call upon the other Greeks; convene, inſtruct, exhort them. Thus it becomes a ſtate of ſuch dignity as our's. If you think the protection of Greece may be intruſted to the Chalcidians and Megaræans, and ſo deſert it's cauſe, you do not think juſtly. It will be well if they can protect themſelves. No: this is your province: this is that prerogative tranſmitted from your anceſtors, the reward of all their

many,

many, and glorious, and great dangers. If every man ſits down in eaſe and indulgence, and ſtudies only to avoid trouble, he will certainly find no one to ſupply his place; and I am alſo apprehenſive, that we may be forced into all that trouble, to which we are ſo averſe. Were there perſons to act in our ſtead, our inactivity would have long ſince diſcovered them; but there are really none.

You have now heard my ſentiments. You have heard the meaſures I propoſe, and by which I apprehend our affairs may be yet retrieved. If any man can offer ſome more ſalutary courſe, let him ariſe, and declare his opinion. And, whatever be your reſolution, the Gods grant that we may feel it's good effects.

INTRO-

THE ELEVENTH
ORATION againſt PHILIP:

Commonly called the FOURTH.

PRONOUNCED IN THE

ARCHONSHIP of NICOMACHUS,

The YEAR after the former ORATION.


BRITISH MUSEUM

INTRODUCTION.

SOON after the preceding oration, the Athenian ſuccours arrived at Eubœa. Demoſthenes had propoſed the decree for them; and the command was given to Phocion, whom the Athenians gladly employed on all extraordinary emergencies, and who was always ready to ſerve them, at the ſame time that he highly condemned their conduct.

Demoſthenes attended Phocion, not in a military character, but to endeavour to gain over the people of Eubœa to the Athenian intereſt; in which he had ſome ſucceſs: while the general, on his part, acted with ſo much conduct and reſolution, that the Macedonians were forced to abandon the iſland; and the Eubœans entered into a treaty of alliance with Athens.

In the mean time Philip marched along the Helleſpont, to ſupport his fleet then in view, and to prevent Diopithes from cutting off his proviſions. When he had croſſed the Iſthmus of the Cherſoneſus, he returned, and by a forced march arrived with the choice of his army at Cardia; where he ſurpriſed Diopithes, and defeated him in an action in which that general fell. This he affected to conſider, not as an open breach of his treaty, but only as the conſequence of the protection he had granted to the Cardians, and an act of particular revenge he had determined to take on Diopithes.

Philip then joined his army, and incamped before Perinthus, a place conſiderable by its commerce and ſituation, ever firm to the Athenians, and conſequently dreadful and dangerous to Philip. The Perinthians defended themſelves with a courage almoſt incredible, and which, it appeared, could not be abated by danger or fatigue. Philip, on his part, preſſed them by all the methods of aſſault: and, after many vigorous efforts on each ſide, when the city was juſt on the point of being taken by aſſault, or of being obliged to ſurrender at diſcretion, fortune provided for it an unexpected ſuccour.

INTRODUCTION.

The fame of Philip's arms having alarmed the court of Perſia, Ochus ſent his letters mandatory to the governors of the maritime provinces, directing them to ſupply Perinthus with all things in their power: in conſequence of which they filled it with troops and proviſions. While the Byzantines, juſtly conceiving their own turn would be next, ſent into the city the flower of their youth, with all other neceſſaries for an obſtinate defence.

The Perinthians, thus reinforced, reſumed their former ardor. And, as all they ſuffered was on account of Athens, they diſpatched ambaſſadors thither, to demand the ſpeedy and effectual aſſiſtance of that ſtate. On this occaſion, Demoſthenes pronounced the following oration.

* PHILIPPIC THE FOURTH.

AS I am perſuaded, Athenians, that you are now convened about affairs of greateſt moment, ſuch as affect the very being of the ſtate, I ſhall endeavour to ſpeak to them in the manner moſt agreeable to your intereſts.

* We ſhall find in this oration many things which occur in thoſe that are precedent: and as it is on the ſame ſubject, already exhauſted by ſo many orations, it was in ſome ſort neceſſary for the orator to make uſe of repetitions. And it ſhould ſeem, that in ſuch a caſe repetition is by no means a fault, particularly as we may conſider this as a recapitulation of all the others: and may in effect call it the PERORATION OF THE PHILIPPICS. In which the orator reſumes the arguments he had already made uſe of; but, in reſuming them, gives them new force, as well by the manner in which they are diſpoſed, as by the many additions with which they are heightened. TOUR.

There are faults of no late origin, and gradually increaſed to no inconſiderable number, which have conſpired to involve us in the preſent difficulties. But, of all theſe, what at this time moſt diſtreſſes us is this: that your minds are quite alienated from public affairs: that your attention is engaged juſt while you are aſſembled, and ſome new event related: then each man departs; and, far from being influenced by what he hath heard, he does not even remember it.

The inſolence and outrage, with which Philip treats all mankind, are really ſo great as you hear them repreſented. That it is not poſſible to ſet bounds to theſe, by the force of ſpeeches and debates, no one can be ignorant: for, if other arguments cannot convince, let this be weighed: whenever we have had occaſion to plead in defence of our rights, we have never failed of ſucceſs, we have never incurred the cenſure of injuſtice: but all places and all perſons muſt acknowledge that our arguments are irreſiſtible. Is he then diſtreſſed by this? and are our affairs advanced? By no means! For, as he proceeds to take up arms, leads out his troops, and is ready to hazard his whole

whole empire in purſuit of his deſigns, while we ſit here, pleading, or attending to thoſe who plead the juſtice of our cauſe, the conſequence (and I think the natural conſequence) is this: actions prove ſuperior to words: and men's regards are engaged, not by thoſe arguments which we ever have advanced, or may now advance, how juſt ſoever; but by the meaſures we purſue: and theſe are by no means fitted to protect any of the injured ſtates: to ſay more of them is unneceſſary.

As, then, all Greece is now divided into two parties; the one compoſed of thoſe who deſire neither to exerciſe, nor to be ſubject to arbitrary power, but to enjoy the benefits of liberty, laws, and independence; the other, of thoſe, who, while they aim at an abſolute command of their fellow-citizens, are themſelves the vaſſals of another perſon, by whoſe means they hope to obtain their purpoſes: his partizans, the affecters of tyranny and deſpotiſm, are ſuperior every-where. So that, of all the popular conſtitutions, I know not whether one be left firmly eſtabliſhed, except our own. And they, who in the ſeveral ſtates have

have been raiſed by him to the adminiſtration of affairs, have their ſuperiority ſecured by all the means which can advance a cauſe. The firſt and principal is this. When they would bribe thoſe who are capable of ſelling their integrity, they have a perſon ever ready to ſupply them. In the next place, (and it is of no leſs moment) at whatever ſeaſon they deſire it, there are forces at hand to overwhelm their oppoſers: while we, Athenians, are not only deficient in theſe particulars, but unable even to awaken from our indolence; [B] like men reduced by ſome potion to a lethargic ſtate. In conſequence of this, (for I hold it neceſſary to ſpeak the truth) we are fallen into ſuch contempt and infamy, that, of the people immediately threatened with danger, ſome contend with us [C] for the honour of commanding, ſome about

[B] *Like men reduced by ſome potion, &c.* In the original, *like men who had drank of mandragora:* an herb ranked by naturaliſts among thoſe of the ſoporiferous kind. It ſeems to have been a proverbial phraſe, to ſignify indolent and negligent perſons. TOUR.

[C] *For the honour of commanding, ſome about the place of conference.* In all the confederate wars of the Greeks, that

about the place of conference; while others determine rather to truſt to their own ſtrength, than to accept of your aſſiſtance.

And why I am thus particular in recounting theſe things? I call the Gods to witneſs, that I would not willingly incur your diſpleaſure; but I would have you know, and ſee, that in public as well as in private affairs, continued indolence and ſupineneſs, though not immediately felt in every ſingle inſtance of omiſſion, yet, in the end, muſt affect the general welfare. You ſee this in the inſtances of Serrium and Doriſcum. When the peace was made, we began with neglecting theſe places. (Perhaps ſome of you have never heard of them.) And theſe places, thus abandoned and deſpiſed, loſt you Thrace, and your ally Cerſobleptes. Again, when he ſaw that this did not rouſe you, and that you ſent no aſſiſtance, he razed Porth-

that ſtate which was acknowledged the moſt powerful had the honour of giving a commander in chief, and of appointing the place of general congreſs for concerting the operations. In the Perſian war we find the Lacedemonians and Athenians ſometimes contending for theſe points; which in effect was a diſpute which of theſe ſtates was moſt reſpectable.

mus;

mus; and, to keep us in continual awe, erected a tyranny in Eubœa, over-againſt Attica. This was diſregarded: and his attempt upon Megara was well nigh ſucceſsful. Still ye were inſenſible, expreſſed no impatience, no inclination to oppoſe him. He purchaſed Antronæ; and ſoon after got poſſeſſion of Oreum. I paſs over many things; [D] Pheræ, the march to Ambracia, the maſſacre of Elis, and thouſands of the like actions: for it is not my deſign to give a detail of Philip's acts of outrage and in-

[D] *Pheræ, the march to Ambracia, the maſſacre of Elis.* An orator does not always picque himſelf on an exact adherence to hiſtory; but ſometimes diſguiſes facts, or aggravates them, when it ſerves his purpoſe. One would imagine that Philip had committed ſome terrible outrages at Pheræ: and yet he only reſtored the liberty of that city, by expelling it's tyrants. And, as to the maſſacre of Elis, it is not to be imputed immediately to Philip. He had, indeed, as chief of the allies in the ſacred war, and head of the Amphictyons, ſuggeſted the reſolution of proſcribing the Phocians and all the favourers of their impiety. Some of theſe, who had fled into Crete with their general Phalecus, joined with a body of men who had been baniſhed from Elis, made an inroad into Peloponneſus, and attempted an attack upon their countrymen; who, with the aſſiſtance of the Arcadians, obliged this rebellious army to ſurrender at diſcretion; and, in obedience to the decree of the Amphictyons, put it to the ſword. TOUR.

juſtice;

juſtice; but to convince you, that the property and liberty of mankind will never be ſecure from him, until he meets with ſome effectual oppoſition.

There are perſons who, before they hear affairs debated, ſtop us with this queſtion, "what is to be done?" not that they may do it, when informed, (for then they would be the beſt of citizens) but to prevent the trouble of attending. It is my part, however, to declare what we are now to do.

Firſt, then, Athenians, be firmly perſuaded of this: that Philip is committing hoſtilities againſt us, and has really violated the peace: that he has the moſt implacable enmity to this whole city; to the ground on which this city ſtands; to the very gods of this city: (may their vengeance fall upon him! (But againſt our conſtitution is his force principally directed: the deſtruction of this is, of all other things, the moſt immediate object of his ſecret ſchemes and machinations. And there is, in ſome ſort, a neceſſity that it ſhould be ſo. Conſider; he aims at univerſal power; and you he regards as the only perſons to diſpute his pretenſions.

tenſions. He hath long injured you: and of this he himſelf is fully conſcious: for the ſureſt barriers of his other dominions are thoſe places which he hath taken from us: ſo that if he ſhould give up Amphipolis and Potidæa, he would not think himſelf ſecure in Macedon. He is then ſenſible that he entertains deſigns againſt you, and that you perceive them: and, as he thinks highly of your wiſdom, he judges that you hold him in the abhorrence he deſerves. To theſe things (and theſe of ſuch importance) add, that he is perfectly convinced, that although he were maſter of all other places, yet it is impoſſible for him to be ſecure, while your popular government ſubſiſts: but that, if any accident ſhould happen to him, (and every man is ſubject to many) all thoſe who now ſubmit to force, would ſeize the opportunity, and fly to you for protection: for you are not naturally diſpoſed to graſp at power, or to uſurp dominion; but to prevent uſurpation, to wreſt their unjuſt acquiſitions from the hands of others, to curb the violence of ambition, and to preſerve the liberty of mankind, is your peculiar excellence. And therefore it is with regret he ſees in that freedom you enjoy a ſpy upon the

the incidents of his fortune: nor is this his reaſoning weak or trivial. Firſt, then, he is on this account to be regarded as the implacable enemy of our free and popular conſtitution. In the next place, we ſhould be fully perſuaded, that all thoſe things which now employ him, all that he is now projecting, he is projecting againſt this city. There can be none among you weak enough to imagine, that the deſires of Philip are centered in [E] thoſe paltry villages of Thrace (for what name elſe can we give to Drongilus, and Cabyle, and Maſtira, and all thoſe places now ſaid to be in his poſſeſſion?) that he endures the ſeverity of toils and ſeaſons, and expoſes himſelf to the utmoſt dangers for theſe; and has no deſigns upon the ports, and the arſenals, and the navies, and the ſilver-mines, and other revenues, and the ſituation, and the glory of Athens, (which, never may the conqueſt of this city give to him or any other!) but will ſuffer us to enjoy theſe; while, for thoſe trifling hoards of grain he finds in the cells of Thrace, he takes up his winter-quarters in

[E] *Thoſe paltry villages, &c.* See the notes of the oration on the ſtate of the Cherſoneſus, p. 187.

all

all the horrors of a dungeon. It cannot be! Even in his march thither he had theſe in view: theſe are the chief objects of all his enterpriſes.

Thus muſt we all think of him. And let us not oblige that man, who hath ever been our moſt faithful counſellor, to propoſe the war in form: that would be to ſeek a pretence to avoid it, not to purſue the intereſt of our country. To yourſelves I appeal: if, after the firſt, or the ſecond, or the third of Philip's infractions of his treaty, (for there was a long ſucceſſion of them) any man had moved you to declare hoſtilities againſt him, and he had given the ſame aſſiſtance to the Cardians, as now, when no ſuch motion came from any Athenian, would not that man have been torn to pieces? would you not have cried out, with one voice, that it was this which made him ally to the Cardians? Do not then ſeek for ſome perſon whom you may hate for Philip's faults; whom you may expoſe to the fury of his hirelings. When your decree for war hath once paſſed, let there be no diſpute, whether it ought or ought not to have been undertaken. Obſerve his manner

of

of attacking you: imitate it in your oppoſition: ſupply thoſe who are now oppoſing him with money, and whatever elſe they want: raiſe your ſupplies: prepare your forces, gallies, horſe, tranſports, and all other neceſſaries of a war. At preſent, your conduct muſt expoſe you to deriſion. Nay, I call the powers to witneſs, that you are acting as if Philip's wiſhes were to direct you. Opportunities eſcape you; your treaſures are waſted; you ſhift the weight of public buſineſs upon others; break into paſſion; criminate each other. I ſhall now ſhew whence theſe diſorders have proceeded; and point out the remedy.

You have never, Athenians, made the neceſſary diſpoſitions in your affairs, or armed yourſelves in time; but have been ever led by events. Then, when it proves too late to act, you lay down your arms. If another incident alarms you, your preparations are reſumed; and all is tumult and confuſion. But this is not the way. It is impoſſible ever to ſecure the leaſt ſucceſs by occaſional detachments. No: you muſt raiſe a regular army; provide for it's ſubſiſtence; appoint ſtate-treaſurers, and

guard the public money with the ſtricteſt attention: oblige thoſe treaſurers to anſwer for the ſums expended; and your general, for his conduct in the field: and let this general [F] have no pretence to ſail to any other place, or engage in any other enterpriſe, but thoſe preſcribed. Let theſe be your meaſures, theſe your reſolutions, and you will compel Philip to live in the real obſervance of an equitable peace, and to confine himſelf to his own territory; or you will engage him upon equal terms. And perhaps, Athenians, perhaps, as you now aſk, "what is Philip doing? whither is he "marching?" ſo there may come a time when he will be ſollicitous to know whither our forces have directed their march, and where they are to appear.

If it be objected, that theſe meaſures will be attended with great expence, and many toils and perplexities, I confeſs it. (It is neceſſary, abſolutely neceſſary, that a war ſhould be attended with many diſagreeable circumſtances). But let us conſider what conſequences muſt attend the ſtate, if we

[F] *Have no pretence, &c.* See note on Phil. 1. p. 32.

refuſe

refuſe to take this courſe; and it will appear that we ſhall really be gainers, by a ſeaſonable performance of our duty. Suppoſe ſome God ſhould be our ſurety, (for no mortal could be depended on, in an affair of ſuch moment) for, although you are quite inactive and inſenſible, yet he will not at laſt lead his armies hither; ſtill it would be ignominious, it would (I call every power of Heaven to witneſs!) be beneath you, beneath the dignity of your ſtate, beneath the glory of your anceſtors, to abandon all the reſt of Greece to ſlavery, for the ſake of private eaſe. I, for my part, would rather die, than propoſe ſuch a conduct: if however there be any other perſon to recommend it to you, be it ſo; make no oppoſition; abandon all affairs: but if there be no one of this opinion; if, on the contrary, we all foreſee, that the further this man is ſuffered to extend his conqueſts, the more dangerous and powerful enemy we muſt find in him; why is our duty evaded? why do we delay? or when will we be diſpoſed to exert ourſelves, Athenians? Muſt ſome neceſſity preſs us? What one may call the neceſſity of freemen not only preſſeth us now, but hath long ſince been felt: that of

ſlaves, it is to be wiſhed, may never approach us. How do theſe differ? To freemen, the moſt urgent neceſſity is diſhonour; a greater cannot, I think, be aſſigned: to ſlaves, ſtripes and tortures. Far be this from us! It ought not to be mentioned!

And now, the neglect of thoſe things, to which your lives and fortunes ſhould be devoted, it muſt be confeſſed, is by no means juſtifiable; far from it! ſome pretence, however, may be alledged in it's excuſe. But to refuſe even to liſten to thoſe things which demand your utmoſt attention, which are of the greateſt moment to be fully conſidered, this deſerves the moſt ſevere cenſure. And yet you never attend but upon occaſions like this, when the danger is actually preſent; nor in time of diſengagement do you ever think of conſulting: but, while he is preparing to diſtreſs you, inſtead of making like preparations, and providing for your defence, you are ſunk in inactivity: and, if any one attempts to rouſe you, he feels your reſentment. But, when advice is received that ſome place is loſt, or inveſted, then you attend, then you prepare. The proper ſeaſon for attending and conſulting was then,

then, when you refuſed: now, when you are prevailed upon to hear, you ſhould be acting, and applying your preparations. And by this ſupineneſs is your conduct diſtinguiſhed from that of all other nations: they uſually deliberate before events: your conſultations follow them.——There is but one courſe left, which ſhould long ſince have been purſued; but ſtill may be of ſervice.—This I ſhall lay before you.

There is nothing which the ſtate is more concerned to procure on this occaſion than money. And ſome very favourable opportunities preſent themſelves, which, if wiſely improved, may poſſibly ſupply our demands. In the firſt place, [G] they, whom the KING regards as his faithful and ſtrenuous adherents, are the implacable enemies of Philip, and actually in arms againſt him. Then [H] the man who was Philip's aſ-

[G] *They whom the king regards, &c.* He probably means the Thebans, who had given Ochus powerful aſſiſtance in the ſiege of Peluſium; and who were now much provoked at Philip, on account of Echinus, which he had taken from them.

[H] *The man who was, &c.* As Philip ſeems to have already projected an expedition into Aſia, he received with

ſiſtant and counſellor in all his deſigns againſt the KING hath been lately ſeized; ſo that the KING will be informed of his practices, not by our accuſations, to which he might ſuppoſe our private intereſt prompted us, but by the very agent and conductor of them. This will give weight to your aſſertions: and there will be nothing left for your miniſters to urge, but what the KING will gladly attend to: "that we ſhould unite to chaſtiſe the man "who hath injured us equally: that Philip "will be much more formidable to the "KING, if his firſt attack be made on us: "for that, if he ſhould be permitted to "gain any advantage here, he will then "march againſt him, free from all ap-

open arms all the malecontents of Perſia, and held ſecret intelligence with the rebel Satraps. Hermias, the tyrant of Atarna, a city of Myſia, was of this number; and had been in confidence with Philip. Mentor, the Rhodian, general of the Perſian army, drew him to an interview, by feigned promiſes; where he ſeized him, and ſent him in chains to Ochus. Inſtead of ἀνάρπαστος, ſome copies have ἀνάσπαστος, *brought back:* in which caſe it muſt be underſtood of Memnon or Artabazus, two rebellious Satraps, who had taken refuge in Philip's court, but, by the mediation of Mentor, were reconciled to the king of Perſia.

ULP. TOUR.

"prehenſions."

" prehenſions." For all theſe reaſons, I think you ſhould ſend ambaſſadors to treat with the KING; and lay aſide thoſe idle prejudices, which have ſo often been injurious to your intereſts; " that he is a " barbarian, our common enemy, and the " like." For my own part, when I find a man apprehending danger from a prince, whoſe reſidence is in Suſa and Ecbatana, and pronouncing him the enemy of our ſtate, [I] who formerly re-eſtabliſhed it's power, and [K] but now made us ſuch conſiderable offers, (if you rejected them, that was no fault of his) and yet ſpeaking in another ſtrain of one who is at our gates, who is extending his conqueſts in the very

[I] *Who formerly re-ſtabliſhed it's power.* That is, when Conon, by the aſſiſtance of Artaxerxes Mnemon, beat the Lacedemonian fleet at Cnidos, and reſtored the liberty and ſplendor of his country.

[K] *And but now made us, &c.* Artaxerxes Ochus, in order to reduce Egypt, which had revolted from him, ſollicited ſuccours from the principal cities of Greece. Argos and Thebes conſented: but from Athens and Lacedemon he could obtain only vain profeſſions of friendſhip. He had, without doubt, offered large advantages to ſuch people as would concur with him. Demoſthenes here inſinuates an accuſation of the imprudence of Athens, in rejecting theſe offers. TOUR.

heart of Greece, the plunderer of the Greeks, I am aſtoniſhed; and regard that man, whoever he is, as dangerous, who doth not ſee danger in Philip.

There is another affair, wherein the public hath been injured, which hath been attacked moſt unjuſtly and indecently; which is the conſtant pretence of thoſe who refuſe to perform their duty to the ſtate; to which you will find the blame of every omiſſion, which every man is guilty of, conſtantly transferred. I cannot ſpeak of it, without great apprehenſions. Yet I will ſpeak: for I think I can ſerve my country, by advancing [L] ſome things, both in behalf of the poor, againſt

[L] *Some things in behalf of the poor, &c.* The theatrical diſtributions afforded a perpetual occaſion of public conteſts between the ſeveral orders of the ſtate. The poor were ever diſſatisfied that the richer citizens ſhared the largeſſes, which they conſidered as their own peculiar right: and the rich beheld with impatience the diſſipation of the public funds; which threw the whole weight of the ſupplies on them. But there was ſtill a greater cauſe of complaint. The revenues of the ſtate were not always ſufficient to defray the immenſe expences of feaſts and entertainments. And, in this caſe, ſome factious leader, who was willing to gain popularity, would propoſe to tax the rich; or perhaps, by ſome infamous calumnies, would raiſe

againſt the neceſſitous; if we firſt baniſh thoſe invectives, unjuſtly thrown out againſt the theatrical funds; and thoſe fears, that ſuch an appointment cannot ſubſiſt without ſome diſmal conſequences; an appointment which, above all others, may be moſt conducive to our our intereſts, and give the greateſt ſtrength to the whole community.

raiſe a proſecution, which would bring in a large pecuniary fine. The rich, it may be imagined, were alarmed at ſuch proceedings: they inveighed loudly againſt the authors of them, and ſometimes ventured to accuſe them in form, and to bring them to a trial. When their baſeneſs and evil deſigns were publicly expoſed, the people were aſhamed to avow their intentions of ſupporting ſuch flagrant injuſtice. Their clamours were loud againſt the perſon accuſed. But, as in all judicial proceſſes they gave their votes by ballot, they then had an opportunity of ſaving their friend.

All that the orator here ſays in defence of the theatrical appointments, is expreſſed with a caution and reſerve quite oppoſite to his uſual openneſs and freedom; and which plainly betray a conſciouſneſs of his being inconſiſtent with his former ſentiments. How far he may be excuſed by the ſuppoſed neceſſity of yielding to the violent prepoſſeſſions of the people, and giving up a favourite point, I cannot pretend to determine. But it is certainly not very honourable to Demoſthenes, to ſuppoſe (with Ulpian) that his former oppoſition was merely perſonal; and that the death of Eubulus now put an end to it.

Attend

Attend then, while I firſt plead for thoſe who are thought neceſſitous. There was a time, not long ſince, when [M] the ſtate could not raiſe more than one hundred and thirty talents; and yet none of thoſe who were to command, or to contribute to the equipment of a galley, ever had recourſe to the

[M] *The ſtate could not raiſe more than one hundred and thirty talents.* We muſt underſtand this of thoſe revenues raiſed out of Attica only: for the contributions of the allies, according to the taxation of Ariſtides, amounted to four hundred and ſixty talents annually. And Pericles raiſed them yet higher. In order to know the real value of their revenues, we ſhould conſider the prices of things. In the time of Solon, an ox was ſold at Athens for five drachmæ: as we learn from Plutarch, in the life of Solon. A hog, in the time of Ariſtophanes, was worth three drachmæ: as appears from one of his comedies called *the Peace.* OLIVET.

A Drachma, according to Artbuthnot, was equal to 7¾d. of our money. A hundred drachmæ made a mina, or 3l. 4s. 7d. We may alſo, from the ſame author, add to the foregoing note theſe particulars. In the time of Solon, corn was reckoned at a drachma the medimnus, or 4s. 6d. *per* quarter. In the time of Demoſthenes it was much higher, at five drachmæ the medimnus, which makes it, *per* quarter, 1l. 2s. 7¾d. In Solon's time, the price of a ſheep was 7¾d. A ſoldier's daily pay was a drachma. The yearly ſalary of a common ſchoolmaſter at Athens was a mina. In the early times of the republic, five hundred drachmæ was thought a competent fortune for a gentlewoman,

the pretence of poverty to be exempted from their duty: but veſſels were ſent out, money was ſupplied, and none of our affairs neglected. After this (thanks to fortune!) our revenues were conſiderably improved; and, inſtead of one hundred, roſe to four hundred talents; and this, without any loſs to the wealthy citizens, but rather with advantage: for they ſhare the public affluence, and juſtly ſhare it. Why then do we reproach each other? why have we recourſe to ſuch pretences, to be exempted from our duty? unleſs we envy the poor that ſupply with which fortune hath favoured them. I do not, and I think no one ſhould blame them: for in private families I do not find the young ſo devoid of reſpect to years, or indeed any one ſo unreaſonable and abſurd, as to refuſe to do his duty, unleſs all others do quite as much: ſuch perverſeneſs would render a man obnoxious to the laws againſt

tlewoman, 16l. 2s. 11d. To Ariſtides's two daughters, the Athenians gave three thouſand drachmæ, 96l. 17s. 2d. The arts and ſciences were rated very high; and, though the price of a ſeat in the theatre was no more than two oboli, or 2½d. yet the performers were rewarded magnificently. When Amœbæus ſung in the theatre of Athens, his pay *per diem* was a talent.

undutiful

undutiful children: for to nothing are we more inviolably bound than to a juſt and chearful diſcharge of that debt, in which both nature and the laws engage us to our parents. And as we, each of us, have our particular parents, ſo all our citizens are to be eſteemed the common parents of the ſtate: and, therefore, inſtead of depriving them of what the ſtate beſtows, we ought, if there were not this proviſion, to find out ſome other means of ſupplying their neceſſities. If the rich proceed upon theſe principles, they will act agreeably not to juſtice only, but to good policy: for to rob ſome men of their neceſſary ſubſiſtence is to raiſe a number of enemies to the commonwealth.

To men of lower fortunes I give this advice: that they ſhould remove thoſe grievances of which the wealthier members complained ſo loudly, and ſo juſtly: (for I now proceed in the manner I propoſed, and ſhall not ſcruple to offer ſuch truths as may be favourable to the rich.) Look out, not through Athens only, but every other ſtate, and, in my opinion, you will not find a man of ſo cruel, ſo inhuman a diſpoſition,

as

as to complain, when he ſees poor men, men who even want the neceſſaries of life, receiving theſe appointments. Where then lies the difficulty? whence this animoſity? [N] When they behold certain perſons charging private fortunes with thoſe demands which were uſually anſwered by the public; when they behold the propoſer of this immediately riſing in your eſteem, and, (as far as your protection can make him) immortal; when they find your private votes intirely different from your public clamours; then it is that their indignation is raiſed: for juſtice requires, Athenians, that the advantages of ſociety ſhould be ſhared by all it's members. The rich ſhould have their lives and fortunes well ſecured; that ſo, when any danger threatens their country, their opulence may be applied to it's defence. Other citizens ſhould regard the public treaſure as it really is, the property of all; and be content with their juſt portion; but ſhould eſteem all private fortunes as the inviolable right of their poſſeſſors. Thus a ſmall ſtate riſes to greatneſs, a great one preſerves it's power.

[N] *When they behold certain, &c.* See note on page 265.

But

But it may be ſaid, that poſſibly theſe are the duties of our ſeveral citizens: yet, that they may be performed agreeably to the laws, ſome regulations muſt firſt be made.—The cauſes of our preſent diſorders are many in number, and of long continuance. Grant me your attention, and I ſhall trace them to their origin.

You have departed, Athenians, from that plan of government which your anceſtors laid down. You are perſuaded by your leaders, that to be the firſt among the Greeks, to keep up your forces ready to redreſs the injured, is an unneceſſary and vain expence. You are taught to think, that to lie down in indolence, to be free from public cares, to abandon all your intereſts one by one, a prey to the vigilance and craft of others, is to be perfectly ſecure, and ſurpriſingly happy. By theſe means, the ſtation which you ſhould have maintained is now ſeized by another, and he is become the ſucceſsful, the mighty potentate. And what elſe could have been expected? for as the Lacedemonians were unfortunate, the Thebans engaged in the Phocian war, and we, quite inſenſible; he had

no

no competitor for a prize ſo noble, ſo great, ſo illuſtrious, which for a long time engaged the moſt conſiderable ſtates of Greece in the ſevereſt conteſts. Thus is he become formidable, ſtrengthened by alliances, and attended by his armies; while all the Greeks are involved in ſo many and ſo great difficulties, that it is hard to ſay where they may find recourſe. But, of all the dangers of the ſeveral ſtates, none are ſo dreadful as thoſe which threaten our's: not only becauſe Philip's deſigns aim principally at us, but becauſe we, of all others, have been moſt regardleſs of our intereſts.

[o] If then, from the variety of merchandiſes and plenty of proviſions, you flatter yourſelves that the ſtate is not in danger, you judge unworthily and falſely. Hence we might determine whether our markets were well or ill ſupplied: but the ſtrength of that ſtate, which is regarded by all who aim at the ſovereignty of Greece as the ſole obſtacle to their deſigns, the well-known guardian of liberty, is not ſurely to be

[o] *If then, from the variety, &c.* See note on the oration on the ſtate of the Cherſoneſus, p. 196.

judged

judged of by it's vendibles. No: we ſhould inquire whether it be ſecure of the affections of it's allies; whether it be powerful in arms. Theſe are the points to be conſidered: and in theſe, inſtead of being well provided, you are totally deficient. To be aſſured of this, you need but attend to the following conſideration. At what time have the affairs of Greece been in the greateſt confuſion? I believe it will not be affirmed, that they have ever been in greater than at preſent. For, in former times, Greece was always divided into two parties, that of the Lacedemonians, and our's. All the ſeveral ſtates adhered to one or the other of theſe. The KING, while he had no alliances here, was equally ſuſpected by all. [P] By eſpouſing the cauſe of the vanquiſhed, he gained ſome credit, until he reſtored them

[P] *By eſpouſing the cauſe of the vanquiſhed, &c.* Lacedemon firſt entered into an alliance with Darius Nothus, by the mediation of Tiſſaphernes; which inabled Lyſander to conquer Athens. Conon obtained from Artaxerxes Mnemon the ſuccours neceſſary to revenge his country, and to re-eſtabliſh it. And it was with reaſon that the kings of Perſia attended to the preſervation of a due balance between the Grecian ſtates, leſt the prevailing power might turn it's thoughts to Aſia, and attempt an invaſion there. TOUR.

to the ſame degree of power with their adverſaries; after that, [Q] he became no leſs hated by thoſe whom he had ſaved, than by thoſe whom he had conſtantly oppoſed. But now, in the firſt place, the KING lives in amity with all the Greeks; (indeed, without ſome immediate reformation in our conduct, we muſt be excepted.) In the next place, there are ſeveral cities which affect the characters of guardians and protectors. They are all poſſeſſed with a ſtrong paſſion for pre-eminence; and ſome of them (to their ſhame!) deſert, and envy, and diſtruſt each other. In a word, the Argians, Thebans, Corinthians, Lacedemonians, Arcadians, and Athenians, have all erected them-

[Q] *He became no leſs hated, &c.* Lacedemon had no ſooner ſubjected the Athenians, by the help of Darius, but ſhe ravaged the Perſian provinces in Aſia Minor, and joined with the rebellious Satraps. And as ſoon as the Athenians were delivered by Artaxerxes from the Spartan yoke, they eſpouſed the quarrel of Evagoras, who had revolted from Artaxerxes, and uſurped a great part of the kingdom of Cyprus. Benefits could not bind theſe ſtates. Intereſt alone formed their engagements, and intereſt diſſolved them. The picture here exhibited of the conduct of the Greeks towards the kings of Perſia, is by no means flattering, in point of morals. But it is not in modern times only that we find morals muſt be ſilent, when politics ſpeak. TOUR.

ſelves into ſo many diſtinct ſovereignties. But among all theſe parties, all theſe governing ſtates, into which Greece is broken, there is not one (if I may ſpeak freely) [R] to whoſe councils fewer Grecian affairs are ſubmitted, than to our's: and no wonder; when neither love, nor confidence, nor fear, can induce any people to apply to you. It is not one ſingle cauſe that hath effected this; (in that caſe, the remedy were eaſy;) but many faults of various natures, and of long continuance. Without entering into a particular detail, I ſhall mention one, in which they all center: but I muſt firſt intreat you not to be offended, if I ſpeak ſome bold truths without reſerve.

Every opportunity which might have been improved to your advantage hath been ſold.

[R] *To whoſe councils, &c.* The ruling ſtates of Greece accounted it their greateſt glory to ſee and hear a number of ambaſſadors in their aſſemblies, ſolliciting their protection and alliance. The conqueſts which Philip made in Thrace had put an end to many applications of this ſort, which had formerly been addreſſed to the Athenians. And their indolence made people decline any engagements with them. Foreigners were perſuaded, that they who were inſenſible to their own intereſts were not likely to grant the due attention to thoſe of others.

The

The eaſe and ſupineneſs in which you are indulged have diſarmed your reſentment againſt the traitors: and thus others are ſuffered to poſſeſs your honours. —— But at preſent I ſhall take notice only of what relates to Philip. If he be mentioned, immediately there is one ready to ſtart up, and cry "we ſhould not act inconſiderately; "we "ſhould not involve ourſelves in a war." And then he is ſure not to forget the great happineſs of living in peace, the misfortune of being loaded with the maintenance of a large army, the evil deſigns of ſome perſons againſt our treaſures; with others of the like momentous truths.

But theſe exhortations to peace ſhould not be addreſſed to you: your conduct is but too pacific: let them rather be addreſſed to him who is in arms. If he can be prevailed on, there will be no difficulty on your part. Then, it cannot be thought a misfortune to provide for our ſecurity at the expence of ſome part of our poſſeſſions: the conſequences that muſt ariſe, if this proviſion be neglected, rather deſerve that name. And, as to the plundering of your treaſury, this muſt be prevented, by finding ſome

effectual means to guard it; not by neglecting your intereſts. Nor can I but expreſs the utmoſt indignation, when I find ſome of you complaining that your treaſures are plundered, though it be in your power to ſecure them, and to puniſh the guilty; and yet looking on with indifference, while Philip is plundering every part of Greece ſucceſſively; and this, that he may at laſtd eſtroy you.

And what can be the reaſon, Athenians, that when Philip is guilty of ſuch manifeſt violations of juſtice, when he is actually ſeizing our cities, yet none of theſe men will acknowledge that he acts unjuſtly, or commits hoſtilities; but aſſert, that they who rouſe you from your inſenſibility, and urge you to oppoſe theſe outrages, are involving you in war? This is the reaſon: that, whatever accidents may happen in the courſe of the war, (and there is a neceſſity, a melancholy neceſſity, that war ſhould be attended with many accidents) they may lay the whole blame upon your beſt and moſt faithful counſellors. They know, that, if, with a ſteady and unanimous reſolution, you oppoſe the inſolent invader, he muſt be conquered, and they deprived

of

of a maſter, whoſe pay was ever ready. But, if the firſt unhappy accident calls you off to private trials and proſecutions, they need but appear as accuſers, and two great points are ſecured; your favour, and Philip's gold: while you diſcharge the vengeance due to their perfidy, againſt your faithful ſpeakers. Theſe are their hopes: theſe the grounds of their complaints, that certain perſons are involving you in war. For my own part, this I know perfectly; that although it hath never been propoſed by any Athenian to declare war; yet Philip hath ſeized many of our territories, and but juſt now ſent ſuccours to the Cardians. But, if we will perſuade ourſelves that he is not committing hoſtilities, he would be the moſt ſenſeleſs of mortals, ſhould he attempt to undeceive us: for, when they who have received the injury deny it, muſt the offender prove his guilt? But when he marches directly hither, what ſhall we then ſay? He will ſtill deny that he is at war with us; (as he did to the people of Oreum, until his forces were in the heart of their dominions; as he did to thoſe of Pheræ, until he was upon the point of ſtorming their walls; as he did to the Olynthians, until

he appeared in their territories at the head of an army.) Shall we then ſay, that they who urge us to defend our country are involving us in a war? If ſo, we muſt be ſlaves. There is no medium! Nor is your danger the ſame with that of other ſtates. Philip's deſign is not to inſlave, but to extirpate Athens. He knows, that a ſtate, like your's, accuſtomed to command, will not, or, if it were inclined, cannot ſubmit to ſlavery: he knows, that, if you have an opportunity, you can give him more diſturbance than any other people: and therefore, if ever he conquers us, we may be ſure of finding no degree of mercy.

Since, then, you are engaged in defence of all that is dear to you, apply to the great work, with an attention equal to the importance of it: let the wretches who have openly ſold themſelves to this man be the objects of your abhorrence: let them meet with the utmoſt ſeverity of public juſtice. For you will not, you cannot conquer your foreign enemies, until you have puniſhed thoſe that lurk within your walls. No: they will ever prove ſo many obſtacles to impede

impede our progreſs, and to give our enemies the ſuperiority.

And what can be the reaſon that he treats you with inſolence, (for I cannot call his preſent conduct by another name;) that he utters menaces againſt you; while he at leaſt condeſcends to diſſemble with other people, and to gain their confidence by good offices? Thus, by heaping favours upon the Theſſalians, he led them inſenſibly into their preſent ſlavery. It is not poſſible to enumerate all the various artifices he practiſed againſt the wretched Olynthians: (ſuch, among others, was the putting them in poſſeſſion of Potidæa.) In his late tranſactions with the Thebans, he enticed them to his party, by yielding Bœotia to them, and by freeing them from a tedious and diſtreſſing war. And thus, after receiving their ſeveral inſidious favours, ſome of theſe people have ſuffered calamities but too well known to all: others muſt ſubmit to whatever may befal them. What you yourſelves have formerly loſt I ſhall not mention; but, in the very treaty of peace, in how many inſtances have we been deceived? how have

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we been deſpoiled? Did we not give up Phocis and the ſtreights? did not we loſe our Thracian dominions, Doriſcum, Serrium; and even our ally Cerſobleptes? is he not in poſſeſſion of Cardia? and doth he not avow his uſurpation? Whence is it, then, that his behaviour towards you is ſo different from that towards others? Becauſe, of all the Grecian ſtates, our's is the only one, in which harangues in favour of enemies are pronounced with impunity: and the venal wretch may utter his falſehoods with ſecurity, even while you are loſing your dominions. It was not ſafe to ſpeak for Philip at Olynthus, until the people had been gained by Potidæa. In Theſſaly, it was not ſafe to ſpeak for Philip, until that people had been gained by the expulſion of their tyrants, and by being reinſtated in the council of Amphictyons. Nor could it have been ſafely attempted at Thebes, until he had given them up Bœotia, and exterminated the Phocians. But, at Athens, without the leaſt danger may Philip be defended, although he hath deprived us of Amphipolis, and the territory of Cardia; although he threatens our city by his fortifications

tifications in Eubœa; although he is now marching to Byzantium. Hence ſome of his advocates have ariſen from penury to affluence; from obſcurity and contempt to honour and eminence: while, on the other hand, you have ſunk from glory to diſgrace; from wealth to poverty: for the riches of a ſtate I take to be the number, fidelity, and affection of it's allies: in all which you are notoriouſly deficient. And by your total inſenſibility, while your affairs are thus falling into ruin, he is become ſucceſsful, great, and formidable to all the Greeks, to all the Barbarians; and you deſerted and inconſiderable; ſumptuous indeed in your markets; but, in every thing relating to military power, ridiculous.

There are ſome orators, I find, who view your intereſts and their own in a quite different light. To you they urge the neceſſity of continuing quiet, whatever injuries you are expoſed to: they themſelves find this impoſſible, though no one offers them the leaſt injury. [s] To you I ſpeak, Ariſtodemus!

[s] *To you I ſpeak, Ariſtodemus!* He was by profeſſion a player;

demus! Suppoſe a perſon ſhould, without ſeverity, aſk you this queſtion: "How is "it, that you, who are ſenſible, (for it is a "well-known truth) that the life of private "men is ſerene and eaſy, and free from "danger; that of ſtateſmen, invidious and "inſecure, ſubject to daily conteſts and diſ-"quiets; ſhould yet prefer the life encom-"paſſed with dangers, to that of peace and "diſengagement?" What could you ſay? Suppoſe we admit the truth of the very beſt anſwer you could make, "that you were "prompted by a deſire of honour and re-"nown:" is it poſſible, that you, who engaged in ſuch painful undertakings, who deſpiſed all toils and dangers, for the ſake of theſe, ſhould adviſe the ſtate to give them up for eaſe and indulgence? You cannot, ſurely, ſay, that it was incumbent upon you to maintain a degree of eminence in the city; and that the city was not concerned to maintain her eminence in Greece! Nor do I ſee how the public

a player; and was one of the ten ambaſſadors which the Athenians had ſent to the court of Macedon, to treat about the peace. At his return, Demoſtheneſs propoſed a decree for crowning this very man for his good ſervices, whom he here inveighs againſt with ſo much bitterneſs.

ſafety

ſafety requires that we ſhould confine ourſelves to our own concerns; and yet, that an officious intruſion into thoſe of others ſhould be neceſſary for your ſafety. On the contrary, you are involving yourſelf in the greateſt dangers, by being unneceſſarily aſſiduous; and the city, by being quite inactive. "But then you have an illuſtrious "reputation, derived from your family, "which it would be ſhameful not to ſupport: while, on the contrary, nothing has "been tranſmitted from our fathers, but "obſcurity and meanneſs." This is equally falſe. Your father was like you, and therefore baſe and infamous. To the honour of our anceſtors, let all Greece bear witneſs; [T] twice reſcued, by their valour, from the greateſt dangers.

There are perſons, then, who do not act with the ſame firmneſs and integrity in the

[T] *Twice reſcued, &c.* Firſt at Marathon, and afterwards at Salamis. Iſocrates mentions a third time, when they delivered Greece from the Spartan yoke. Demoſthenes [frequently ſpeaks of this in the higheſt terms, but] here rather chuſes to leſſen the glory of his country, than to recal an event which reflected on the Lacedemonians, now in alliance with Athens. TOUR.

conduct

conduct of their own affairs, and thoſe of the ſtate. Is not this the caſe, when ſome of them, after eſcaping from priſon, have raiſed themſelves ſo high, as to forget their former condition; and yet have reduced a ſtate, whoſe pre-eminence in Greece was but now univerſally acknowledged, to the loweſt degree of infamy and meanneſs?——I could ſay more on theſe and other points: but I forbear: for it is not want of good counſel that now diſtreſſes, or ever hath diſtreſſed you. But when your true intereſts have been laid before you, and that you have been unanimous in your approbation, you can, with equal patience, attend to thoſe who endeavour to diſcredit, to overthrow all that hath been advanced. Not that you are ignorant of their characters; (for you can, at firſt glance, diſtinguiſh the hireling and agent of Philip from the true patriot) but that by impeaching your faithful friends, and by turning the whole affair into ridicule and invective, you may find a pretence for the intire neglect of your duty.

You have now heard truths of the higheſt moment, urged with all freedom, ſimplicity,

city, and zeal. You have heard a ſpeech, not filled with flattery, danger, and deceit; calculated to bring gold to the ſpeaker, and to reduce the ſtate into the power of it's enemies. It remains, therefore, that the whole tenour of your conduct be reformed: if not, that utter deſolation which will be found in your affairs muſt be imputed wholly to yourſelves.

End of the FOURTH PHILIPPIC.

2 AP 57

THE TWELFTH

ORATION againſt PHILIP:

COMMONLY CALLED THE

ORATION on the LETTER.

PRONOUNCED IN THE

ARCHONSHIP of THEOPHRASTUS,

The Year after the foregoing ORATION.

To which is prefixed,

PHILIP'S LETTER to the ATHENIANS.


BRITISH MUSEUM

INTRODUCTION.

THE former oration inſpired the Athenians with the reſolution of ſending ſuccours to all the cities that were threatened by Philip's arms: and their firſt ſtep was to diſpatch to the Helleſpont a convoy with proviſions; which weighed anchor in view of Selymbria, a city of the Propontis, then beſieged by the Macedonians; and was there ſeized by Amyntas, Philip's admiral. The ſhips were demanded by the Athenians, and returned by Philip, but with declarations ſufficiently alarming.

The obſtinate valour of the Perinthians had forced Philip to turn the ſiege into a blockade.

He marched off with a conſiderable body of his army, to attack other places; and made an incurſion into the territories of Byzantium. The Byzantines ſhut themſelves up within their city, and diſpatched one of their citizens to Athens, to deſire the aſſiſtance of that ſtate; who, with ſome difficulty, prevailed to have a fleet of forty ſhips ſent out, under the command of Chares.

As this general had not the ſame reputation in other places, as at Athens, the cities by which he was to paſs refuſed to receive him: ſo that he was obliged to wander for ſome time along the coaſts, extorting contributions from the Athenian allies; deſpiſed by the enemy, and ſuſpected by the whole world. He appeared at laſt before Byzantium; where he met with the ſame mortifying treatment as in other places, and was refuſed admiſſion: and ſhortly after was defeated by Amyntas in a naval engagement, in which a conſiderable part of his fleet was either ſunk or taken.

Philip had for ſome time perceived, that, ſooner or later, he muſt inevitably come to a rupture

rupture with the Athenians. His partizans were no longer able to lull them into ſecurity. Their oppoſition to his deſigns, however imperfect and ineffectual, was yet ſufficient to alarm him. He therefore determined to endeavour to abate that ſpirit which now began to break through their inveterate indolence; and for this purpoſe ſent them a letter, in which, with the utmoſt art, he laid open the cauſes of complaint he had againſt them, and threatened them with repriſals. This letter was not received at Athens till after the news of Chares's defeat.

Philip had now laid ſiege to Byzantium; and exerted all his efforts to make himſelf maſter of that city. On the other hand, the Athenians were diſheartened by the ill ſucceſs of their commander, and began to repent of having ſent any ſuccours: when Phocion, who always aſſumed the liberty of ſpeaking his ſentiments freely, aſſured them, that, for once, they themſelves had not been in fault; but that their general only was to blame. He was immediately deſired to take on himſelf the charge of relieving Byzantium; and ſet ſail with a numerous body of forces. He was re-

ceived with the greateſt demonſtrations of joy: and his whole conduct expreſſed the utmoſt wiſdom and moderation. Nor was his valour leſs conſpicuous: he ſuſtained many aſſaults with an intrepidity worthy of the early ages of the commonwealth; and at laſt obliged Philip to raiſe the ſiege.

Phocion then departed amidſt the general acclamations of the people whom he had ſaved. He proceeded to the relief of the colonies of the Cherſoneſus, who were ever expoſed to the attacks of the Cardians. In his way, he took ſome veſſels laden with arms and proviſions for the enemy: and obliged the Macedonians, who had attempted Seſtos, to abandon their enterpriſe, and ſhut themſelves up in Cardia.

And thus, after various expeditions highly honourable both to himſelf and to his country, Phocion returned home, where he found the Athenians engaged in a debate on Philip's letter: on which occaſion Demoſthenes pronounced his laſt oration againſt Philip. To have anſwered the letter particularly would have been very difficult: for, though Athens had the better cauſe, yet many irregularities had really been

been committed; which Philip knew how to display in their full force. The orator therefore makes use of his art to extricate himself from the difficulty; avoids all former discussions of facts; and applies himself at once to raise the lively passions: affects to consider this letter as an open declaration of war; inflames the imaginations of his hearers with this idea; and speaks only of the means to support their arms against so powerful an enemy.

* PHILIP's LETTER TO THE ATHENIANS.

PHILIP to the ſenate and people of ATHENS: greeting.

AS the embaſſies I have frequently ſent to inforce thoſe oaths and declarations by which we ſtand engaged, have produced no alteration in your conduct, I thought it neceſſary thus to lay before you the

* This letter is a maſter-piece in the original. It has a majeſtic and perſuaſive vivacity; a force and juſtneſs of reaſoning, ſuſtained through the whole; a clear expoſition of facts, and each followed by it's natural conſequence; a delicate irony: in ſhort, a noble and conciſe ſtile, made for

ſeveral particulars in which I think myſelf aggrieved. Be not ſurpriſed at the length of this letter: for, as I have many cauſes of complaint, it is neceſſary to explain them all diſtinctly.

Firſt then, [B] when Nicias the herald was forcibly taken out of my own territory; inſtead of puniſhing the author of this outrage, as juſtice required, you added to his wrongs, by keeping him ten months in priſon: [C] and the letters intruſted to him, by

for kings who ſpeak well; or have taſte and diſcernment at leaſt to make choice of thoſe who can make them ſpeak well. If Philip was himſelf the author of this letter, as it is but juſt to believe, ſince we have no proof to the contrary, we may reaſonably pronounce of him, as was ſaid of Cæſar, *that he wrote with that ſpirit with which he fought.* Eodem animo dixit, quo bellavit. Quint. inſt. l. 10. c. 1. TOUR.

[B] *When Nicias the herald, &c.* Probably he had been ſeized upon his journey from Thrace to Macedon, by Diopithes, at the time of his invading Philip's Thracian dominions, as mentioned in the preface to the oration on the ſtate of the Cherſoneſus. TOUR.

[C] *And the letters intruſted to him, by us, &c.* The Athenians hoped, by opening his packet, to get ſome light into Philip's ſecret ſchemes and practices againſt them. There were found in it ſome letters directed to Olympias, Philip's queen, which they treated with a moſt ſcrupulous

by us, you read publicly in your aſſembly. Again: [D] when the ports of Thaſſus were open to the Byzantine gallies, nay, to any pirates that pleaſed, you looked on with indifference; although our treaties expreſſly ſay, that ſuch proceedings ſhall be conſidered as an actual declaration of war. About the ſame time it was that Diopithes made a deſcent upon my dominions, carried off in chains the inhabitants of [E] Crobyle and Tiriſtaſis, ravaged all the adjacent parts of Thrace, and at length proceeded to ſuch a pitch of lawleſs violence, as to ſeize [F] Amphilocus, who went, in quality of an ambaſſador, to treat about the ranſom of pri-

ſcrupulous reſpect, and took care ſhe ſhould receive them in the ſame condition in which they had been intercepted. TOUR.

[D] *When the ports of Thaſſus were open, &c.* The Athenians had engaged, by an article of their treaty, that the Thaſſians, who were their ſubjects, ſhould not receive any ſhips that committed piracies on the ſubjects or allies of Philip. This article had not been ſtrictly obſerved; perhaps on account of Philip's own infidelity. TOUR.

[E] *Crobyle and Tiriſtaſis.* The firſt of theſe places is quite unknown. Tiriſtaſis is placed by Pliny in the Thracian Cherſoneſus. TOUR.

[F] *As to ſeize Amphilocus.* It is impoſſible to ſave the honour of Diopithes, but by denying the fact; at leaſt in the manner that Philip repreſents it. TOUR.

ſoners;

ſoners; whom, after he had reduced him to the greateſt difficulties, he compelled to purchaſe his freedom, at the rate of nine talents. And this he did with the approbation of his ſtate. Yet the violation of the ſacred character of heralds and ambaſſadors is accounted, by all people, the height of impiety: nor have any expreſſed a deeper ſenſe of this, than you yourſelves: [G] for, when the Megareans had put Anthemocritus to death, the people proceeded ſo far

[G] *For, when the Megareans had put Anthemocritus to death, &c.* Philip, here, beats the Athenians with their own weapons, and cites, very much to the purpoſe, the example of a memorable vengeance, which they had taken about an age before, upon the Megareans. They had accuſed this people of favouring a revolt of their ſlaves, and of profaning a tract of conſecrated land; and, upon this account, excluded them from all advantages of commerce in the ports and markets of Athens. Thucydides ſtops here: but Pauſanias adds, that Anthemocritus went from Athens, in quality of an herald, to ſummon the Megareans to deſiſt from their ſacrilege, and that, for anſwer, they put him to death. The intereſt of the Gods ſerved the Athenians for a pretence; but the famous Aſpaſia, whom Pericles was ſo violently in love with, was the true cauſe of their rupture with Megara. Some young Athenians, heated by wine, had taken away from Megara, a remarkable courtezan, called Simætha; and the Megareans, by way of repriſal, ſeized two Athenian ladies

far as [H] to exclude them from the myſteries; and erected a ſtatue before the gates, as a monument of their crime. And is not this ſhocking to be avowedly guilty of the very ſame crimes, for which your reſentment fell ſo ſeverely upon others, when you yourſelves were aggrieved?

In

ladies of the ſame character, that were in Aſpaſia's train. Pericles eſpouſed his favourite's quarrel; and, with the power which he then poſſeſſed, eaſily perſuaded the people to whatever he pleaſed. They thundered out a decree againſt the Megareans, forbidding all commerce with them upon pain of death: they drew up a new form of an oath, by which every general obliged himſelf to invade the territories of Megara twice every year. This decree kindled the firſt ſparks of contention, which at length flamed out, in the Peloponneſian war. It was the work of three courtezans. The moſt illuſtrious events have ſometimes as ſhameful an origin. TOUR.

[H] *To exclude them from the myſteries; and erected, &c.* All the Greeks had, ordinarily, a right to be initiated into what were called the leſſer myſteries which the Athenians celebrated at Eleuſis, in honour of Ceres and Proſerpine. But upon the death of Anthemocritus the Megareans were excluded; and a ſtatue or tomb erected in honour of this herald, on the road leading from Athens to Eleuſis, near the gate called Dipylon. According to Ariſtophanes (in Acharn. Act. 2. Sc. 5.) the Megareans denied this murder, and threw the whole blame of it upon Aſpaſia and Pericles. TOUR.

In the next place, Callias, your general, hath made himſelf maſter of all the towns upon the bay of Pagaſæ; though comprehended in the treaty made with you, and united in alliance to me. Not a veſſel could ſteer it's courſe towards Macedon, but the paſſengers were all treated by him as enemies, and ſold: and this his conduct hath been applauded by the reſolutions of your council. So that I do not ſee how you can proceed further, if you actually declare war againſt me. For, when we were at open hoſtilities, you did but ſend out your corſairs, make prize of thoſe who were ſailing to my kingdom, aſſiſt my enemies, and infeſt my territories. Yet now, when we are profeſſedly at peace, ſo far have your injuſtice and rancour hurried you, that [1] you have ſent ambaſſadors to the

[1] *You have ſent ambaſſadors to the Perſian, &c.* Diodorus informs us, that about this time the ſatraps of the leſſer Aſia had obliged Philip to raiſe the ſiege of Perinthus. The hiſtorian does not ſay that the Athenians invited them: but Philip complains of it here; and Pauſanias obſerves, that in this expedition the Perſian forces were commanded by Apollodorus, an Athenian general. We may obſerve, with what diſreſpect Philip (whoſe anceſtors, in their greateſt proſperity, never aſpired higher than

the Perſian to perſuade him to attack me: which muſt appear highly ſurpriſing: for, [K] before that prince had ſubdued Egypt and Phœnicia, it was reſolved, that, if he attempted any new enterpriſes, you would invite me, as well as all the other Greeks, to an aſſociation againſt him. But now, with ſuch malice am I purſued, that you are, on the contrary, confederating with him againſt me. In former times, I am told, [L] your anceſtors objected it as an heinous

than to the alliance of ſome ſatrap) here ſpeaks of the GREAT KING—*The Perſian!* TOUR.

[K] *Before that prince had ſubdued Egypt and Phœnicia, it was reſolved, &c.* Artaxerxes Ochus, who governed Perſia at that time, before his reduction of theſe revolted provinces, had marched into the leſſer Aſia, againſt Artabazus, a rebellious ſatrap. The approach of the Perſians alarmed the Greeks: and Athens conceived a deſign of attacking them in their own country. This gave occaſion to the oration of Demoſthenes, intitled, Περὶ τῶν Συμμοριῶν. Philip pretends that they had reſolved to admit him into the confederacy which was then forming in favour of the Greeks, with whom he affects to rank, and by his expreſſions removes every idea of foreigner and barbarian, which are the repreſentations that the orator frequently makes of him. TOUR.

[L] *Your anceſtors objected it as an heinous crime to the family, &c.* The compariſon which Philip makes here, between the ſons of Piſiſtratus and the orators who adviſed

heinous crime to the family of Piſiſtratus, that they had led the Perſian againſt the Greeks: and yet you are not aſhamed to commit the very ſame action, for which you were continually inveighing againſt thoſe tyrants.

But your injuſtice hath not ſtopped here. Your decrees command me to [M] permit Teres and Cerſobleptes to reign unmoleſted in Thrace, as being citizens of Athens.—— I do not know that they were included in our treaty, that their names are to be found in the records of our engagements, or that they are Athenians. But this I know, that Teres ſerved in my army againſt you; and that when Cerſobleptes propoſed to my ambaſſa-

viſed an alliance with Perſia, is founded upon an hiſtory too well known to be enlarged upon. It is undoubtedly by no means juſt: for, in different conjunctures, the good citizen may employ the ſame forces to ſave his country that the wicked one had formerly employed to deſtroy it. However, the turn he gives it was the fitteſt in the world to affect the people, who thought it their greateſt honour to expreſs an inveterate hatred to the Perſians.

[M] *To permit Teres and Cerſobleptes to reign, &c.* Hiſtory ſpeaks only of Cerſobleptes. They had ſuffered him to be overthrown by Philip: and, when they found how nearly they themſelves were affected by his fall, employed thoſe decrees to endeavour to reſtore him. TOUR.

dors

dors to take the neceſſary oaths, in order to be particularly included in the treaty, your generals prevented him, by declaring him an enemy to the Athenians. And how is this equitable or juſt? when it ſerves your purpoſes, to proclaim him the enemy of your ſtate; when I am to be calumniated, to give him the title of your citizen; [N] when Sitalces was ſlain, to whom you granted the privileges of your city, inſtantly to enter into an alliance with his murderer; yet to engage in a war with me, on account of Cerſobleptes? and this, when you are ſenſible, that not one of theſe your adopted citizens have ever ſhewed the leaſt regard to your laws or determinations. But to bring this affair to a ſhort iſſue. [O] You granted the

[N] *When Sitalces was ſlain, &c.* This Sitalces was the grandfather of Cerſobleptes. In the beginning of the Peloponneſian war, he rendered the Athenians ſuch important ſervices, that they, by way of acknowledgment, admitted his ſon Sadocus into the number of their citizens. In the eighth year of this war, Sitalces was killed in a battle againſt the Triballi. His nephew Seuthes ſeized the kingdom, in prejudice of his children: and hence became ſuſpected of being the cauſe of his death. Philip argues, from this ſuſpicion, as if it was an undoubted truth.

TOUR.

[O] *You granted the rights of your community, &c.* What idea muſt we form of the ſplendor of that city, where even kings

the rights of your community [P] to Evagoras of Cyprus, to Dionyſius the Syracuſan, and to their deſcendants. Prevail there-

kings ſollicited for the rank of private citizens! The other ſtates of Greece affected the ſame kind of grandeur. At a time, when ambaſſadors from Corinth were congratulating Alexander on his victories, they made him an offer of the freedom of their city, as the greateſt mark of honour poſſible. Alexander, now in the full ſplendor of his fortune, diſdained to return them any anſwer but a contemptous ſmile. This ſtung the ambaſſadors to the quick; and one of them was bold enough to ſay, *Know, Sir, that the great Hercules, and you, are the the only perſons whom Corinth has ever deigned to diſtinguiſh in this manner.* This ſoftened the prince: he received them with all poſſible marks of reſpect, and accepted of a title which had been ſo dignified. TOUR.

[P] *To Evagoras of Cyprus.* The Athenians erected a ſtatue to Evagoras, the elder of that name, and declared him a citizen of Athens, for having aſſiſted Conon in reſtoring their liberty. He cauſed Salamis to revolt from the Perſians, and ſubdued moſt part of the iſland of Cyprus; but was afterwards reduced, and fell by the hands of Nicocles. His ſon, Evagoras the younger, however, aſſerted his claim to the kingdom of Cyprus, and was ſupported by the Athenians againſt Protagoras, the ſucceſſor of Nicocles. But his attempts were not ſucceſsful. Protagoras ſupplanted him at the court of Perſia, where he had been in full favour. He was cited to anſwer to ſome heads of an accuſation; and, upon his juſtifying himſelf, he obtained a government in Aſia, well worth his little kingdom. But his bad conduct ſoon obliged him to abdicate, and fly into Cyprus; where he periſhed wretchedly. TOUR.

fore

fore upon the men who have diſpoſſeſſed each of theſe to reſtore them to their dominions, and you ſhall recover from me [Q] all thoſe territories of Thrace, which Teres and Cerſobleptes commanded. But if you have nothing to urge againſt thoſe who expelled them, and yet are inceſſantly tormenting me, am not I juſtly warranted to oppoſe you?—I might urge many other arguments upon this head; but I chuſe to paſs them over.

[R] The Cardians, I freely declare, I am determined to ſupport; as my engagements to them are prior to our treaty; and as you refuſed to ſubmit your differences with them to an arbitration, though frequently urged by me: nor have they been wanting in the like ſollicitations. Should not I therefore be the baſeſt of mankind, to abandon my allies, and to ſhew greater regard for you,

[Q] *All thoſe territories of Thrace.* In the original τὴν Θρᾴκην, ὅσην, &c. By the ironical pomp of this expreſſion, he ſets their dominions (which were really inconſiderable) in the moſt contemptous light. TOUR.

[R] *The Cardians, &c.* See the preface to the oration on the ſtate of the Cherſoneſus.

my inveterate oppoſers, than for my conſtant and aſſured adherents?

Formerly (for I cannot paſs this in ſilence) you contented yourſelves with remonſtrating upon the points above-mentioned. But lately, upon the bare complaint of the Peparethians, that they had been ſeverely treated by me, you proceeded to ſuch outrage, as to ſend orders to your general to revenge their quarrel. Yet the puniſhment which I inflicted was no way equal to the heinouſneſs of their crime: as they had, in time of peace, ſeized Haloneſus, nor could be prevailed upon, by all my ſollicitations, to give up either the iſland or the garriſon. The injuries I received from the Peparethians were never thought of; but their puniſhment commanded all your attention, as it afforded a pretence for accuſing me; although I did not take the iſland either from them, or from you, but from the pirate Soſtratus. If then you confeſs that you delivered it to Soſtratus, you confeſs yourſelves guilty of ſending out pirates: if he ſeized it, without your conſent, how have I injured you, by taking poſſeſſion of it, and by

by rendering it a ſecure harbour? Nay, ſo great was my regard to your ſtate, that I offered to beſtow you this iſland: [s] but this was not agreeable to your orators: they would not have it accepted, but reſumed. So that, if I complied with their directions, I proclaimed myſelf an uſurper: if I ſtill kept poſſeſſion of the place, I became ſuſpected to the people. I ſaw through theſe artifices, and therefore propoſed to bring our differences to a judicial determination; and, if ſentence was given for me, to preſent you with the place; if in your favour, to reſtore it to the people. This I frequently deſired: you would not hear it: the Peparethians ſeized the iſland. What then was I to do? ſhould I not puniſh the violators of oaths? was I tamely to bear ſuch an audacious inſult? If the iſland was the property of the Peparethians, what right have the Athenians to demand it? if it be your's, why do you not reſent their uſurpation?

So far, in ſhort, have our animoſities been carried, that, when I had occaſion to diſpatch

[s] *But this was not agreeable to your orators: they, &c.* Demoſthenes in particular oppoſed their receiving a reſtitution under the name of a preſent.

ſome veſſels to the Helleſpont, I was obliged to ſend a body of forces through the Cherſoneſus, to defend them againſt your colonies, who are authoriſed to attack me [T] by a decree of Polycrates, confirmed by the reſolutions of your council. Nay, your general has actually invited the Byzantines to join him, and has every-where publicly declared, that he has your inſtructions to commence hoſtilities, at the firſt favourable opportunity. All this could not prevail upon me to make any attempt upon your city, or your navy, or your territories; although I might have had ſucceſs in moſt, or even all of them. I choſe rather to continue my ſollicitations to have our complaints ſubmitted to proper umpires. And which, think ye, is the fitteſt deciſion; that of reaſon or of the ſword? Who are to be judges in your cauſe, yourſelves or others? What can be more inconſiſtent, than that the people of Athens, [U] who compelled

[T] *By a decree of Polycrates.* This orator had great credit at Athens, and on many occaſions favoured the deſigns of Philip. Poſſibly he acted otherwiſe upon this occaſion, the better to conceal his attachment; or that he might afterwards ſell his integrity at a dearer rate.

TOUR.

[U] *Who compelled the Thaſſians and Maronites, &c.*

The

compelled the Thaſſians and Maronites to bring their pretenſions to the city of Stryma to a judicial deciſion, ſhould yet refuſe to have their own diſputes with me determined in the ſame manner? particularly, as you are ſenſible, that, if the decree be againſt you, ſtill you loſe nothing; if in your favour, it puts you in poſſeſſion of my conqueſts.

But what appears to me moſt unaccountable is this: when I ſent you ambaſſadors, choſen from all the confederated powers, on purpoſe, to be witneſſes of our tranſactions; when I diſcovered the ſincereſt intentions of entering into reaſonable and juſt engagements with you, in relation to the affairs of Greece; you even refuſed to hear theſe ambaſſadors on that head. It was then in your power to remove all their apprehenſions, who ſuſpected any danger from my deſigns; or to have openly convicted me of conſummate baſeneſs. This was the intereſt of the

The firſt of theſe people inhabited an iſland in the Egean ſea; the other, a maritime place in Thrace. The Thaſſians had founded Stryma, according to Herodotus; but, as it was in the neighbourhood of Maronea, probably the Maronites had, in quality of protectors, or benefactors, acquired ſome pretenſions to it. TOUR.

people; but the orators could not find their account in it; for they are a ſett of men, to whom (if I may believe thoſe that are acquainted with your polity) [x] peace is war, and war is peace; as they are always ſure to make a property of the generals, either by aiding their deſigns, or by malicious proſecutions. Then they need but throw out ſome ſcandalous invectives againſt perſons of worth and eminence, citizens of foreigners, and they at once acquire the character of patriots, among the many. I could have eaſily ſilenced their clamours againſt me, by a little gold; and even have converted them into praiſes: but I ſhould bluſh to purchaſe your friendſhip from ſuch wretches. To ſuch inſolence have they pro-

[x] *Peace is war, and war is peace, &c.* Ariſtotle, in his Rhetor. l. 3. c. 10, quotes this [nearly] as an example of an agreeable antitheſis: which, joined to the force, and, what is more, to the order of the arguments contained in this letter, inclines me to think that Ariſtotle was his ſecretary on this occaſion. But my conjecture, whether well or ill founded, does not detract from Philip, in point of genius and ſpirit. The true talent of a king is to know how to apply the talents of others to the beſt advantage. And we do not want other proofs of Philip's abilities in writing; witneſs his letter to Ariſtotle, on the birth of Alexander. TOUR.

ceeded

ceeded upon other occaſions, that they even dared to diſpute my title to Amphipolis; which is founded, I preſume, upon reaſons beyond their power to invalidate: for, if it is to belong to thoſe who firſt conquered it, what can be juſter than our claim? [Y] Alexander, our anceſtor, was the original ſovereign; [Z] as appears from the golden ſtatue which he erected at Delphos, from the firſt

[Y] *Alexander, our anceſtor, was the original ſovereign.* Philip aſſerts boldly, without giving himſelf much trouble even to preſerve probability: for in the time of Alexander, the cotemporary of Xerxes, there was no city, nor any fortified poſt, in the place where Amphipolis was afterwards raiſed: nor was it till thirty years after the defeat of the Perſians that Agnon founded it. TOUR.

[Z] *As appears from the golden ſtatue, &c.* Herodotus ſpeaks of this ſtatue, and places it near the coloſſal ſtatue, which the Greeks raiſed, according to cuſtom, out of the Perſian ſpoils. The proximity of theſe ſtatues ſerves Philip as a foundation for giving his anceſtors an honour which really belonged to the Greeks. Solinus mentions, that Alexander, a very rich prince, made an offering of a golden ſtatue of Apollo in the temple of Delphos, and another of Jupiter in the temple of Elis; but not that the Perſian ſpoils were any part of theſe offerings.——This Alexander, ſurnamed Φιλέλλην, friend of Greeks, had the reputation of an able politician, but not of a good ſoldier, or great commander. He ſerved the Perſians a long time, rather by force than inclination; and, before the battle of Salamis, declared, of a ſudden, for the Greeks. TOUR.

fruits of the Perſian ſpoils taken there. But if this admits of conteſt, and it is to continue the property of thoſe who were laſt in poſſeſſion, it is mine by this title too; (for [A] I took it from the Lacedemonian inhabitants, who had diſpoſſeſſed you:) and all cities are held either by hereditary right, or by the right of conqueſt. And yet you, who neither were the original poſſeſſors, nor are now in poſſeſſion, preſume to lay claim to this city, under pretence of having held it for ſome ſhort time; and this, when you have yourſelves given the ſtrongeſt teſtimony in my favour: for I frequently wrote to you upon this head; and you as often acknowledged me the rightful ſovereign: and, by the articles of our late treaty, the poſſeſſion of Amphipolis, and your alliance, were both ſecured to me. What title therefore can be better eſtabliſhed? It deſcended to us from our anceſtors; it is our's by conqueſt; and, laſtly, you yourſelves have acknowledged the juſtice of our pretenſions; you

[A] *I took it from the Lacedemonian inhabitants, who had diſpoſſeſſed you, &c.* Braſidas, the Lacedemonian general, took Amphipolis from the republic of Athens: and, by the aſſiſtance of Sparta, it afterwards maintained its independence, until it fell into the power of Philip. TOUR.

who

who are wont to aſſert your claim, even when it is not ſupported by right.

I have now laid before you the grounds of my complaints. Since you have been the firſt aggreſſors; ſince my gentleneſs, and fear of offending, have only ſerved to increaſe your injuſtice, and to animate you in your attempts to diſtreſs me; I muſt now take up arms; and I call the gods to witneſs to the juſtice of my cauſe, and the neceſſity of procuring for myſelf that redreſs which you deny me.

End of the LETTER.

* THE ORATION on the LETTER.

NOW, Athenians! it is fully evident to you all, that Philip made no real peace with us, but only deferred hoſti-

* It muſt be confeſſed, that this oration conſiſts almoſt wholly of repetitions. This great man ſeems to have thought himſelf ſuperior to all vain criticiſms; and, only concerned for the ſafety of Athens, was in no pain about his private glory. He ſpeaks as an orator, whoſe end is to perſuade and convince; not as a declaimer, who ſeeks only to give pleaſure, and excite admiration. He therefore reſumes thoſe topics he had already made uſe of, and gives them new force, by the cloſe and lively manner in which he delivers them. TOUR.

lities.

lities. [B] When he ſurrendered Halus to the Pharſalians, when he completed the ruin of Phocis, [C] when he overturned all Thrace, then did he really attack the ſtate, under the concealment of falſe allegations and unjuſt pretences; but now he hath made a formal declaration of war, by this his letter. That we are not to look with horror upon his power; that, on the other hand, we are not to be remiſs in our oppoſition, but to engage our perſons, our treaſures, and our navies; in one word, our whole ſtrength, freely, in the

[B] *When he ſurrendered Halus to the Pharſalians, &c.* Halus was a town of Theſſaly, upon the river Amphryſus. Parmenio beſieged and took it: after which Philip put the people of Pharſalia in poſſeſſion of it. TOUR.

[C] *When he overturned all Thrace, &c.* This is the language of an orator, who, to repreſent Philip's outrages with the greater aggravation, takes the liberty of ſpeaking of a part of that country as of the whole. Philip had indeed made himſelf maſter of the territories of Teres and Cerſobleptes, both kings in Thrace, and allies of the Athenians. But Pauſanias obſerves, that, before the Romans, no one had ever made an intire conqueſt of Thrace. TOUR.

com-

common cauſe: theſe are the points I would eſtabliſh.

Firſt then, Athenians! the gods we may juſtly regard as our ſtrongeſt allies and aſſiſtants: ſince, in this unjuſt violation of his treaty, he hath trampled upon religion, and deſpiſed the moſt ſolemn oaths. In the next place, thoſe ſecret practices to which his greatneſs hath hitherto been owing, all his arts of deceiving, all his magnificent promiſes, are now quite exhauſted. The Perinthians, and the Byzantines, [D] and their confederates, have at length diſcovered, that he intends to treat them as he formerly treated the Olynthians. The Theſſalians are no longer ignorant, that he affects to be the maſter, and not the leader of his allies. The Thebans begin to ſee danger in his ſtationing a garriſon [E] at Nicæa,

[D] *And their confederates.* The inhabitants of Chios, Rhodes, and ſome other places, joined to defeat Philip's deſigns upon Perinthus and Byzantium. TOUR.

[E] *At Nicæa.* This town was ſituated near Thermopylæ, and was counted among the principal towns of the Locrians, (Epicnemidii) the neighbours and allies of the Bœotians

Nicæa, his aſſuming the rank of an Amphictyon, [F] his bringing into Macedon the embaſſies from Peloponneſus, and his preventing them in ſeizing the advantage of an alliance with the people of that country. So that, of thoſe who have hitherto been his friends, ſome are now irreconcilably at war with him; others no longer ſerve him with zeal and ſincerity; and all have their ſuſpicions and complaints. Add to this, (and it is of no ſmall moment) that the ſatraps of Aſia have juſt now forced him to raiſe the ſiege of Perinthus, by throwing

Bœotians and Thebans. Philip made himſelf maſter of it at the time that he ſeized Thermopylæ, under pretence of putting an end to the ſacred war. TOUR.

[F] *His bringing into Macedon the embaſſies from Peloponneſus, &c.* Probably this was at the time when he intereſted himſelf in the diſputes between Sparta and the Argians and Meſſenians, as mentioned in the preface to the ſecond Philippic oration.——Strabo mentions an application of the Argians and Meſſenians to Philip to regulate a conteſt between them and Lacedemon about their boundaries. And Pauſanias declaims againſt the pride of Gallus, a Roman ſenator, who thought it derogated from his dignity to decide the differences of Lacedemon and Argos; and diſdained to meddle with a mediation, which Philip had formerly not only accepted, but courted. TOUR.

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in a body of hired troops: and [G] as this muſt make him their enemy, and as they are immediately expoſed to danger, ſhould he become maſter of Byzantium, they will not only readily unite their force with our's, but prevail upon the king of Perſia to aſſiſt us with his treaſure; who, in this particular, far exceeds all other potentates; and whoſe influence in Greece is ſo great, that formerly, when we were engaged in a war with Lacedemon, [H] he never failed to

[G] *As this muſt make him their enemy.* This proved an exact prediction of what happened ſome time after. Alexander, in his letter to Darius, alledges, as one of the principal ſubjects of their rupture, the powerful ſuccours which Perinthus received from the Perſian ſatraps. Arrian. L. I. TOUR.

[H] *He never failed to give the ſuperiority to, &c.* Hiſtory repreſents the king of Perſia as the ſupreme arbiter of the fate of Athens and Lacedemon, during the whole time of their quarrels. Darius Nothus joined with the Lacedemonians; and Lyſander, their general, deſtroyed Athens. Artaxerxes Mnemon protected Conon, the Athenian general; and immediately Athens reſumed her former ſplendor. Lacedemon afterwards joined in alliance with the great king; and this intimidated the Athenians, and obliged them to ſeek for peace. Artaxerxes dictated the articles of it, threatening to declare againſt

to give the ſuperiority to that party which he eſpouſed: and now, when he unites with us, he will with eaſe ſubdue the power of Philip.

I ſhall not mention, as a balance to theſe ſo conſiderable advantages, that he hath taken the opportunity of the peace to make himſelf maſter of many of our territories, our ports and other like conveniencies. For it is obſervable, that where affection joins, and one common intereſt animates the confederating powers, there the alliance is never to be ſhaken; but where ſubtle fraud, and paſſions inſatiable, and perfidy, and violence have formed it, (and theſe are the means which he hath uſed) the leaſt pretence, the ſlighteſt accident, gives it the fatal ſhock, and, in an inſtant, it is utterly diſſolved. And, from repeated obſervations, I am convinced, Athenians! that Philip not only wants the

againſt thoſe who ſhould refuſe to ſubſcribe to them. Athens inſtantly obeyed. Thus it was that a foreign power lorded it over the Greeks, and by means of their diviſions had the abſolute command of their fate.

confidence and affection of his allies, but, even in his own kingdom, he is by no means happy in that well-eſtabliſhed regularity, and thoſe intimate attachments, which might be expected. The power of Macedon, indeed, as an ally, may have ſome effect; but, if left to itſelf, is inſufficient; and, when compared with his pompous enterpriſes, quite contemptible. And, then, his wars, his expeditions, all thoſe exploits which have given him this ſplendor, are the very means of rendering it yet weaker: for you are not to imagine, Athenians! that Philip and his ſubjects have the ſame deſires. He is poſſeſſed with the love of glory: they wiſh only for ſecurity. The object of his paſſion muſt be attended with danger: and they but ill endure a baniſhment from their children, parents, wives; a life worn out with toils, and expoſed to continual perils in his cauſe.

Hence we may learn how his ſubjects in general are affected to their prince. But, then, his guards, and officers of his foreign troops: theſe you will find have

ſome military reputation: yet they live in greater terrors than the obſcure and mean. Theſe are expoſed only to their avowed enemies: the others have more to fear from calumny and flattery, than in the field. The one, when engaged in battle, but ſhare the common danger: the others, beſides their part, and this not the leaſt of that danger, have alſo their private apprehenſions from the temper of their prince. Among the many, when one hath tranſgreſſed, his puniſhment is proportioned to his crime: the others, when they have moſt eminently diſtinguiſhed themſelves, are then, in open defiance of all decency, treated with the greateſt inſolence and diſdain.

That theſe are inconteſtable truths, no reaſonable man can doubt: for they who have lived with him aſſure us, that his ambition is ſo inſatiable, that he will have the glory of every exploit aſcribed wholly to himſelf; and is much more incenſed againſt ſuch commanders as have performed any thing worthy of honour, than againſt thoſe whoſe miſconduct hath ruined his enter-

enterpriſes. But, if this be the caſe, how is it that they have perſevered ſo long in their attachment to his cauſe? It is for this reaſon, Athenians! becauſe ſucceſs throws a ſhade on all his odious qualities (for nothing veils men's faults from obſervation ſo effectually as ſucceſs): but let any accident happen, and they will all be perfectly diſcovered. Juſt as in our bodies; while we are in health, our inward defects lie concealed but, when we are attacked by a diſorder, then they are all ſenſible, in the veſſels, in the joints, or wherever we are affected: ſo in kingdoms and governments of every kind, while their arms are victorious, their diſorders eſcape the common obſervation; but a reverſe of fortune (and this he muſt experience, as he hath taken up a burden much beyond his ſtrength) never fails to lay them open to every eye.

If there be a man among you, (Athenians!) who regards Philip as a powerful and formidable enemy, on account of his good fortune, ſuch cautious foreſight beſpeaks a true prudent mind. Fortune,

indeed, does greatly influence, or, rather, has the intire direction of all human affairs: but there are many reaſons to expect much more from the fortune of Athens, than that of Philip. We can boaſt an authority in Greece, derived from our anceſtors, not only before his days, but before any one prince of Macedon. They all were tributaries of Athens: Athens never paid that mark of ſubjection to any people. In the next place, the more inviolably we have adhered to piety and juſtice, the greater may be our confidence in the favour of the gods. But, if this be the caſe, how is it that in the late war his arms had ſuch ſuperior fortune? This is the cauſe (for I will ſpeak with undaunted freedom): he takes the field himſelf; endures it's toils, and ſhares it's dangers: no favourable incident eſcapes him, no ſeaſon of the year retards him. While we (for the truth muſt not be concealed) are confined within our walls, in perfect inactivity, delaying, and voting, and wandering through the public places, in ſearch of news. Can any thing better deſerve the name of new, than that one ſprung from

from Macedon ſhould inſult Athens, and dare to ſend ſuch letters as you have juſt heard recited? that he ſhould have his armies and his orators in pay? (Yes, I call Heaven to witneſs, there are thoſe among us, who do not wiſh to live for Philip, who have not ſenſe to perceive that they are ſelling all the intereſts of the ſtate, all their own real intereſts, for a trifling pittance!)——While we never once think of preparing to oppoſe him; are quite averſe to hiring troops, and want reſolution to take arms ourſelves. No wonder, therefore, that he had ſome advantage over us in the late war: On the contrary, it is really ſurpriſing that we, who are quite regardleſs of all that concerns our cauſe, ſhould expect to conquer him, who leaves no means omitted that may aſſure his ſucceſs.

Let theſe things be duly weighed, Athenians! and deeply impreſſed upon your minds. Conſider, that it is not at your option, whether to profeſs peace or no; for he hath now made a declaration of war, and hoſtilities are commenced. Spare

no expences, public or private: let a general ardour appear for taking arms: appoint abler commanders than you have hitherto choſen: for it muſt not be imagined, that the men who, from a ſtate of proſperity, have reduced us to theſe difficulties, will again extricate us, and reſtore us to our former ſplendor: nor is it to be expected, that, if you continue thus ſupine, your cauſe will find other aſſertors. Think, how infamous it is, that you, whoſe anceſtors were expoſed to ſuch inceſſant toils, and ſo great dangers, in the war with Lacedemon, ſhould refuſe to engage with reſolution in defence of that rightful power which they tranſmitted to us! how ſhameful, that this Macedonian ſhould have a ſoul ſo daring, that, to enlarge his empire, his whole body is covered with wounds; and that the Athenians, they whoſe hereditary character it is to yield to none, but to give law to all their adverſaries, are now ſupine and enervated, inſenſible to the glory of their fathers, and regardleſs of the intereſt of their country!

That

That I may not detain you, my ſentence is this: that we ſhould inſtantly prepare for war, and call upon the other ſtates of Greece to join in the common cauſe; not by words, but actions; for words, if not attended with actions, are of no force. Our profeſſions particularly have always had the leſs weight, as we are confeſſedly ſuperior to the reſt of Greece, in prompt addreſs, and excellence of ſpeaking.

End of the ORATION *on the* LETTER.

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CONCLUSION.

HAVING thus far traced the progreſs of Philip's attempts on Greece, it may be no improper concluſion to continue the account down to his final triumph over the liberty of that country.

We have ſeen the Athenians at laſt exerting themſelves in a manner worthy of that renowned people. And Philip now returning from his Scythian expedition, in which he had engaged, when foiled in his attempts on Perinthus and Byzantium, found himſelf conſiderably diſtreſſed and harraſſed by the hoſtilities of Athens

Athens. To extricate himſelf from theſe difficulties, he formed a bold and ſubtle project of entering Greece: and ſo laid his ſcheme, as to make the Athenians themſelves the inſtruments of his deſigns.

By his intrigues he procured Æſchines to be ſent as their deputy to the council of Amphictyons. This was in reality of the higheſt conſequence: for no ſooner had the deputy taken his ſeat, but a queſtion was moved, whether the Locrians of Amphiſſa had not been guilty of ſacrilege, in plowing the fields of Cirrha, contiguous to the temple of Delphos? Sentiments were divided. Æſchines propoſed a view: this was decreed: and, when the Amphictyons came to take it, the Locrians, jealous of their property, and no doubt inflamed by thoſe who were in the ſecret of the whole deſign, fell on thoſe venerable perſons, and obliged them to conſult their ſafety, by flight. Such an outrage was judged to demand the ſevereſt puniſhment: and it was decreed, that all Greece ſhould join in inflicting it. But, when the army came to the place of rendezvous, their appearance gave no great proſpect of ſucceſs. His agents and partiſans then aroſe, and by their artful repreſentations

preſentations prevailed upon the Amphictyons to declare Philip general of the Grecian forces, and to invite him to execute their decrees. As the event was expected, his army was ready. He marched into Greece: but, inſtead of attacking the Locrians, he immediately ſeized Elatæa, a city of Phocis, of the utmoſt moment, as it awed Bœotia, and opened him a paſſage into Attica.

This ſtep ſtruck Greece with aſtoniſhment. Athens particularly received the news with inexpreſſible confuſion. The people ran diſmayed to an aſſembly, and called on their uſual counſellors to give their opinion in this critical juncture. Demoſthenes aroſe; and his eloquence was exerted to animate their drooping courage; by his advice ambaſſadors were ſent through Greece, and particularly to Thebes, to engage the ſtates to riſe at once, to oppoſe the Macedonian torrent before it bore down all. Demoſthenes himſelf headed the embaſſy to the Thebans. He found a powerful antagoniſt in Python, Philip's agent: yet, in ſpight of his remonſtrances, he ſo fired that people, that they at once forgot all the favours Philip had conferred on them, and joined againſt him with the utmoſt cordial zeal.

zeal. The confederates met at Eleuſis. The Pythian prieſteſs uttered the moſt terrible predictions, and threatened them with the ſevereſt fate; but Demoſthenes took care to prevent the effect of this, by treating her oracles with contempt; which he declared were dictated by Philip, and calculated to ſerve his intereſts.

This prince now ſaw all his arts defeated; and therefore reſolved upon an engagement, as his laſt reſource. He advanced to Cheronæa, in the neighbourhood of which city the confederates were incamped, under the command of Chares and Lyſicles, two Athenian generals, by no means worthy of commanding ſo illuſtrious an army. The next day, by ſun-riſe, both armies were in the field. Alexander, then but nineteen years old, ſurrounded by a number of experienced officers, commanded the left wing of the Macedonians. He began the onſet; and was bravely oppoſed by the Sacred Band *of the Thebans. On the right Philip himſelf commanded; where the Athenians made their attack with ſuch vigour as obliged his ſoldiers to give ground. The advantage was purſued with the moſt imprudent and intemperate heat. But, while the Athenians were ruſhing on without any order, Philip*

lip bore down upon them with his phalanx, and obtained an eaſy, though a bloody victory. At the ſame time, and with a like effuſion of blood, Alexander triumphed over the Thebans.

Thus were the confederates totally overthrown, and the liberty of Greece loſt for ever.

FINIS.

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